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CHAPTER 1 – INSTITUTIONS AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF COMPLIANCE 
WITH INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW 
 
Of the debates central to comparative politics, one of the most foundational addresses the 
conditions under which and the mechanisms by which the rules that individual state actors have 
implemented can be used to explain differences in outcomes among them. Rules enacted 
domestically toward any given policy aim are instituted so as to define and delimit the state’s 
actions with regard to the relevant aim. Yet the question persists – under what conditions is the 
key to observed differences in outcomes among states to be located within these rules, and by what 
processes do differences among these rules explain the variations in observed outcomes? Put 
somewhat differently, when and how do institutions matter?      
 Within successfully consolidated democracies, a second question follows – how do elites 
nest the rule construction game within the overall game of electoral survival? Are different 
institutions constructed with a mind only to the procedure to be defined, or does the possibility 
exist that states actively shape institutions based on the relative weights that elites may assign to 
factors such as the salience of the procedure at question, their own ability to shape public sentiment 
on the procedure at question, and the likelihood that they will be called on to pay any costs 
associated with overly “generous” institutions?          
 To address both the importance of and the mechanisms behind the construction of domestic 
institutions, I examine variations in implementation of international human rights law. Toward an 
answer to the first question, that of the institution’s relevance to observed outcomes, I look at 
human rights treaty adoption and domestic implementation. In adopting a particular convention, 
signatory states agree to afford protections in their role as donors toward a particular public good. 
Some of these protections are defined within the text of the convention itself, while more 
specialized protections will vary according to particulars of the legislative, bureaucratic, and 
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judicial procedures implementing the convention at the domestic level. Because an international 
convention may be held as a constant factor in analysis of the differences among state outcomes, 
variations in domestic rules regarding any given international human rights convention may be of 
use to analyze the means through which domestic institutions govern the differences observed with 
regard to how the relevant norm is pursued among different states. Under what conditions is it the 
institution that matters to compliance outcomes, and under what conditions do logical or temporal 
priors create structural hierarchies that effectively preempt the importance of the rule-making 
process to these outcomes?         
 Toward an answer to the second question, that of the specific forms that the institution will 
take as a result of political competition, I observe the domestic interplays informing the different 
shapes that relevant rules have assumed across states. Whether or not the institutions to be drawn 
will be of importance to outcomes, what is the end goal of the drafters’ process, and how will the 
competitive political environment affect the specific instruments that elites will employ to achieve 
this goal?                  
 As a test case, I examine the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 
1967 Protocol (UN 1951, 1967). The text of this convention and its protocol prove particularly 
useful to address the questions of domestic institutions for two reasons. First, whereas signatory 
states are obligated to provide many protections, such as immunity from prosecution according to 
the laws of the state from which the migrant has fled, and rights to reside, work, associate, and 
hold property within the country of refuge, to those deemed eligible, Article 16, Section 1 of the 
convention stipulates that decisions regarding which claimants will be eligible to receive these 
protections are to be determined by the domestic law governing the state to which the claimant has 
fled. Here exists the possibility that elites may adopt instruments intended to broadcast full 
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compliance with the Refugee Convention and its Protocol while simultaneously erecting 
institutions that have the very real effect of manipulating the number of recipients to whom these 
instruments may be extended. Second, this legislation is particularly amenable to addressing 
domestic-level questions of political salience, goods provisions, and cost acceptance vs. cost 
avoidance because the recipients of the good to be accorded (asylum) are, by definition, outsiders 
who may exercise no direct effect on the electoral survival of the elites charged with forging 
domestic institutional frameworks. This fact permits the researcher to hold constant an important, 
yet otherwise potentially confounding variable – the presence or absence of potential goods 
claimants among domestic electorates.              
 Because this study aims to contribute to the dialogue through an examination of 
institutional variation as an effect of elite concerns regarding their own political survival, I hold 
several further variables constant. First, I consider only multi-party, consolidated democracies. 
The objective is to examine inter-party contestation as a means to uncover the differences observed 
among state-level domestic institutions. Second, I consider a temporal domain spanning the two 
most recent pre-2010 election cycles within each state. This permits examination of the process of 
the construction of rules that remain in place to date within the majority of countries observed. 
Third, of the multi-party democracies considered, I examine only states housing electorates of over 
1-million. This permits the exclusion of microstates and states such as Malta, where the high 
number of potential asylum claimants may exercise highly disproportionate influence relative to 
that observed in other states due to the small number of voters. Finally, I examine only democracies 
with laws permitting access to the asylum adjudication process within the country’s territory, as 
opposed to the ability to file claims only at ports of entry. This permits a minimum standard of 
similarity in process among the state cases considered. Additionally, this limits the study to states 
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where the provisions of the Convention apply to the greatest number of potential asylum claimants. 
Holding all potential state observations to these standards permits evaluation of the mechanisms 
at play within 44 countries.              
 In framing my study in this manner, I intend to contribute to the dialogue in three important 
ways. First, I intend to speak to the domestic political interplays informing legislation defining the 
institutions behind asylum processing within democracies. How do the rule makers nest the 
compliance game within the overall game of electoral survival? Second, and more broadly, I intend 
to speak to the phenomena of cost acceptance vs. cost avoidance with respect to the implementation 
of human rights law in general. Are issues of public sentiment, direction of influence, and salience 
more accurately predictive of elite decisions on the final forms that full implementation will take 
across democracies than the current literature would suggest? Finally, I intend to speak to the still 
broader question – under what conditions and by what mechanisms can the rules of the game in 
question be shown to explain the game’s outcomes? To address these questions first requires a 
reconciliation of three separate dialogues within the literature: that addressing comparative 
compliance law, that addressing the pull and push factors at work within democratic asylum 
receiving states, and that addressing the role of electorate response to narratives as framed by those 
attempting to achieve or maintain power within the democratic context.            
 First, I briefly examine questions of comparative compliance with international human 
rights law. Of note is the fact that the primary questions that I consider are not questions of 
compliance politics, per se. The states I observe are generally agreed to be in full compliance with 
the instruments of the Convention and its Protocol, and where compliance observably lapses, 
informal mechanisms become erected on an ad hoc basis toward international-level shaming of the 
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non-compliant state.1 Instead, the question at hand regards the domestic-level determination of 
individuals as worthy recipients of the good afforded through the international convention and of 
the types of institutional machinations that, to varying degrees, inform effective levels of 
disimplementation of the provision of the good in question through domestic legislation that 
complies in full with the international normative standard.      
 Debates within the compliance politics literature notably address questions of democratic 
influence on norms adoption and implementation, the potential effectiveness of cost signaling, and 
the use of international human rights law as a “lock in” device at the domestic level. I begin from 
the premise that arguments surrounding compliance cannot be held as conceptually limited only 
to questions of ratification, accession, and implementation with the convention itself, but these 
arguments may also be extended to particular state-level determinants of domestic implementing 
procedures at the legal, bureaucratic, and judicial levels. Extension of these arguments to the 
Refugee Convention becomes particularly illustrative because of the extensive latitude granted per 
Article 16-1 to states in their determination of those worthy of asylum, as this is a process left 
solely to the domestic laws of each signatory state, notably without regard to any question of full 
compliance.                    
 Next, I examine the literature on the determinants of levels of asylum adjudication within 
democracies. Although this second body of literature assesses questions of forced migration 
patterns, of the varying tools that states use toward the goal of limiting the presence of the outsider 
while complying with human rights norms, and of the determinants underlying where asylum 
seekers will land and where they will likely be granted refugee status, these assessments are made 
                                                          
1 Examples of these mechanisms are discussed in detail in Chapter 3 as they relate to Greece and within Chapter 4 as 
they relate to Belgium. At this point, it is sufficient to note that these mechanisms significantly alter either the 
expectation of compliance (as in Greece) or the specific form that full compliance will assume (as in Belgium).  
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almost exclusively with an eye to their implications at the international level. In large part, 
predictions fall in line with subsequent observations concerning mass movements.  
 Third, I examine the literature on issue salience, policy framing, and direction of influence 
within the multi-party context. This third strand of literature becomes important insofar as it serves 
to frame the treatment of domestic political contests between those candidates and incumbents 
advocating for individual procedures, as this treatment is nearly absent from dialogues addressing 
the institutional importance and reach. To what extent may those in power score points with 
domestic electorates while still placating international bodies observing measures of compliance 
with the terms of what may be an unpopular obligation?    
Brief Literature Review*         
 The idea that the level of effort a state will expend toward the goal of honoring its 
international commitments will increase as a function of its level of democracy is well established 
in the literature. Smith (1998) and Fearon (1994) attribute a state’s ability to generate audience 
costs to vary with regard to the escalation of international disputes in a manner concomitant with 
and relative to indicators of the functioning of its democracy, and the premise that this ability to 
generate real costs both at the domestic and the international levels can be useful to explain 
outcomes varying from political survival to the democratic peace (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2005, 
Dixon 1994). For Dixon in particular, we see the beginnings of a logical argument – democracies 
will be less likely to escalate disputes because of their commitment to international norms.  
 Landman (2005) demonstrates observed limitations to the effectiveness of human rights 
law on state practice can only be observed when state levels of democracy, wealth, and 
                                                          
* Parts of this literature review also appear in the author’s MA thesis. Anderson 2011. Lingering Indeterminacy: The 
Domestic Political Causes of Global Asylum Seeker Distribution Levels. MA Thesis. University of Texas at San 
Antonio. 
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international interdependence are held constant, leading to the conclusion that rich, interdependent 
democracies are more likely both to commit to and to honor commitments to international norms. 
Landman attributes this to the fact that increases in these important variables combine to create 
domestic conditions that make a state better able to protect individual rights. The argument takes 
on an even more normative tone in Mitchell and Hansel (2007), who argue that the two primary 
factors informing levels of compliance are domestic state-level openness and transparency and 
propensity for enforcing peace, and that both of these factors are more likely to be present within 
democracies.                   
 Enter empirics. Democratic states do not show greater levels of ratification of or 
compliance with international law. For example, Powell and Staton (2009) show that among 
democratic state signatories to the Convention Against Torture, 78% had violated terms of the 
agreement in the very year of its ratification. Given the observation that democracies may not be 
prone to take on or live up to obligations, several arguments have been proposed toward the 
reconciliation of observed ratification / compliance levels to the arguments from logical induction, 
above. Moravcsik (2000) attributes differences between expected and observed outcomes to 
domestic “lock-in” mechanisms, whereby state ratifiers will agree to oversight on internal 
activities in order to ensure that the actions preferred by the siting government are written into 
domestic law while they are still in power. Farber (2002) and Mansfield and Peevehouse (2006) 
argue that democracies find the fact of treaty ratification to carry the expectation among other 
states that the signatory state will comply. This expectation signals an image of legitimacy on the 
international stage. Because of this, ratification becomes a signal of cost significant to encourage 
the type of trust among other states to inform greater levels of trade and investment, whereby 
fostering domestic economic growth.        
8 
 
 
 
 By contrast, Hathaway (2002) finds that mere ratification is a signal without real cost, and 
that it may instead be used as a tool to relieve international pressure with regard to changes to be 
made at the domestic level. As a logical consequence, instances of ratification or accession and 
measures of compliance must be held as conceptually separate because they are used toward 
different goals. Because undertaking an international obligation may constitute a signal without 
cost, states may accept provisions of treaties that they are institutionally incapable of upholding, 
thus providing means for states that may never intend to comply to forestall castigation through 
the implementation of cheap talk. The value associated with the decision to adopt the norm in spite 
of a state’s real ability to effect its intended outcome is shown to increase as its domestic 
enforcement ability decreases (Hathaway 2007, Powell and Staton 2009).           
 Although the literature above speaks specifically to the processes of ratification or 
accession and compliance, nothing inherent to the logic as developed speaks to a conceptual 
distinction between treaty compliance and procedures enacted domestically toward the 
implementation of the treaty. An understanding of this premise permits the examination of 
differences between domestic means of distributing goods in accordance with the text of an 
international convention and the domestic political interplays informing differences in compliance 
outcomes among state signatories. I take each in turn as it relates to issues concerning audience 
cost and preference signaling, to the uses of domestic policy toward locking in preferences, and to 
ensure political survival.               
 Domestic procedures instituted toward the processing, hearing, and adjudicating asylum 
claims have not been systematically analyzed. Instead, scholarship has evolved along three distinct 
lines. In the US, authors have preferred to examine the phenomenon through an international 
relations standpoint, with an eye to the use of the asylum decision process as signaling device. 
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Herein, asylum decisions, and refugee and asylum law in general, reflect the specific goals of a 
receiving state as it attempts to negotiate with other states on the international stage. Much work 
addressing instrumental aims of this type focuses on casting patterns of positive or negative 
decisions on individual asylum cases as political calculations – states attempt to signal policy 
preferences, both to the expatriate’s state of origin (Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004), and to the 
international community at large (Salehyan and Rosenblum 2008, Teitelbaum 1984). During the 
Cold War, this trend was easily demonstrable, both in law (Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004) and in 
practice (Lai 2003, Teitelbaum 1984), as the US and the USSR both provided political refuge to 
expatriates of states aligned, almost exclusively, with the rival coalition.            
 Fearon (1994) proposes that in order for preference signaling of this type to be effective, 
states that engage in the practice must be able to generate audience costs. The author’s logic is that 
talk is cheap – unless elites within a state can demonstrate that it would prove electorally costly 
for them to act according to the state’s adopted line, the state’s adopted line is significantly 
diminished in credibility and consequence. Because of a seated government’s vulnerability to 
changing views of its electorate, preference signaling through domestic policy gains credence 
relative to its level of democracy (Smith 1998).  By extension of Fearon’s logic, asylum decisions 
cannot serve as effective signaling devices because they do not generate public attention outside 
of the isolated communities in which asylees settle. The literature challenges this logic on three 
grounds.                      
  First, the decision to grant asylum suggests a pronouncement on the part of the receiving 
state that the sending state has acted in violation of international humanitarian norms (Salehyan 
and Rosenblum 2008, Pace 2006). The very ideal of asylum interferes with the nationality principle 
– those who seek asylum seek status beyond the reach of their state of origin, and immunity against 
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that state’s claim to exercise jurisdiction. In weighing asylum claims, a host state must make two 
judgments: what is the general political situation of the state of origin toward the group of which 
the applicant claims to be a member, and does the applicant belong to this group (Thomas 2008). 
In deciding the initial question, the receiving state is called to form a judgment on the internal 
policy of the state of origin, and the weight of this decision is well known to those charged with 
adjudication. Pace (2006) notes that such decisions become exceedingly difficult in states such as 
Austria and Switzerland; in order to be granted asylum in these states, the petitioner must prove 
country-of-origin complicity in his persecution. That a host state would offer such a 
pronouncement against the internal policy of another state, thereby calling its jurisdictional 
authority, and by extension, its sovereignty into question, cannot be dismissed as inconsequential.      
 Second, although electorates may afford little attention to domestic asylum policy, asylum 
policies and decisions are noted and acted upon through internal domestic policies of other states. 
For example, because of the strain of refugee and asylum-seeker inflows into Greece dating back 
to the late 1990s, its government has been unable to handle the number of asylum claimants 
present, and has violated the principle of nonrefoulement, pushed asylum seekers over its northern 
border into the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and its eastern border into Turkey, and 
has adopted harsh treatment practices toward those claimants remaining in the state awaiting 
asylum determination. In response, both Sweden and Finland have violated terms of the Dublin II 
Accord by refusing to return asylum seekers to their state of signatory community entry, in cases 
involving those who first entered the community through Greece (Amnesty International 2009). 
Subsequent ruling by the European Court of Human Rights (M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece 2011) 
has vindicated these state practices, based largely on Greece’s inability to deal effectively with its 
disproportionate levels of inflow. Also, Australia regularly places asylum seekers in detention until 
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their claims are heard, and this practice has invited international disapproval and debate on the 
floor of the United Nations General Assembly (Newmann and Taylor 2009). The 1990 debate in 
the US Congress over the fate of Chinese students’ return to China to face potential persecution 
after their visas had expired was decried by the Chinese government; the US was judged to be 
meddling in the state’s internal affairs (Weiner 1990).               
 Third, the possibility of implementation of asylum procedures toward the furtherance of a 
state’s domestic aims must be taken into account because it has been so blatantly and publicly 
advocated. For example, Teitelbaum (1984) notes that in his 1980 acceptance of the Republican 
Party nomination, Ronald Reagan spoke of the need to accept those fleeing communist regimes. 
Teitelbaum argues that although Reagan’s speech was couched in a rhetoric of American 
exceptionalism, his thinly veiled goal was the public-arena embarrassment of Haiti, Cuba, and the 
USSR. The first five years of the Reagan presidency saw a continuation of a stated policy, whereby 
refugees were defined as those fleeing from communist oppression.   
 Although not explicitly stated following the Cold War, similar considerations have 
continued to play a role in US asylum decisions. Rosenblum and Salehyan (2004) note that 
throughout the 1990s, applications from those fleeing non-U.S. trade partner states were approved 
at a significantly higher level than from those fleeing U.S. trade partner states. The authors 
conclude that the U.S. continued to observe the potential for public-arena embarrassment of states, 
and exercised extreme caution in cases in which a breakdown of trade relations could result.  
 For Pace (2008), this view of asylum decision practice is seen as a mere holdover of Cold 
War era policy. In fact, it is only within the literature specific to US asylum policy that this trend 
is still examined, although similar means for informing decision trends have been noted by human 
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rights organizations in countries such as South Korea.2 For the vast majority of receiving states, 
domestic concerns far outweigh concerns of the signal to be sent from receiving to sending state.
 While the literature on US asylum decisions continues along these lines, a second strand 
of literature has evolved over the past decade. Political economists have written extensively on the  
factors informing the destination preferences of asylum seekers within subsets of states (Hatton 
2009, Moore and Shellman 2007, Neumayer 2004). Whereas Hatton and Neumayer focus on the 
EU-15, finding the most significant determinants to be a state’s prior  history of positive first-
instance asylum grants and per capita GNP, respectively, Moore and Shellman focus on a broader 
subset of advanced post-industrial democracies, finding the most significant determinant to be the 
state’s year-over-year GDP growth. A third strand in the political geography and political 
sociology literatures observes the prevalence of state-erected impediments to grants of asylum. 
Mountz (2010) demonstrates several examples of “long tunnels” – geographic spaces primarily in 
Canada, but also in Australia, that are declared ports of entry upon immigrant arrival or 
interception. Domestic protections, such as access to a state’s asylum adjudication process, are no 
longer applicable on the basis that the migrant has not reached the state’s sovereign territory. 
Weiner (1996) attributes policy stances similarly hostile to the forced migrant to the emergence of 
or gains made by right governments within receiving states.            
 Although useful to the assessment of the decision preferences of and challenges faced by 
forced migrants, none of these strands of literature attempts to examine domestic determinants of 
asylum indeterminacy – the factor most significantly affecting the distribution of those counted as 
asylum seekers within various state borders. To answer this question, I look at domestic policies 
of individual receiving states as outcomes of state-specific processes, both at the level of interplay 
                                                          
2 South Korea is shown to reject a disproportionate number of claims initiated by Chinese asylum seekers in order to 
avoid diplomatic tensions with China (Lee 2010). 
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between states, as suggested in the first and second strands of the literature, and at the level of 
government / electorate interplay, as suggested in the third.        
 Essential to determine which pursuit elites will perceive to be more beneficial toward their 
electoral survival is an understanding of which course each state will value more highly – will 
those charged with the construction of the relevant rules judge it more expedient to score points at 
the international level or at the domestic level? At its heart, this may be framed as a direction-of-
influence issue; where masses are more receptive to elite cues on issues of asylum, we should 
expect for the respective government perceive it less costly to play to the international crowd. 
 Zaller (1992) proposes a framework by which responses to elite cue giving may be 
understood. Here, in such cases that a party in power is able to present to potential voters a unified 
stance on an issue of salience, individuals will take cues as a positive function of their level of 
political understanding. Levels of political understanding, or more specifically, of civic education, 
are also fundamental to the formulation of Kam (2005) and Slothuus and de Vreese (2010). In 
contrast to Zaller, the authors argue that with increased levels of education, voters are less likely 
to blindly accept frames set by the elite, but more likely to consider the overall ideological stance 
of the authors or proponents of these frames. Here, both elite frames and elite party affiliation 
(used as a proxy for ideological stance) serve as intellectual shortcuts for voters who are unwilling 
to investigate political claims – the less aware take the cue; the more aware take a decision on the 
cue based on the party affiliation of the cue giver. By contrast, Gabel and Scheve (2007), find no 
significant correlation between levels of civic awareness and electorate malleability, assigning less 
importance to authors following Zaller, on the basis that their models do not accurately capture 
mass predilections to adopt an understanding of issues as framed. Common to all three is the 
understanding idea that preference framing is inherently a top-down process.           
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 Party affiliation, or more specifically, party left-right orientation is at the center of 
Warwick’s (2011) contribution. The author argues that cue giving works in the opposite direction 
as opposing parties and coalitions shift their dialogue in pursuit of the median voter. Voter 
preferences are not shaped by the political discourse; instead, the political discourse is shaped by 
the elite according to estimates on the stance of the ever-elusive median voter. Carrubba (2001), 
does not attribute this bottom-up process to a pursuit of the median voter, but instead interprets 
elite convergence to weakly held mass preferences as potentially less costly than attempts to shape 
public opinion in the case of EU convergence. Carrubba finds support for Stimson’s (1991) “policy 
mood” theory, according to which elite perception of mass impartiality serves as sufficient to 
indicate that they are taking policy actions within parameters acceptable to the masses; crossing 
these boundaries would inform a decrease in public complacency in spite of low levels of civic 
education, so the elite must always be receptive. What the literature fails to consider is the idea 
that under various conditions at different points in time, any given electorate may be more or less 
prone to view issues as they are framed by those vying to assume or to retain power.   
 Serious questions arise for which models gauging cross-electorate quantifiable measures 
of mass predilections to elite cue giving would prove highly instructive at best; at worst, the 
absence of such measures is sufficient to cast a shadow of doubt on the conclusions of many 
studies. As an example of the best case, Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2003) 
argue that primary among the aims of political leaders is the desire to maintain power. To this end, 
leaders within democracies must provide public goods to citizens who are apt to wish to hold onto 
these provisions insofar as possible; mass preferences are merely assumed in order to maintain the 
simplicity of the model, and this assumption poses no threat to the model’s internal logic. Yet at 
the same time, elites are protective of the way they (and by extension, the states that they are 
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perceived to represent) are viewed within the international community. Powell and Staton (2009), 
find that states will take whatever action is necessary to effect de jure compliance with the norms 
set forth in international law in order to avoid pariah status within the community of states. The 
key here is that states will willingly sign onto human rights treaties with full knowledge that 
implementation of the terms of the treaties will prove fiscally untenable. Powell and Staton 
conclude that states will willingly encode the normative standard while intending to rely on 
internal weakness in order to bring about de facto noncompliance with the standard.  
 Here, following Zaller’s logic, the implication is that within states whose governments are 
able to present a unified front and are more protective of their status as proponents of international 
normative standards, the seated government will suffer greater electoral losses from attempts to 
bend to public sentiment than they would from attempts to shape public sentiment. Therefore, the 
provision of public goods may prove to be of secondary concern to political elites whose primary 
goal is the retention of power, and this calculation can only be taken under the condition that state 
actors are able to weigh the cost of attempts to frame the human rights dialogue in a manner that 
would permit them to save face internationally versus the cost of attempts to bend to public 
preference.                      
 A growing body of work within the international relations and comparative politics 
literatures has established itself following from the assumption that mass opinion is equally 
malleable across the universe of electorates within multi-party democracies. For most (e.g., Bueno 
de Mesquita et al 2003), this condition results from the necessity to simplify models of political 
behavior, and the error in logic is of little consequence to the results obtained. In other cases, this 
condition is fundamental to the logic of the model itself. For example, in his study on the conditions 
under which ethnic cleavages result in the outbreak of violence worldwide, Wilkinson (2004) 
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reports data on the timing of elections, fractionalization of populations, and numbers of riot deaths 
in order to test hypotheses drawn from  his overall theory – that political elites manipulate potential 
voters to incite instances of violence, and that these manipulations are based on elite calculations 
of the salience of the preexisting ethnic divide and the relevance of the potential victim group to 
the electoral survival of the party in power. The error here is in the underspecification of the model 
– in order for results to obtain, each electorate must respond in the same manner to elite calls to 
instigate. Failure to control statistically for this factor suggests that each electorate is assumed 
equally amenable to calls to initiate violence in response to the same cues. Had the means to obtain 
such a measure existed, authors pursuing research incorporating similar leaps in logic may have 
plugged this measure into their regression equations, controlling for varying levels of electorate 
malleability. The literature, instead, is virtually silent on the question.    
 To speak to this void requires an examination of three theoretically distinct, but interrelated 
possible input factors as suggested in the existing literature – electorate satisfaction with (or mere 
complacence with regard to) the party in power, electorate satisfaction with its role in government, 
and voter turnout. Anderson and Guillory (1997) propose that the first two concepts are 
inseparable. Voters who identify with parties to have recently lost majorities within elections are 
generally more disaffected by the mechanisms unique to their democracy; however, this 
disaffection varies according to the type of electoral model employed within their state. Voters in 
majoritarian systems, where winners are in more of a position to implement changes, will perceive 
less of an injury than those in consensual systems, where winners face a comparatively diminished 
practical mandate. However, when all voter preferences for their state-specific manifestation of 
democracy are taken into account, those in proportional representation systems register higher 
levels of satisfaction. Norris (1999) draws to a contrary conclusion – voters in majoritarian systems 
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tend to be the most satisfied, if not with the outcome of a specific election, than at least with the 
workings of the government itself. But more important to a measure of disconnect, these voters 
are much more satisfied with their role in government. The absence of a consensus is of little 
consequence, as both studies point to both the conceptual distinction and the inherent 
interconnection between these two variables.             
 Therefore, it follows that, depending on internal weaknesses inherent to a specific 
government, the perceived political instrumentality of policy framing (as a function of issue 
salience) and the direction of elite-mass influence, generosity in provision of the good of asylum 
may be artificially manipulated by political elites – while these same elites maintain full 
compliance with the Refugee Convention – toward the goal of retaining influence and power at 
home.    
Operationalizing Compliance: Length of Time to Final Status Determination  
 When playing to competing, and often, ideologically opposed audiences, hypocrisy is 
likely the most rational, most cost-avoidant strategy elites can take. This idea is captured in the 
title of Krasner’s (1999) work Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. For Krasner, a state will 
perceive the greatest benefit to actions that trumpet the existence and importance of an imagined 
sovereign ideal, while simultaneously acting to undermine the ideal as domestic and geopolitical 
calculations place this sabotage within leaders’ own domestic interest. This sabotage is possible 
because sovereignty itself is a fuzzy term, devoid of actual empirical meaning throughout its entire 
history of use, yet to invoke the term plays well to audiences both at home and abroad. The 
simultaneous embrace of and interference with the imagined sovereign ideal permits elites to avoid 
any cost that would be associated with the abandonment of the sovereignty myth as well as any 
other potentially important cost that would be associated with non-involvement in the internal 
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affairs of other states.          
 Full compliance with the instruments of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 
Protocol permits a mechanism for advancing a parallel hypocrisy. Whereas signatory states have 
agreed to provide access to the domestic adjudication system set up for granting claims, to provide 
a minimum standard of benefits to those whose claims remain pending, and to issue decisions on 
all claims heard, these states have assumed no international obligation to provide the determination 
of refugee status within a specified window of time. So, states may fulfill their international 
obligation by providing access, benefits, and eventual decisions, while simultaneously placating 
domestic electorates who may hold varying degrees of nativist sentiment by taking one of two 
courses of action – by denying claims, or by erecting or maintaining mechanisms that effectively 
extend the median applicant’s time in awaiting the final determination of asylum status.  
 Execution of this first course of action proves prohibitively impractical for two reasons. 
First, decisions to be rendered by courts or by bureaucratic review fall outside the purview of 
legislative action or executive decree, and second, each asylum case must be decided on its own 
merit. Although executives have taken action to reconstruct legal codes so as to make a positive 
affirmative asylum claim much more difficult to prove (as will be discussed in Chapter 3 in the 
case of Austria), executives and legislatures are forbidden within the text of the Convention from 
setting quotas on the number of affirmative claims to be granted.3 Therefore, only the judicial 
branch or other civil service branch charged with deciding asylum claims may exert real control 
over the number of claims that are granted after they are heard, and per the Convention, this is 
must be done on a strict, case-by-case basis.         
                                                          
3 Lists of safe countries are permitted in international law, although they are forbidden under the domestic law of some 
countries (notably Canada). For example, within the community of state signatories to the Dublin Accord, no potential 
claims for asylum status may be heard from applicants fleeing any of the fellow signatory states, Australia, Canada, 
or New Zealand.  
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 By taking the second course of action – extending the wait time to final status determination 
– a state avoids both of these obstacles. This is true even among states observed to be in full 
compliance with their obligations under the Convention.4 Also, because the relevant domestic 
procedural protocols must precede any individual asylum case, the restriction that state action must 
be taken on a case-by-case basis does not preclude the implementation of these protocols. 
Therefore, it is only through the use of this second mechanism, the creation and/or maintenance of 
institutions that have the effect of increasing wait times to final status determination, that a state 
may reap the benefit of full compliance while scoring points with domestic audiences who may 
prefer institutions that ensure a low year-over-year number of asylum grants.5 
Preliminary Hypotheses          
 The following hypotheses point to directional preliminaries.  Following the establishment 
of these preliminaries in Chapter 2, these hypotheses will be restated based on the results of the 
theoretical model and its implications.         
 I begin from the assumption that, in some states, the legislation adopted at the domestic 
level will significantly influence the time to final status determination within the state, whereas in 
other states, logical and temporal priors will create hierarchies that effectively render the 
institutional output irrelevant to the median applicant’s wait time.  In Chapter 2, I lay out the case 
that these priors are discretely structural – not as they point only (or even primarily) to differences 
in material wealth, but also as they work to create very real gradations both within and among 
                                                          
4 Within each of the states registering totals over 3.0 on the “Where should the institution matter?” axis and above the 
origin on the “How should the institution matter” axis to be developed in Chapter 2 (Austria, Canada, France, Greece, 
South Africa, Switzerland, and the United States), this course has been established on the basis of legislative action 
(in Switzerland), executive action (Austria, France, and the United States), or action by the fused executive-legislative 
branch within the strict parliamentary governments. 
5 I do not argue that the number of asylum grants needs to be politically important in its own right within any country. 
Instead, I argue that domestic audiences may prefer the maintenance of institutions that lead to low numbers of asylum 
grants for other reasons that may be of politically important. I develop this argument further as through the cases of 
Greece and Austria in Chapter 2, and of Belgium and South Korea in Chapter 3. 
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potential destination states in the exercise of power, the provision of benefits, and the access to 
appeals processes. Where does institutional output affect observed outcomes, and where does 
institutional output demonstrate no effective role beyond mere “superstructure”? Within the 
context of this question, structure is not understood strictly, or even primarily, in materialist terms. 
Instead, “structure” is used in reference to various types of hierarchical orderings within and 
among individual receiving states as these may render the rules far less relevant to observed 
outcomes. This definition of “structure” is entirely consistent with the classification of such 
authors as Gramsci, Poulantzas, as Bourdieu as theorists of structure, as each characterizes the 
decision-making procedure informing outcomes as nearly irrelevant to outcomes in light of 
hierarchies of dissemination, power, and capital in its various forms, respectively. 
H1: Along the continuum of states where historical, legal, and geopolitical factors indicate 
an increasing relevance of structural hierarchies, domestic procedural instruments passed 
and enforced in implementation of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol will 
prove progressively less predictive of the length of time to final status determination. An 
increase in the effect of the domestic legislation will be observable and measurable as either 
a positive or a negative function of the length of time over which the median asylum claim 
remains pending. 
The process by which the outcomes observed within the two classes of states – where the domestic 
institution is judged to be predictive of length of time to final status determination vs. where the 
domestic institution is judged not to be predictive of length of time to final status determination – 
must be measured differently because the goals within the state may be understood as different.  It 
is only where the domestic institution is predicted to matter to outcomes that either the 
prolongation or reduction of wait times to status determination becomes the factor of interest, as 
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these outcomes are uniquely attributable to the rules of the game (here, the relevant domestic legal, 
bureaucratic, or judicial codes) within the observed receiving state. The rules themselves may 
contribute to two discrete outcomes, and the outcome to which the legislation aims may be 
understood in terms of the political instrumentality of cost acceptance through the more immediate 
expansion of provisions vs. that of cost evasion through the more incremental expansion of 
provisions.   
H2a: Among states where the domestic legislation is predicted to influence strongly the 
median applicant’s wait time to final status determination, and where the configuration of 
calculations suggests the tactic of cost avoidance to prove more expedient toward the goal 
of elite political survival, institutional procedures will display the effect of lengthening the 
period of time over which the median claim will remain pending.  
H2b: Where the configuration suggests the tactic of cost acceptance to prove more 
expedient toward the same goal, legislation with the effect of diminishing the wait time to 
final status determination will be observed.    
Each potential configuration of calculations is embedded within a process. Therefore, 
discrete measures of individual input factors will prove uninstructive. In first disaggregating the 
question of distribution levels into two separate questions – where does the rule matter, and what 
does the environment of electoral competition tell us about the type of rule that will be drawn, 
maintained, and enforced – I take the first step in correcting this weakness within the literature to 
date, while also contributing to the larger dialogue on the importance of and the workings of 
institutions in general. I address this weakness by situating these two processes within two discrete 
decision-making frameworks. I report the specific decisions taken by each state within both 
processes by estimating the utility attached to each decision as a function of revealed preferences. 
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I map the summed estimates along two dimensions of analysis. This step permits the view of 
clusters of states as configured according to decisions taken within each process and to draw 
preliminary, testable conclusions regarding the pertinence of and the motivations behind the 
institution constructed.            
Plan for chapters to follow                                                                
 In Chapter 2, I situate these mechanisms within two simultaneous processes. The first is 
presented in the form of a six-stage, revealed preference decision sequence, which I model after 
the median applicant’s asylum claim process within each of 44 democratic countries. This permits 
identification of the presence and relative strength of factors that create relevant hierarchies 
among state decision makers. I establish each of these factors as inherently structural, insofar as 
each creates a type of hierarchy that I show to render the specific domestic institution more or 
less relevant to the outcomes observed. At its essence, it is a test of structure vs. institution at the 
cross-national level – where are factors that create hierarchies of a durability sufficient to negate 
the effect or the importance of the rule-making process on observed outcomes, and where can the 
rules themselves significantly influence observed outcomes? To effect a parallel examination of 
the domestic interplays within the 44 multi-party democracies, I construct a concomitant six-stage 
sequence examining issues of state ratification of  / accession to the relevant convention (here, 
treated as an element prior to state-level decision making), public sentiment, political salience, 
policy framing, and electoral outcomes over the two most recent pre-2010 election cycles.      
 I map the outcomes of these two processes onto a two-dimensional model. This permits 
identification of both the domestic political considerations among states adopting similar 
institutions but with vast differences in outcome due to the relative importance of structural 
determinants (the x-axis), and the motivations underlying the construction of the institution within 
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states where the rules are predicted to matter (the y-axis). The horizontal dimension identifies 
states where similarities in the domestic implementing legislation lead to very different results; 
The vertical dimension elucidates the division of states where the institution is predicted to matter 
most strongly to outcomes into two quadrants – the first identifying those states in which elites 
interpret instrumental cost avoidance through incremental gains as the more politically expedient 
outcome toward their domestic survival, and the second identifying those states in which elites 
interpret cost acceptance through more immediate gains as the more politically expedient 
instrument toward their survival.                
 Among the states where the domestic institution should matter, this division proves 
instructive toward an understanding of the length of time over which the mean asylum claim 
remains pending within the democracies observed, whereas among states where the institution 
should not matter, no similar prediction is possible. I examine the domestic legislation and 
provisions granted therein informing relatively longer wait times vs. relatively shorter wait times 
to final asylum status determination. The fact that domestic legislation produces real effects 
toward both numbers of pending claims across many cross-sectional measures and the amount of 
time over which asylum claims remain pending permits the possibility for a powerful examination 
of the question – under what circumstances is it the institutions that matter, and under what 
circumstances are structures that serve as logical priors to domestic-level rule making the 
determining factors?                   
 Examination of state-level input factors across both dimensions of analysis permits three 
preliminary conclusions. First, where the maintenance of policies less hospitable toward outsiders 
can be of use toward elite political survival, a state will implement mechanisms that have the 
effect of lengthening wait times for the median claimant’s final status determination. Second, 
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where advocacy for more generous procedures can be of use toward aims that are more relevant 
to the electoral survival of elites charged with the creation and maintenance of the relevant 
institution, a state may implement mechanisms that effectively reduce observed wait times for 
the median claimant’s final status determination. Third, where the convergence of domestic 
economic, geopolitical, and procedural considerations are sufficient to inform a strong likelihood 
that the state will be called upon to assume the costs inherent to its adopted instruments of 
compliance, the state will be more likely to adopt procedures in line with the predictions of the 
two postulates above; where these considerations converge to inform a likelihood that the state 
will not be called upon to assume the cost of generosity, the state will consider only the relative 
weights of the two considerations above toward their political survival as a function of domestic 
sentiment toward the outsider and the political salience of issues regarding the outsider. Under 
this second condition, elites within a state may be understood to have implemented more or less 
generous instruments into the relevant institutions as a form of cheap talk where they may expect 
that such cheap talk will not undermine their survival in office. Here, the domestic institutions 
become largely irrelevant, and structural priors serve as the primary determinants of levels of 
continued indeterminacy of final status.          
 I orient each of the three subsequent chapters within its own discrete theoretical context, 
through which I identify two ideal-typical poles of action. In Chapter 3, I examine avoidance of 
cost through two opposing mechanisms – instrumental action, and instrumental inaction. In 
Chapter 4, I first establish that only instrumental action may be of use to understand the 
phenomenon of cost acceptance, and that this action may be understood to follow more or less 
strongly from one of two discrete ideal-typical motivations – as a result of pressure from the 
international community, and as a result of pressure from the domestic electorate. In Chapter 5, I 
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examine differences in the manners through which similarly benign legal, bureaucratic, and 
procedural rules are sold by elites and are received by electorates and the international community 
under the condition that the institution is predicted not to matter strongly to compliance outcomes 
– either in response to the impetus to exert more liberally driven instruments, or in response to 
exert more conservatively driven instruments.         
 In Chapter 3, I identify two states that exemplify action toward the more common and 
more intuitive motivation in domestic institution building – instrumental cost evasion. Wait times 
to status determination are effectively increased by separate mechanisms, each driven by a 
discrete logic of expected consequences. While Greece funnels claimants through complicated 
bureaucratic institutions, in which asylum seekers effectively become lost in the process, Austria 
permits unlimited appeals of negative first-instance decisions over a ten-year period, during 
which time the claimant is granted the opportunity to live and earn a livelihood within the state’s 
borders, but are at the same time prohibited by a multi-lateral treaty agreement from leaving the 
state’s territory – both informing separate means of lengthening the time to determination for 
asylum claims. Here, the issue at question regards the domestic institution in its role to shift the 
cost of full compliance away from the state through the effective increase in wait times to final 
status determination.         
 Chapter 4 pairs two states that have in recent years implemented extremely generous 
provisions (all exceeding the minimums stipulated in the Convention), including guarantees of 
state-paid housing, translation and legal services, and medical benefits. I observe the phenomenon 
much rarer among democratic potential receiving states – the calculation of cost acceptance as 
the instrument judged more expedient toward elite political survival. While Belgium has adopted 
this tactic largely in response to international pressure in the effort to restore its status as protector 
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of human rights norms, South Korea has adopted guarantee in order to incentivize the filing of 
claims, whereby asserting control over its land and sea borders and its undocumented immigrant 
population within these borders.          
 In Chapter 5, I contrast two states for which I predict the institution to hold far less 
importance to observed outcomes. In Chile and the United Kingdom, comparatively benign 
configurations in institutional procedures and protections yield outcomes contrary to the 
predictions on the “how should the institution matter” question, if taken in isolation. Here, the 
contrast of interest concerns the ways that these effectively toothless measures are sold and 
understood – both by the domestic public and by international human rights observers. Here, 
institutions assume the form of cheap talk, which is sold and received at opposing poles; Chile is 
seen to set the example for liberalization in institutional output throughout Latin America, while 
in separate dialogues, the United Kingdom is judged to trail much of the developed world through 
the deployment of remarkably similar instruments. These configurations of institutions without 
cost are shown not to affect outcomes because both the instrumental output and the selling 
procedure itself are employed as if under the common understanding that structural hierarchies – 
not institutional output – will be the predominant determinants of differences in outcomes. 
 Chapter 6 relates lessons drawn from each of the three country-case comparisons back to 
the broader discussion of institutions. Although institutional analysis has numerous advocates 
across the social sciences, is the institution always the thing that best points to causal 
explanations? And if not, how can the concept of the relative level of importance of the 
institutional analysis be reconciled to the decision-making process itself? To what extent have the 
three separate decision calculi observed within Chapters 3, 4, and 5 created path dependencies 
that are of use to understand current debates surrounding asylum status, specifically as they are 
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playing out in 2016?  Can the decision-making process be rendered uninstructive toward and 
understanding of short-term outcomes for some potential decision takers, yet highly instructive 
toward an understanding of similar outcomes to others in a similar environment? And if this is 
possible, can either outcome become instructive toward an understanding of the path 
dependencies that these create within states over time? Asked differently, does analysis of the 
institution remain relevant, if not in terms of wait time to final status determination (as in the first 
case), then across cases in terms of the legacies of encoded procedures on the political importance 
of questions of asylum today? 
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CHAPTER 2 – INSTITUTIONS: WHERE AND HOW? 
The foremost aims of this work are to highlight and to lend some conceptual clarity to the 
questions of when and how institutions matter. In answering this question, I intend also to unite 
various research traditions within the comparative politics literature through examination of the 
titular question of Lichbach’s 2003 work – Is Rational Choice Theory All of Social Science? To 
do so requires a brief explication of the manner I use to organize these traditions through an 
understanding of the components of the rationality assumption. 
Demarcation of Research Traditions       
 Lichbach and Zuckerman (1997) examine three primary research traditions – rationality, 
culture, and structure. Lichbach, both in the essay concluding the 1997 compilation, and in his 
2003 work, holds that the distinctions among these three schools is located in the various 
philosophies governing authors’ conception of science, assigning each to a position as it conforms 
more or less strongly to one of the three ideal-typical exemplars. For Parsons (2007), this means 
of demarcation among the research traditions proves less than ideal for instruction for two primary 
reasons. First, it lacks clarity to such a degree that its primary result reads as unnecessary, if clearly 
unintended obfuscation. Instead, Parsons proposes that the only question important to an 
understanding of the delineation among research schools is the mechanism by which the 
independent variable(s) influences movement on the dependent variable(s) under consideration. 
Second, the Lichbach and Zuckerman framework completely ignores other theoretically possible 
explanations of causality. Only works focusing on solitary decision makers fall under the 
rationalist umbrella, works focused on culture are assigned to their own tradition at the expense of 
other ideational explanations of causality, works in the structuralist tradition encompass non-
materialist explanations which would be more accurately relegated to the rationality paradigm, and 
the possibility of explanation based on “psychological” motivations is completely ignored.  From 
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this understanding, Parsons develops a four-pronged  method of delineation among the research 
traditions, including the institutional (roughly equivalent to Lichbach and Zuckerman’s school of 
rationality, but permitting the possibility that a decision maker may not be identifiable), the 
ideational (corresponding to, but expanding on Lichbach and Zuckerman’s cultural designation), 
psychological (proposing that under any configuration of conditions, any possible decision maker 
would react in the same manner, thus making only analysis of pre-existing conditions necessary to 
understand causation), and structural (including only materialist explanations of structure). With 
this work, I begin to propose a distinct method of demarcation among the major research schools 
in comparative politics. The aim is to propose a key toward the resolution of the commensurability 
problem common among researchers working across different traditions. Following Parsons, I hold 
that the distinction among research schools can be best understood through the identification of 
the theoretical mechanism through which x is proposed to cause y.     
            Necessary to begin this examination is an understanding of the term “institution” as it is 
used throughout this work. I speak of institutional research as research that seeks not only to 
interpret causal mechanisms through an understanding of “the rules of the game,” but also through 
an understanding of the creation or choice among available rules. When understood in this 
manner, a reconciliation of Lichbach’s “rationality” paradigm and Parson’s “institutional” 
paradigm becomes clear through an understanding of what rational choice theorists call the 
“rationality assumption.” In its most basic form, the rationality assumption consists of three 
elements: the decision maker’s prior endowments (to include beliefs, values, capabilities, and 
limitations), the decision maker’s menu of possible choices among available instruments, and the 
decision maker’s expected or desired outcomes.      
 Proceeding from the philosophy that the goal of a scientist is the uncovering of causal 
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mechanisms behind observed empirical regularities, I substitute the term “institution” for the term 
“instrument” where the choice among available instruments takes the form of the choice or 
construction of rules that are intended to define or delimit future action.    
 With this understanding, identification of the form of analysis followed begins with the 
question – is the choice among possible rules of play useful toward an understanding of the 
outcome observed? And if not, why not? Where the decision-making process itself is of use to 
understand the causal mechanism behind the regularity we wish to explain, we have the role of 
institutionalism. Where analysis of the decision-making environment is not of use to understand 
the causal mechanism behind the regularity we attempt to explain, why is this? Where analysis of 
the decision-making process is uninstructive due to certain cultural or otherwise ideational factors 
that will cause possible decision makers to act in a certain manner based on their uniquely held 
predispositions, or where such analysis is uninstructive due to the fact that the configuration of 
endowments is sufficient to explain outcomes, we see two schools of research roughly 
corresponding to Parsons’s ideational and psychological, respectively. Where the decision-
making process is uninstructive because causation may instead be located within factors that 
create pre-existing hierarchies among possible actors within the decision-making environment, 
we see a school of research corresponding to Lichbach’s (although, not Parsons’s) structuralist 
school. 
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Table 1. Research programs understood with reference to the rationality assumption 
 
  NO  NO  NO  YES  YES  YES 
 Are the three  The decision  Ideational  Structural  Information  The historical  Analysis of 
 elements of  making  elements  hierarchies  on any two of  selection of  the identity of 
 the rationality  process   attributed to  present  the three  instruments  the individual 
 assumption  will be   the actors  within the  elements  remains  decision 
 used toward  uninstructive  by the author  community  permit the  useful to  maker within 
 an  because any  render the  of decision  prediction of  understand  the 
 understanding  actor taking  decision  makers  the third  observed  community of 
 of the causal  a decision  making  render the  element  outcomes,  decision 
 mechanism  would select  environment  decision-   even where  makers 
 studied?  the same  uninstructive  making   the  facilitates 
  instrument if   environment   endowments  understanding 
  all preliminary   uninstructive   informing this  of the 
  endowments     selection may  institution 
  were equal     no longer be  chosen 
      in place  
Type of  Psychological  Ideational  Structural  Rational-  Historical  Sociological 
analysis being     Choice  Institutionalist  Institutionalist 
conducted     Institutionalist   
 
 
Proceeding from here, an important goal of this work is the creation of a framework useful 
to an understanding of the conditions under which and the means through which the creation of 
the rule is of use to the interpretation of the outcome observed. Further following Lichbach, I hold 
that the tools of rational choice – here, the redefinition of the rationality assumption to substitute 
the term “institution” for “instrument” – may be successfully implemented toward an 
understanding of the conditions under which the rules matter to the outcomes observed. 
Unlike Lichbach, I develop a conceptual framework that relies heavily on the “as-if” 
assumption. This permits the imputation of the three elements of the rationality assumption even 
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to those questions for which no single decision maker is taking calculations. In turn, this imputation 
permits the estimation of utilities for each actor based on empirical observations “as if” there were 
a single decision maker acting according to these calculations.      
 I estimate possible utilities attached to answers to a common framework of theoretical 
questions for each of the country cases I observe, and I base subsequent decisions taken within this 
framework on the utilities estimated for each country case. This permits the placement of the 
mechanism of causation as either structural (reliant on a hierarchy among actors that will render 
the institution to be constructed irrelevant to the outcomes to be observed) or institutional (where 
the choice of and construction of the rules to be set in place to define and delimit future action and 
decision are of import to the outcomes to be observed). Thus, working from Lichbach’s (2003) 
suggestion, I begin by using the tools of institutionalism to determine the cases for which the 
elements of the institution to be developed will most likely be shown to matter. 
At its heart, this first dimension of analysis highlights the competition between the two 
research schools that rely differently on the fact that potential decision makers exist within closed 
communities of decision makers. The core question is one of the community’s role. Is the decision 
maker’s placement in a hierarchy of the community sufficient to explain the observed outcome, 
regardless of the institution to be drawn? If so, the decision maker’s placement is to be understood 
as structure, and analysis of the institution becomes less instructive to the uncovering of the causal 
mechanism behind the regularities observed. Alternatively, does the actor’s position within the 
community lend to a situation within the decision-making environment in which the actual 
construction or choice of the institution can be of greater use to understand the outcomes 
observed? If so, analysis of this rule-building procedure becomes the purview of institutional 
analysis.           
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 Whereas the first dimension of analysis I introduce is basically a test of structure vs. 
institution toward an answer to the question of where the institution should matter, the second 
dimension of analysis proves potentially useful toward an answer to the question of how the 
institution should matter. I submit each of the country decision makers to a simultaneous decision-
making environment, which I map along a second dimension of the model. The question here 
becomes one of the type of institution we should expect to see. In cases for which structure should 
matter more than institution, we should expect no prediction of the type of institution in place to 
be predictable based merely on markers of ideation. By contrast, in cases for which institution 
should matter more than structure, ideational analysis, here captured through preferences revealed 
through decision-making process itself, should lend insight into the type of institution that has 
been created through an understanding of the type of game that the institution-builder is playing. 
Thus, where the institution should matter, analysis of the decision maker’s ideation will permit 
the identification of the type of rule that the institution-builder will construct toward its goal. 
Experimental Framework 
The passage of non-self-implementing legislation6 at the international level permits an 
interesting, yet to date untested framework for analysis of the conditions under which and the 
mechanisms by which institutions matter. This framework is most clearly testable where signatory 
status is nearly universal, yet wide variation exists among the examples of domestic legislation drawn 
across signatory states. On its face, this permits examination of the question of the reasons behind 
differences among domestic laws in implementation of the same treaty. With the passage of time, 
this framework also permits examination of variation in the effects of the rules enacted at the 
                                                          
6 By definition within several states, all treaties entered into at the UN level are self-implementing. However, many 
treaties require action at the domestic level toward their implementation. For the purpose of this work, I speak of “non-
self-implementation” as the condition under which the terms of a treaty itself are not sufficient to bring about 
meaningful action toward the goal of the treaty without legislation to be written and passed at the domestic level. This 
distinction is important to the current work only as it relates to the country-case study of South Korea in Chapter 4. 
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domestic level – where do the rules matter, and where does the observed outcome seem to be 
independent of the rule constructed? Where is the issue covered within the convention politically 
important of its own right, and where can the legislation drafted be used toward ends not addressed 
within the convention?         
 Furthermore, restriction of the study to democratic states permits analysis of data within a 
construct in which elites charged with forging institutions are doing so with a mind to a common 
goal – the retention of political power. Following Bueno de Mesquita et al, I use this common goal 
as a control for the possible influence of psychological motivation. As each decision is taken by 
player within the state is held to be informed by a motive to maintain personal, party, or coalitional 
survival against the backdrop of a competitive, consolidated democracy, separate psychological 
motivations, such as those held by elites functioning within authoritarian, totalitarian, or 
unsuccessfully tested or consolidated democratic systems are excluded from the decision-making 
environment.            
 To conduct this test, I examine conditions within successfully consolidated, multi-party 
democracies in implementation of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 
its 1967 Protocol.7 Legislation following from this convention proves particularly useful to 
examine questions of the role of institutions within democracies for two primary reasons. First, 
although the text of the Convention itself outlines many responsibilities to be undertaken and 
observed within signatory states to those both seeking and having been granted asylum, the entire 
                                                          
 
7 All state signatories to the 1967 Protocol are bound to the terms of the 1951 treaty, regardless of signatory status to 
the Convention itself. The United States and Venezuela, although not signatories to the 1951 Convention, assumed 
all responsibilities under the Convention as ratifiers of the 1967 Protocol, and many states to have accepted 
responsibility under UN oversight for compliance with the terms covered within the Convention have since 1967 
acceded only to the Protocol. Examination of Madagascar and Turkey, the only two state signatories to the Convention 
not to have adopted the Protocol remains outside the scope of the current work, as neither state meets the criterion of 
fully consolidated democracy for inclusion in this study. 
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process for determining which claimants may be recognized as asylum seekers and which 
recognized claimants will be granted permanent or temporary status (and whether temporary status 
may even exist within the state) is left completely to the state signatory to determine through its 
own legislation. Second, the potential claimant or recipient of asylum within each state is, by 
definition, a non-citizen who may exert no direct influence over the electoral process within the 
democracy. This permits examination of the unique condition under which elites forge institutions 
that may be more directly linked to questions other than asylum status.8   
 To identify states meeting the best possible criteria for inclusion, I first create an index of 
potential receiving states using the list of multi-party democracies identified by Freedom House 
(2009). I then cross list this index with the list of states achieving scores of 7.5 and higher on 
Economist Intelligence Unit 2008 Index of Democracy (2009) in order to limit examination to 
only those states with proven legacies of interparty play and successfully consolidated 
democracies. Following the logic set forth in the U.S. case study in Salehyan and Rosenblum 
(2008), to restrict the examination to multi-party democracies permits a cross-the-board 
examination of states for which domestic inter-party play may influence the variables identified 
as causal to asylum-seeker inflows in Hatton (2009), Moore and Shellman (2007), and Neumayer 
(2004). Of these states, I examine only these hosting populations over 1 million. In restricting the 
examination to this subset, I am able to exclude state cases for which small population size may 
more significantly influence asylum policy preferences. Although many small states (e.g., Malta) 
do host disproportionately large numbers of forced migrants, a look at these states would 
necessitate analysis according to variables informed by the size of the population and the 
                                                          
8 This condition will be examined fully within Chapter 4 of this work; at this point, it is sufficient to point out that the 
question of how institutions matter may best be examined under the condition that those charged with forging the 
domestic legislation may judge themselves to be involved in the construction of rules to a different game. 
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government. Such an examination falls outside the scope of the current work. I further restrict the 
selection of cases to those permitting access to the asylum adjudication process within their 
borders, as opposed to permitting access only at ports of entry. This criterion is important to the 
distinction of those covered under the Convention and its Protocol vs. those explicitly not covered. 
Access within a country’s borders allows for the expectation that a potential claimant may have 
availed himself to domestic legal representation after arrival in the potential host state; where this 
is not the case, to seek legal advice prior to entry blurs the line between negotiated and un-
negotiated crossing of the host state’s border, and under the condition of negotiated entry, many 
of the terms of the Convention and its Protocol do not apply. The list of 44 states follows.  
 I report data on each of these countries along two dimensions of analysis. Toward the 
question of where the domestic institution should matter, I report data on variables useful to an 
understanding of the embeddedness of a configuration of structural determinants that may or may 
not preclude the relevance of the institution to be drafted. Toward the question of how the domestic 
institution should matter, I report data on electoral and procedural outcomes that serve to 
determine the type of politically important outcome the drafters of the institution may be 
understood to have pursued.         
 I estimate the utility that each state maker would assign to each of a series of decisions 
along two common sequences “as if” each state were taking decisions on each question as a single 
actor adhering to each sequence. I then map the sums of estimates for each state along both 
sequences onto complementary axes. Placement along the horizontal axis represents the degree to 
which the domestic legislation should affect length of time to final status determination; placement 
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along the vertical axis represents the degree to which the question of the length of time to final 
status determination accurately represents the outcome pursued by the potential host state. 
Where Should the Institution Matter? 
I create a decision sequence useful to understand the process by which pre-existing 
structural hierarchies may preempt the importance of the domestic implementing legislation within 
the 44 states observed. The question underlying each decision is an examination of a factor that 
creates a hierarchical ordering that is relevant to the issue of asylum determination status within 
the community of potential receiving states. Whereas orderings according to measures of material 
wealth are understood to form the foundational exemplars of structuralist argument, justification 
for the placement of each subsequent measure under the structuralist banner accompany the 
 
States meeting all criteria for inclusion. 
  
Australia Greece  
Austria India Poland 
Belgium Indonesia Portugal 
Brazil Ireland Romania 
Bulgaria Israel Slovakia 
Canada Italy Slovenia 
Chile Jamaica South Africa 
Costa Rica Latvia South Korea 
Czech Republic Lithuania Spain 
Denmark Mauritius Sweden 
Dominican Republic Mexico Switzerland 
El Salvador Netherlands Trinidad and Tobago 
Estonia New Zealand United Kingdom 
Finland Norway United States 
France Peru Uruguay 
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respective question in the paragraphs to follow. I model the decision sequence after the process 
undertaken by the potential asylum seeker within each potential host state. The sequence is 
represented in Figure 1.9 
 
 Material Wealth 
 
                                                                                Maintain Neglect 
 
 Openness Openness 
 
                                                               Yes No Yes No 
 
 Application        Sequence Ends Application Sequence Ends 
 
                                              Yes No Yes No 
 
 1st Instance Sequence Ends 1st Instance Sequence Ends 
 
                          Yes No Yes No 
 
 Sequence Ends   Extend Benefits Sequence Ends Extend Benefits 
 
                                          Yes No Yes No 
 
                          Appeal                                             Appeal  
                                                    Sequence Ends                                                    Sequence Ends 
                            Yes/No Yes/No 
 
              
                         Sequence Ends                                                        Sequence Ends 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Decision sequence. Where should the institution matter? 
 
 
                                                          
9 For the purpose of explicating the model, I include only brief descriptions of and justifications for the use of each 
variable. More detailed treatments of each input factor, to include the precise mechanisms by which these input factors 
work toward the understanding of indeterminacy of status, are presented in the Chapters 3, 4, and 5. 
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To estimate utilities at the first node, material wealth, I consider the factor shown 
Neumayer to assert the strongest influence on asylum seeker inflows – adjusted per capita GNP, 
as reported in March 2011 $US by World Bank (2011). I recreate the structure inherent to a ranking 
each of the 44 potential receiving states according to these figures, and report for each its 
percentage of the highest observed figure (Norway, at $US 55,420). The value each state places 
on the maintenance of its position within the material structure is reported as the value it assigns 
to its decision—to maintain or to neglect its current position. This is estimated as Log(percent of 
$US 55,420).10 For states reporting percentages at 50% or greater, the move to maintain yields a 
payoff equal to the value of its resources; for states reporting percentages at 49.9% or less, the 
move to neglect yields a payoff equal to the value of its resources. Estimates for each state follow 
as Table 2. The move to maintain is labeled M; the move to neglect is labeled X.   
 With the second decision, state players consider the openness of their borders. These 
decisions necessarily imply a hierarchical relationship within the community of potential receiving 
states; borders that are more open will permit higher levels of entry, regardless of the instruments 
written into the domestic legislation in implementation of the relevant treaty. Although a more 
perfect examination would consider levels of military and police spending on the protection of 
borders and the numbers of seats on international flights entering each state annually, such data 
are not available for many of the potential receiving states that I consider. In order to estimate a 
score migrants present in January 2011 whose resettlement had not been negotiated by the UNHCR 
or other human rights organizations. This number permits the consideration of the number of 
forced migrants who entered the state legally, as opposed to the number who entered illegally, and  
 
                                                          
10 For decisions taken at most nodes, where the logic of a decline in marginal payoffs permits, I estimate utilities 
along a logarithmic curve.  
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Table 2. Material Wealth 
 
Move I: M  
Australia   1.842 
Austria   1.841 
Belgium   1.820 
Canada   1.828 
Denmark   1.845 
Finland   1.804 
France   1.787 
Greece   1.716 
Ireland   1.775 
Italy   1.760 
Netherlands   1.856 
New Zealand   1.700 
Norway   2.000 
Spain   1.755 
Sweden   1.837 
Switzerland   1.929 
United Kingdom   1.811 
United States   1.916 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Move I: X  
Brazil   1.263 
Bulgaria   1.379 
Chile   1.384 
Costa Rica   1.295 
Czech Republic   1.635 
Dominican Republic   1.165 
El Salvador   1.064 
Estonia   1.538 
India   0.383 
Indonesia   0.668 
Israel   1.688 
Jamaica   1.115 
Latvia   1.502 
Lithuania  1.495 
Mauritius   1.379 
Mexico   1.403 
Peru   1.166 
Poland   1.519 
Portugal   1.638 
Romania   1.419 
Slovakia   1.601 
Slovenia   1.679 
South Africa   1.258 
South Korea   1.692 
Trinidad and Tobago   1.654 
Uruguay   1.367 
as such, serves as a proxy for the openness of each state’s border. I report the ratio of illegal entrants 
to the total of all registered entrants as a percentage of the highest observed ratio (Greece, at 
99/100). For those reporting percentages in the lowest third, thus suggesting stricter border 
controls, I assign the optimal payoff to the decision to deny entry; for the remaining states, I assign 
the optimal payoff to the decision to permit entry. I estimate each state’s payoff as Log(percent of 
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99).11 Utilities are reported in Table 3. A move of Yes is labeled Y; a move of No is labeled N. 
The sequence is terminated for those states taking a decision of No at this node. 
 
Table 3. Openness of Borders 
 
Move I: M     Move I: M     Move I: X        Move I: X 
Move II: Y    Move II: N    Move II: Y    Move II: N  
Austria 1.586  Australia 1.179  Brazil 1.233  Chile 1.171 
Belgium 1.715  Denmark 1.210  Bulgaria 1.319  Costa Rica 0.287 
Canada 1.383  Italy 0.840  Czech Republic 1.493  India 0.309 
Finland 1.298  Netherlands 1.182  Dominican Republic 1.884  Jamaica 0.000 
France 1.301  New Zealand 0.944  El Salvador 1.518  Lithuania 0.921 
Greece 2.000  United Kingdom 0.781  Estonia 1.321  Mauritius 0.000 
Ireland 1.568     Indonesia 1.868  Mexico 1.052 
Norway 1.385     Israel 1.265  Poland 1.091 
Spain 1.630     Latvia 1.653  Portugal 1.209 
Sweden 1.276     Peru 1.283    
Switzerland 1.332     Romania 1.451    
United States 1.360     Slovakia 1.575    
      Slovenia 1.455    
      South Africa 1.885    
      South Korea 1.834    
      Trinidad and Tobago 1.902    
      Uruguay 1.253    
 
For the third decision, the applicant (in a move by nature) decides whether to initiate the 
asylum adjudication process. A move of Yes yields the optimal payoff for the potential seeker; 
this is reflected in the report of the utility attached to a decision of Y as Log(100). This is shown 
in Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 I do not suggest that there is an observable empirical difference between states registering totals at 33.3% and 33.4% 
of the baseline total. Detailed treatment of the justification behind the 1/3 threshold follows in Chapter 5. 
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Table 4. Initiate Adjudication Process 
 
Move I: M  
Move II: Y  
Move III: Y  
Austria 2.000 
Belgium 2.000 
Canada 2.000 
Finland 2.000 
France 2.000 
Greece 2.000 
Ireland 2.000 
Norway 2.000 
Spain 2.000 
Sweden 2.000 
Switzerland 2.000 
United States 2.000 
 
   Move I: X  
   Move II: Y  
   Move III: Y  
Brazil 2.000 
Bulgaria 2.000 
Czech Republic 2.000 
Dominican Republic 2.000 
El Salvador 2.000 
Estonia 2.000 
Indonesia 2.000 
Israel 2.000 
Latvia 2.000 
Peru 2.000 
Romania 2.000 
Slovakia 2.000 
Slovenia 2.000 
South Africa 2.000 
South Korea 2.000 
Trinidad and Tobago 2.000 
Uruguay 2.000 
 
For the fourth decision, the judicial or bureaucratic body responsible for adjudicating 
asylum claims issues formal ruling on the applicant’s case. As Hatton (2008) demonstrates, a 
state’s history of asylum grants on first-instance is predictive of both the number of applications it 
will receive in subsequent years and its tendency to approve affirmative claims in subsequent 
years. Following this logic, a record of past formal judicial or bureaucratic rulings will be useful 
to estimate a state’s utility in granting affirmative asylum.12 I rank states according to average 
observed first-instance recognition rates, beginning in 2001 (the first year for which data are 
available) through the year of the first pre-2010 election observed for each state, as recorded in 
                                                          
12 I consider only affirmative asylum claims, which are defined as those initiated by the applicant following entry and 
not initiated as a result of deportation action on the part of the state. 
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UNHCR annual statistical yearbooks. I report each state-level payoff as Log(percent of 96) – the 
first-instance approval rating for Israel, the highest-ranked state. Utilities are reported in Table 5. 
The sequence terminates for the five states taking a decision of Y at this node.   
 
Table 5. First-Instance Decision 
 
Move I: M   Move I: X           Move I: X  
Move II: Y   Move II: Y           Move II: Y  
Move III: Y   Move III: Y           Move III: Y  
Move IV: N   Move IV: N           Move IV: Y  
Austria 1.235  Brazil  1.600  Dominican Republic 1.995 
Belgium 1.248  Bulgaria  0.598  Indonesia 2.000 
Canada 1.694  Czech Republic  1.338  Israel 2.000 
Finland 0.810  El Salvador  1.665  Peru 1.771 
France 1.051  Estonia  1.416  Slovenia 1.821 
Greece 0.248  Latvia  1.148    
Ireland 0.273  Romania  1.097    
Norway 1.378  Slovakia  0.831    
Spain 1.055  South Korea  1.278    
South Africa 0.774  Trinidad and Tobago  1.148    
Sweden 0.947  Uruguay  1.173    
Switzerland 1.552        
United States 1.680        
  
The state then takes the decision whether to grant benefits to the denied applicant. I begin 
with the process taken in UNHCR’s annual Statistical Yearbooks for reports of each state’s per 
capita GDP. Following from the logic that a state with higher levels of per capita assets will be 
able to support higher numbers of asylum seekers, UNHCR reports for each state the number of 
asylum seekers present per US$1 per capita GDP. Because per capita GNP has been shown a more 
significant indicator of the distribution of asylum seekers, I first take the number present per US$1 
of this figure. I rank each potential receiving state in descending order. South Africa emerges as 
an obvious outlier; whereas all other states derive a score between 0 and 2, South Africa derives a 
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score of 22.85. For this reason, I exclude South Africa from the calculation. I report each state’s 
score as a percentage of the score for the second highest state (Greece, which I report as 100; I use 
the score of 100 for South Africa as well). Following UNHCR logic, higher figures will correlate 
to higher monetary costs associated with granting benefits, but at the same time, these higher 
figures will correlate to greater costs imposed by the international community for not granting 
benefits. For this reason, I divide the list in two, differentiating the states reporting per capita GNP 
at or above the mean from states reporting per capita GNP below the mean. I assume that states in 
the first list, because of higher income, will display a greater concern toward the maintenance of 
humanitarian norms, whereas states in the second list will find this concern more costly. I again 
make an exception in the case of South Africa. Because of its history of pariah status in the 
community of states, and because of the reforms it has taken to guarantee the de jure rights of 
asylum seekers (Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa 2009), I count South 
Africa among the high per capita GNP states. For the states in the first list, I report the logarithmic 
function of the derived percentage; for states in the second list, I report the logarithmic function of 
100-minus the derived percentage. For Jamaica and Mauritius, which held no asylum seekers in 
January 2011, and therefore, for which no log could be calculated, I report a score equal to that of 
Estonia— the state for which I observe the lowest function of the low per capita GNP states. I 
estimate each state’s reported function as the value it places on a positive decision to grant benefits. 
This is represented in Table 6.         
 For the final decision, I mirror the applicant’s procedure for proceeding with a denied claim 
with a report of each state’s utility in granting an appeal to the denied claimant. Because the right 
to appeal is embedded within the text of the Convention, I report a total equal to Log(100) for each 
state signatory. This is shown in Table 7. 
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Table 6. Extend Benefits
Move I: M  
Move II: Y  
Move III: Y  
Move IV: N  
Move V: Y  
Austria 1.538 
Belgium 1.412 
Canada 1.850 
Finland 0.478 
France 1.869 
Greece 2.000 
Ireland 0.904 
Norway 1.066 
Spain 0.649 
South Africa 2.000 
Sweden 1.403 
Switzerland 1.151 
United States 0.852 
Move I: X 
 
Move II: Y  
Move III: Y  
Move IV: N  
Move V: Y  
Brazil 0.647 
Bulgaria 0.741 
Czech Republic 0.362 
El Salvador 1.097 
Estonia -1.568 
Latvia -0.808 
Romania 0.140 
Slovakia -0.205 
South Korea 0.131 
Trinidad and Tobago -0.675 
Uruguay -0.795 
  
A state’s summed total of estimates will be of use to an understanding of the conditions 
under which the institution in place within the state should permit an understanding of the asylum 
outcomes within the state, specifically as these relate to the median applicant’s wait time to final 
status determination.  The summed utilities are centered on the mean and reported in Figure 2, 
below.
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Table 7. Appeal     
     
Move I. M   Move I: X  
Move II. Y   Move II: Y  
Move III: Y   Move III: Y  
Move IV: N   Move IV: N  
Move: Y   Move V: Y  
Austria 2.000  Brazil 2.000 
Belgium 2.000  Bulgaria 2.000 
Canada 2.000  Czech Republic 2.000 
Finland 2.000  El Salvador 2.000 
France 2.000  Estonia 2.000 
Greece 2.000  Latvia 2.000 
Ireland 2.000  Romania 2.000 
Norway 2.000  Slovakia 2.000 
Spain 2.000  South Korea 2.000 
South Africa 2.000  Trinidad and Tobago 2.000 
Sweden 2.000  Uruguay 2.000 
Switzerland 2.000    
United States 2.000    
     
 
 
How Should the Institution Matter? 
 
Along this dimension of analysis, the goal is twofold. Among states registering the highest sums 
of expected utilities on the “where does the institution matter” scale, measures of adoption of the 
relevant convention, electoral outcomes, and the means incorporated within each state toward the 
implementation of its goals will be of use to determine the specifics of the implementing 
legislation enacted at the domestic level. Among states registering the lowest sums of expected 
utilities on the “where does the institution matter” scale, no similar prediction of instruments to 
have been employed within the domestic legislation should be possible. The decision sequence 
is represented in Figure 3. 
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Figure 2. Where Should the Institution Matter? Estimates are centered on the mean value. 
 
 
          At the initial node, I assign to the seated government within each of the 44 multi-party 
democracies states a payoff estimated as Log(100) according to its ratification of or accession to 
either the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol. I hold further decisions taken only by state 
signatories to either of the two UN directives to inform the state’s position relative to others as one 
of asylum. Therefore, I continue the sequence into the second node only for states collecting the   
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 Adopt Norms 
 
                                                                                                                             Yes No 
 
 Direction of Influence Face International Scrutiny 
 
                                                                             Top-Down Bottom-Up 
 
          Reelect Reelect Sequence Ends 
 
                                                                        Yes/No                        Yes/No 
 
                                                                        Election Result              Expand 
 
                 No Yes 
   
                                                               Election Result           Sequence Ends   Saleability 
                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                  High/Low 
 
                                                                                Reelect                              Reelect   
 
                       Yes/No                                       Yes/No  
 
 
 
                                                                       Sequence Ends                          Sequence Ends  
 
 
Figure 3. Decision sequence. What Institution Should We Expect? 
 
 
optimal payoff for the decision to maintain signatory status.               
   For the 41 states remaining to take a second decision, I assign a payoff to each 
government according to its tendency to elite cue giving. A state will, ceteris paribus, prefer not 
to increase the number of asylum applications because of the fiscal and potential diplomatic costs 
of hosting escapees. However, the government level decision at this node depends greatly on the 
ability of the seated government to shape the view of the electorate in accordance with its own 
preferences. 
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Table 8. Commitment to the Adoption of Norms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to estimate a measure of this ability, I consider two scores for each state as reported in 
Economist Intelligence Unit Index of Democracy 2010, which I compound with measures of 
electoral participation as reported by International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (2009).          
 This permits a ranking of states which yields the highest scores for those observing the 
lowest level of disconnect between the electorate’s satisfaction with its participation rate, and its 
actual observed participation rate. In the absence of more precise measures of electorate 
malleability and of the salience of issues pertaining to forced migrants present within each country, 
Move I: Y      Move I: N  
Australia 2.000     India 2.000 
Austria 2.000  Lithuania 2.000  Indonesia 2.000 
Belgium 2.000  Mexico 2.000  Mauritius 2.000 
Brazil 2.000  Netherlands 2.000    
Bulgaria 2.000  New Zealand 2.000    
Canada 2.000  Norway 2.000    
Chile 2.000  Peru 2.000    
Costa Rica 2.000  Poland 2.000    
Czech Republic 2.000  Portugal 2.000    
Denmark 2.000  Romania 2.000    
Dominican Republic 2.000  Slovakia 2.000    
El Salvador 2.000  Slovenia 2.000    
Estonia 2.000    South Africa 2.000    
Finland 2.000  South Korea 2.000    
France 2.000  Spain 2.000    
Greece 2.000  Sweden 2.000    
Ireland 2.000  Switzerland 2.000    
Israel 2.000  Trinidad and Tobago 2.000    
Italy 2.000  United Kingdom 2.000    
Jamaica 2.000  United States 2.000    
Latvia 2.000  Uruguay 2.000    
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I assume that states with higher scores will host populations less averse to elite cue giving in 
general, and therefore, respective governments will incur less of a cost for enacting policies, either 
friendly or unfriendly to asylum seekers. Elites in these states may then implement action toward 
the construction of institutions under the expectation that electorates will understand asylum issues 
as framed.           
 For each state, I calculate a percentage of the high score (Italy, at 88.43). In an atmosphere 
in which the political survival is primary goal of the elected government, the ability to act in 
defiance of public preference must be reserved for those states for which only the highest scores 
are reported. I assign the optimal utility for the decision not to increase applications in all states 
for which scores do not reach 95% of Italy’s reported score. I assign the condition of top-down 
direction of influence only to the five states (Italy, plus Austria, Denmark, Latvia, and New 
Zealand) meeting the 95% threshold. Because the system of preferences here varies according to 
a state’s status as holder of top scores, the logic of a decline in marginal utilities cannot apply. I 
report each state’s optimal-move utility as the derived percentage, multiplied by 0.02. This is 
reported in Table 9.           
 For the third decision, the electorate chooses whether or not to reseat the government. I 
observe the second pre-2010 election campaign in each of the 41 remaining multi-party 
democracies. Of these, 32 are parliamentary democracies; I estimate state-specific payoffs as a 
function of a party’s resulting representation in office. Because the emergence of right 
governments has been shown to correlate positively to measures of nativist sentiment (Weiner, 
1998), where specific policy pronouncements are not available, I consider election of right parties 
and coalitions over left parties and coalitions in such states for which coalitions containing nativist 
parties hold no legislative seats. This permits the continuation of the decision sequence for all  
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Table 9. Direction of Influence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
states observed. For the nine presidential democracies, I estimate government payoffs according 
to outcomes of the second pre-2010 legislative election. Of the states I observe, only Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico, United States and Uruguay host bicameral legislatures; I consider election to the lower 
house in each of these cases.           
 In order to standardize state-level scores without regard to the specific decision taken, I 
estimate government payoffs as a function of the positive or negative gain in legislative seats 
within each state. For the electorate within states which moved at the previous node according to 
a low propensity to elite cue giving, I compound the percentage of the vote with a 1-100 score 
derived as the percentage of citizens who identified immigrants and foreign workers among those 
 
Move I: Y   Move I: Y     
Move II: T-D   Move II: B-U     
Austria 1.942  Australia 1.602  Mexico 1.468 
Denmark 1.939  Belgium 1.649  Netherlands 1.794 
Italy 2.000  Brazil 1.702  Norway 1.753 
Latvia 1.921  Bulgaria 1.794  Peru 1.853 
New Zealand 1.903  Canada 1.461  Poland 1.507 
   Chile 1.622  Portugal 1.607 
   Costa Rica 1.732  Romania 1.701 
   Czech Republic 1.819  Slovakia 1.817 
   Dominican Republic 1.697  Slovenia 1.768 
   El Salvador 1.555  South Africa 1.891 
   Estonia 1.645  South Korea 1.482 
   Finland 1.727  Spain 1.779 
   France 1.660  Sweden 1.843 
   Greece 1.897  Switzerland 1.055 
   Ireland 1.646  Trinidad and Tobago 1.692 
   Israel 1.691  United Kingdom 1.652 
   Jamaica 1.644  United States 1.452 
   Lithuania 1.612  Uruguay 1.649 
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whom they would not wish to have as neighbors as reported in the Four Waves Aggregate of 
Values reported by World Values Survey. For these states, I report mean values where survey data 
are not available. The compounded figure is reported as a percentage of the highest observed total 
(Romania, at 21.8%), and the payoff is reported as Log(percent of 21.8). This is shown in Table 
10.              
 
Table 10. First Election Cycle / Xenophobic Sentiment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
            
 Along the two branches down which the sequence continues to the fourth node, separate 
considerations are taken by potential receiving states. For those states having reelected 
governments under the condition of top-down influence, the decision at this node is based solely 
on electoral data. By winning seats in the legislative body, elites casts may gauge the level at which 
Move I: Y   Move I: Y     
Move II: T-D   Move II: B-U     
Move III: Y/N  Move III: Y/N     
Austria 1.475  Australia  1.125  Mexico 1.846 
Denmark 1.591  Belgium  1.602  Netherlands 1.423 
Italy 1.545  Brazil  0.962  Norway 1.262 
Latvia 1.230  Bulgaria  1.850  Peru 1.468 
New Zealand 1.691  Canada  1.207  Poland 1.979 
   Chile  1.438  Portugal 1.043 
   Costa Rica  1.420  Romania 1.842 
   Czech Republic  1.749  Slovakia 1.693 
   Dominican Republic  1.660  Slovenia 1.787 
   El Salvador  1.567  South Africa 2.000 
   Estonia  1.856  South Korea 1.511 
   Finland  1.390  Spain 1.184 
   France  1.572  Sweden 0.944 
   Greece  1.502  Switzerland 1.239 
   Ireland  1.041  Trinidad and Tobago 1.552 
   Israel  1.052  United Kingdom 1.511 
   Jamaica  1.999  United States 1.240 
   Lithuania  1.735  Uruguay 1.467 
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their frames have been accepted by the voting public. The state’s utility, having first been 
calculated as a function of its propensity to influence public sentiment, is validated as a result of 
the election. This is reported as the confidence of the electorate in the government as measured by 
the number of legislative seats won by parties holding similar positions, as a percentage of the 
greatest electoral victory. For those states having reelected governments under the condition of 
bottom-up influence, the decision at this node is one of mechanism: does the state perceive a 
practical ability to avoid the cost of full compliance through the expansion of its bureaucracy?  
 I embed the assumption that states that have established histories of using the public sector 
to foster job growth will prefer to reap the dual benefit of appearing to comply with humanitarian 
norms while essentially losing the potential asylum claimant within the very machinery it 
implements to create jobs. I report the percentage of the vote-eligible public employed by the 
public sector, as calculated as the average of totals reported annually from the year prior to the 
first observed election through 2009 by International Labour Organization. Because measures of 
the efficiency of a state’s bureaucracy are shown to correlate positively to the number of years it 
has been in place and to contiguity with states successfully utilizing the public sector, I compound 
this percentage with a dichotomous variable, derived according to the following procedure. 
 For states whose public sectors were successfully consolidated or which share a land border 
with states whose public sectors were successfully consolidated according to the criteria set forth 
in Gunther, Puhle, and Diamandouros (1995) in the year of the first observed election, I assign a 
score of 0.5; for states meeting neither criterion, I report a score of 1.13 I assign the optimal payoff 
to the decision to impede progress toward final status determination for those states whose scores 
meet or exceed the mean reported score. For states at or above the mean score (65.1% of 
                                                          
13 Calculations and criteria considered in calculating this dichotomous interaction variable are discussed in Appendix 
2.  
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Lithuania’s 30.1%, held by Costa Rica), I report the optimal payoff as Log(percent of 30.1); for 
states registering totals below the mean score, I report 1-Log(percent of 30.1). This is shown in 
Table 11. Because the perception of a practical means to avoid the full potential cost of compliance 
through the expansion of the public sector is comparatively absent within states at the lower end 
of this measure, I terminate the decision sequence for these states.     
 
Table 11. Election Data / Ability to Expand Bureaucracy 
 
 
 
 
Move I: Y   Move I: Y   Move I: Y   
Move II: T-D   Move II: B-U   Move II: B-U   
Move III: Y/N   Move III: Y/N  Move III: Y/N   
Move IV: E   Move IV: -   Move IV: X   
Austria  1.475  Belgium 1.821  Australia   1.768 
Denmark  1.591  Czech Republic 1.719  Brazil   1.857 
Italy  1.545  Estonia 1.826  Bulgaria   1.738 
Latvia  1.230  Finland 1.838  Canada   1.710 
New Zealand  1.691  Jamaica 1.745  Chile   1.908 
    Lithuania 2.000  Costa Rica   1.813 
    Netherlands 1.828  Dominican Republic   1.861 
    Norway 1.957  El Salvador   1.946 
    Poland 1.857  France   1.768 
    Portugal 1.745  Greece   1.859 
    Romania 1.771  Ireland   1.730 
    Slovakia 1.845  Israel   1.760 
    Slovenia 1.883  Mexico   1.823 
    South Korea 1.745  Peru   1.858 
    Sweden 1.896  South Africa   1.748 
    United Kingdom 1.745  Spain   1.785 
       Switzerland   1.784 
       Trinidad and Tobago   1.826 
       United States   1.770 
       Uruguay   1.767 
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 For the fifth decision, the sequence also continues along two separate branches. For those 
states meeting the criteria for top-down influence, the decision is merely whether to maintain stated 
policy. Utilities reported at the third node are duplicated. For those states whose governments have 
moved according to a perception of the practical ability to avoid cost through the expansion of 
bureaucracy, the decision at this node is reported as a function of the perception of the saleability 
to the electorate to implement this course of action. Because the most saleable benefit to the 
electorate within a country to have established a history of utilizing its public sector to create jobs, 
I operationalize this payoff as the logarithmic function of the state’s average observed  
 
Table 12. Election Data / Saleability of Expansion 
 
Move I: Y   
 Move I: Y  
Move II: T-D   
 Move II: B-U  
Move III: Y/N   
 Move III: Y/N  
Move IV: E   
  Move IV: X  
Move V: E   
 Move V: X  
Austria 1.475  
 Australia 1.230 
Denmark 1.591  
 Brazil 1.410 
Italy 1.545  
 Bulgaria 1.646 
Latvia 1.230  
 Canada 1.466 
New Zealand 1.691  
 Chile 1.448 
   
 Costa Rica 1.489 
   
 Dominican Republic 1.755 
   
 El Salvador 1.575 
   
 France 1.375 
   
 Greece 1.743 
   
 Ireland 1.360 
   
 Israel 1.337 
   
 Mexico 1.483 
   
 Peru 1.516 
   
 South Africa 2.000 
   
 Spain 1.917 
   
 Switzerland 1.059 
   
 Trinidad and Tobago 1.360 
   
 United States 1.382 
   
 Uruguay 1.561 
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unemployment level, beginning in the year of the party’s reelection, and terminating in the year of 
the subsequent election, as reported by International Labour Office. I report for each state its 
percentage of the highest observed unemployment level (South Africa, at 22.3%) and report its 
payoff as Log(percent of 22.3). This is shown in Table 12.      
 
 
Table 13. Second Election Cycle 
 
Move I: Y  
Move II: T-D  
Move III: Y/N  
Move IV: E  
Move V: E  
Move VI: Y/N  
Austria 1.442 
Denmark 1.572 
Italy 1.643 
Latvia 1.554 
New Zealand 1.577 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 Move I: Y  
 Move II: B-U  
 Move III: Y/N  
 Move IV: R  
 Move V: X  
 Move VI: Y/N  
Australia 1.437 
Brazil 1.554 
Bulgaria 2.000 
Canada 1.616 
Chile 1.585 
Costa Rica 1.721 
Dominican Republic 1.923 
El Salvador 1.628 
France 1.529 
Greece 1.576 
Ireland 1.364 
Israel 1.906 
Mexico 1.395 
Peru 1.387 
South Africa 1.617 
Spain 1.571 
Switzerland 1.606 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.000 
United States 1.404 
Uruguay 1.475 
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Figure 4. If the institution were to matter, how would its effect be measured? Estimates are centered on the 
mean value. 
 
 At the final node, I calculate positive or negative gains made by the parties observed in the 
first election cycle again for the second election cycle. I report each state’s utility as the logarithmic 
function of each remaining state’s percentage of Bulgaria’s 2.79-fold increase in right government 
across parties observed. This is shown in Table 13; adjusted sum of state estimates along this 
58 
 
 
 
dimension of analysis is shown in Figure 4. 
I map the summed total of payoffs collected following each decision onto a two-
dimensional model in order to assess the determinants of each state’s status as one of asylum. I 
subtract the mean of summed payoffs from the optimal strategy to be pursued by each state. This 
permits a shift of the origin to the mean payoff calculated according to all state-player strategies. 
Along the horizontal axis, I place adjusted scores estimated according to dyadic measures 
traditionally examined in the literature to explain the movement of forced migrants. Structural 
determinants of material wealth are examined alongside measures of border openness, histories of 
positive affirmative asylum decisions, and the issuance or denial of state-provided benefits during 
asylum appeals processes as a conceptualization of the first question – where will domestic 
institutions matter. Along the vertical axis, I place adjusted scores as estimated as functions of 
each respective state’s electoral process and outcomes as a conceptualization of the second 
question – what types of domestic implementing procedures can be expected.  
Preliminary Observations and Assumptions: Where and How Should Institutions Matter?
 States appearing in Q1 and, to a lesser extent, in Q2 share relatively lengthy processes 
toward final status determination for asylum applicants; processes are generally much more 
expedient in states in Q4, and to a lesser extent, in Q3. States with the highest summed expected 
utilities in the “where should institutions matter” sequence display much greater variation with 
regard to the specific determinants of their scores. South Africa, Bulgaria, Dominican Republic, 
New Zealand, and Greece top the list. The only inputs common to four of the five are the strengths 
of domestic nativist sentiment and the gains made by right parties. Lowest on this vector are India, 
Indonesia, and Mauritius – the three non-signatories to the relevant UN conventions.
59 
 
 
 
 
60 
 
 
 
However, the explanatory power of this sequence lies not in its extremes; it lies near the 
mean value, where it serves the purpose of separating the states that process claims quickly from 
states that do not. I focus specifically on the 10 states for which the highest scores on the horizontal 
axis are reported. Here I locate the states with the highest numbers of pending asylum claims. 
Resolution of status prevails below the mean; indeterminacy prevails above the mean.14  
 Of the three states registering scores below the mean, Belgium, Norway, and Sweden, each 
hosted over 12,000 active asylum cases as of January 2011. Although these states have all proven 
a preference to deny asylum status, claims are heard and decided comparatively quickly. 
According to the criteria considered, each state employs an effective, consolidated bureaucracy 
and, none meets the criteria introduced to suggest the condition of top-down direction of influence. 
Furthermore, of the three, only Belgium experienced a move to the right in government orientation 
for the first observed election cycle. “As if” informed by the utility estimates reported here, the 
three states have taken moves to offer state-paid housing, translation, and legal assistance to all 
claimants, and to ensure that claims are heard within months (or in Norway, sometimes within 
weeks).           
 States registering values above the mean offer no such guarantees. Six of the seven states 
took a decision at the third node according to reported low susceptibility to elite cue giving. Of 
these six, all perceived the ability to avoid the full potential cost of Convention compliance through 
the expansion of the state bureaucracy. Therefore, all seven continued the decision sequence into 
                                                          
14 Although H2 asserts that we should be able to predict the demarcation between states that process asylum claims 
quickly and states that do not process claims quickly according to the criteria considered among states where the 
institution should matter, the clustering of the ten states hosting the highest numbers of pending claims at the positive 
end of the “where do institutions matter” sequence as of January 2011 was not predicted and cannot be explained by 
the theory outlined with this work. At this point, it is sufficient to note that with these ten states excluded from the 
calculation, there is no discernable correlation between the prediction that the institution should matter and the overall 
number of claims awaiting decision within the state. For this reason, I treat this clustering as unexplained and as 
incidental to the findings I attempt to explain. Further work will examine the question of this observed clustering as it 
is noted only at the upper extreme. 
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the final node. Five (Canada, France, Greece, South Africa, and Switzerland) experienced right 
shifts in government in the second observed electoral cycle, while the left gains made in Austria 
and the United States were comparatively small.15       
 Common to all of these states is that once inside, the seeker is not provided housing outside 
of immigrant detention facilities. The resulting lower cost of hosting the seeker creates conditions 
in which pressure to process claims quickly is reduced. States holding the greatest number of 
seekers pending decisions on their asylum claims clearly fall within Q1, where a discrete cluster 
groups all states according to positive scores on the “how do institutions matter” sequence, and 
scores exceeding 3.0 on the “where do institutions matter” sequence. Here, the conditions that 
inform high levels of uncertain asylum status are met; they are met at no other point on the model. 
 In Chapter 3, I examine two states found within Q1, where the institution in place should 
not only matter, but should be implemented with the effect (whether intended or unintended) of 
lengthening wait time to final status determination. I do not argue that it is the goal of states to 
burden courts and police departments as in Greece or to manipulate legal codes to leave tens of 
thousands of claimants awaiting final status determination for years on end as in Austria. Instead, 
I demonstrate that both mechanisms embedded within the domestic implementing legislation serve 
these goals, and by extension, also serve the twin goals of avoiding scrutiny of the international 
community and placating voters who have voiced significant measures of nativist sentiment. 
 In Chapter 4, I examine two states found within Q4. Both have adopted legislation 
incorporating significant elements of the Swedish law, which is viewed historically as the 
exemplar of generosity in asylum provision. The matter at question with the Belgian and South 
Korean domestic institutions regards not a “logic of appropriateness” vs. “logic of expected 
                                                          
15 As I discuss in Chapter 3, left gains in parliamentary seats Austria were accompanied by rightward moves on issues 
relating to asylum by both center-right and center-left parties in grand coalition. 
62 
 
 
 
consequences” argument, as would possibly be instructive only in the cases of Sweden or Norway, 
and would do little to advance an understanding of the conditions under which the rules of the 
game should matter. Instead, the analysis treats the formation, passage, and implementation of the 
rules, not as instruments toward further goals on asylum outcomes, but as intermediate ends in 
themselves, yielding payoffs within other games that are nested within state-specific determinants 
of political expedience and survival.         
 In Chapter 5, I examine two states where the specifics of the domestic implementing 
legislation are predicted not to matter. As hypothesized in Chapter 1 (H1), where configuration of 
structural determinants preempt the importance of domestic legislation toward the length of time 
to final status determination, we should expect for the rule-building process to produce outcomes 
that are not predictable based on the predictions of the “how should the institution matter” 
dimension of analysis. UK and Chile are observed to have constructed legislation that has little  
effect on asylum outcomes, but the terms of the two states’ legislation were sold in manners that 
directly contradict the predictions summarized in Figure 4 if taken in isolation. I lay out the case 
that where states perceive that the domestic implementing legislation may not matter in light of 
structural priors, elites are freed to draft legislation unencumbered by the prospect of needing to 
project simultaneous embrace of humanitarian norms and embrace of hostility toward outsiders – 
the primary impetus driving states that have taken effective action to increase wait time to final 
status determination. 
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CHAPTER 3 – COST AVOIDANCE AND INCREMENTAL GAINS: INSTRUMENTAL 
ACTION VS. INSTRUMENTAL INACTION 
The primary theoretical question of this work considers the conditions under which an 
understanding of the rules in place may be of use to an understanding of the outcomes observed. 
Toward an answer to this question, I construct a framework that places competing manners of 
forging causation arguments within a mutually exclusive context using a modified system of 
classification based on Parsons (2008). Holding constant factors indicative of treatment under the 
psychological approach, I use markers of structure to point to answers to questions concerning 
where the institution should matter, and I use markers of ideation to point to answers to questions 
concerning how the institution should matter.      
 To test this framework, I place state decision makers within a theoretic construct with 
reference to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. By 
restricting observations to fully democratic states, I hold constant the possibility of competing 
motivations inherent to classification under the psychological approach. The framers of the 
relevant institutions within each country are presumed to take calculations guided primarily by the 
impetus to remain politically competitive and electorally viable within successfully consolidated 
democracies with demonstrated histories of multi-party contestation. Further controls for 
psychology include population size exceeding 1-million and the presence of a domestic legal 
framework that permits access to asylum adjudication within the country’s borders. The result is 
that actors within all countries take decisions and execute actions within environments in which 
they must seek reelection from a distance imposed by a large population and within which that 
they must oversee an asylum system that may be reached from the inside. From here, I submit state 
decision makers to series of questions along two dimensions of analysis.     
 The first dimension considers questions of structure, here understood through the presence 
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and durability of hierarchies within the community of states taking decisions that will result in the 
construction or enforcement of the institution to be drawn or maintained. A state’s placement 
within these hierarchies will be of use to determine whether questions of asylum were, under the 
period of consideration, likely to have been sufficiently important and pragmatically answerable 
as discrete issues. If so, the rules in place should be of use to understand observed outcomes. Under 
the alternate condition, elites may take action “as if” under a perception of the opportunity to 
construct compliance institutions without mind to the question of whether they would be called 
upon to pay the cost to be associated with any generosity that may be extended. Here, the rules 
instituted can be best understood as epiphenomenal and of little use toward an understanding of 
observed outcomes, and this dimension of analysis will be of use toward answers to two separate 
questions. Where is placement within these hierarchies sufficient to explain outcomes regardless 
of the institution drawn, and how does the politics of electoral survival suggest the specific forms 
that institutions will take under the condition that decision makers may be engaging in what is, 
essentially, the construction of signals without cost?      
 The goal of the second dimension of analysis is twofold. Among states where questions of 
structure do appear sufficient to determine, to understand, or to predict a relative lack of 
importance on the part of the domestic institution, questions of political ideation, elite-mass 
influence, electoral platforms, and electoral outcomes serve to demonstrate the intended audience 
to which the state intends to signal its intent through the implementation of effectively benign and 
ultimately costless institutions and  elucidates decisions taken within states where placement 
within structural hierarchies is likely to be sufficient to understand or predict asylum outcomes. 
This outcome is discussed in Chapter 5. Among states where structural hierarchies are predicted 
to be insufficient to explain the institution in place, the institutions themselves should be of use to 
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understand asylum outcomes. As I outline in Chapter 1, this importance should be most easily 
understood in terms of its influence on the length of time to final status determination. Within these 
states, this second dimension aids in an understanding of the type of institution that should be in 
place.             
 Under the scenario that is less intuitive and less likely, questions of asylum may not be 
politically important as ends to the rule-building game in themselves. Here, the game of drafting 
the relevant institution will still be important for two reasons. First, the rules become important 
because, unlike in countries where structural hierarchies should prove likely to preclude the 
importance of the institution, the rules will be drawn with the understanding that they are going to 
display measurable effects on outcomes. But second, because issues of avoiding cost in the 
construction, maintenance, and enforcement of the relevant institution are comparatively less 
important to elected decision makers, those charged with forging the rules may perceive the 
opportunity to nest the rule-construction game within the greater electoral survival game in ways 
that may seem counterintuitive. Instead of the impetus to evade the full potential cost of treaty 
compliance, rule-makers may perceive an incentive to incorporate compliance instruments that 
will cause the state to effectively surpass these minimum costs, possibly even by great margins. 
The rules, once in place, will have the effect of reducing the wait time to final status determination 
if doing so will simultaneously permit the elected rule makers to avoid greater costs on other, 
possibly even seemingly unrelated issues that may be of greater salience within domestic 
electorates. This outcome is discussed in Chapter 4. For states where the institution is predicted to 
matter, this second dimension of analysis serves to divide the states falling within this category 
from those for which the more likely and more intuitive motivation behind rule making is observed 
– cost avoidance.          
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 The purpose of this chapter is to aid in an understanding of this more intuitive and the more 
frequently observed scenario – that the institutions drawn and maintained toward compliance with 
the Refugee Convention and its Protocol should be of use to understand asylum outcomes, and that 
they should result in processes that result in an avoidance of the full potential cost of treaty 
compliance, which will be observable through the comparatively lengthy wait time for the median 
applicant awaiting status determination.       
 The existing literature fails to address the conditions under which the rules enacted at the 
domestic level should be predictive of asylum outcomes within democratic states. Because this 
literature forms an insufficient springboard for questions of whether and how institutions affect 
outcomes, for the purpose of this chapter, I reorient the discussion with reference to the literature 
on the expansion of rights through means that clearly demonstrate the reality of the motivation to 
evade payment of the full cost of granting and enforcing these rights. I then examine two states 
where the institution is predicted to matter and where the institution serves the purpose of 
instrumental cost avoidance through different means. Using the case of Austria, I lead the reader 
through the domestic political situation surrounding the construction of a unique configuration of 
rules, all politically motivated, but often motivated toward ends related only tangentially to 
questions of asylum. I narrate Austria’s perfect political storm of unrelated decisions, promises, 
and mass appeals as these have converged to create conditions unconducive to the final issuance 
of decisions on asylum cases, resulting in thousands cases remaining open for a decade or longer. 
In Greece, the country that from the outside would appear to have the greatest incentive to overhaul 
its system for processing asylum claims due to the practically unmanageable number of potential 
claimants within its territory, I demonstrate that, by contrast, no reframing of the relevant legal, 
bureaucratic, or judicial institutions is observed over the period of time considered, and that this 
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lack of action is shown to have proven politically beneficial to actors on all sides of the relevant 
debates.  
Incrementalism and the Expansion of Rights      
 The literature examining the causal mechanisms behind instances of compliance and non-
compliance with human rights norms within democracies (Farber 2002, Hathaway 2002 and 2007, 
Mansfield and Peevehouse 2006, Moravcsik 2000, Powell and Staton 2009) focuses specifically 
on two processes: ratification or accession, and compliance. Do democratic states sign on to follow 
the rules, and do states follow through with their signaled intentions after the sign-on process? One 
goal of this work is to expand this line of scholarship to incorporate discussion of the varied forms 
that full compliance actually takes within democracies, the domestic political conditions that 
influence these forms, and the degree to which the procedures in place within an individual 
democratic state can exert a meaningful influence on its compliance outcomes.   
 Because this literature proves uninstructive toward an examination of the types of domestic 
mechanisms that are in place under the condition of full compliance, I turn to a literature addressing 
the diffusion of economic and social rights across states. This review is not intended to be 
exhaustive; instead, the goal is to set up the discussion of the expansion of rights through the 
avoidance of costs to be borne by elites whose ultimate goal is the retention of political power, and 
to introduce varied means of cost avoidance into the discussion of domestic human rights treaty 
compliance.           
 In The Crisis of Dictatorships, Poulantzas (1976) examines the 1970s replacements of the 
Regime of the Colonels in Greece, the Salazar-Caetano regime in Portugal, and the Franco regime 
in Spain with their current democratic counterparts. The dictatorial regimes are first placed within 
the context of the world capitalist economy. Increasing interdependence inherent to the expansion 
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of capitalism created conditions under which ideological isolationism could not thrive and would 
become less sustainable over time. Simultaneously, domestic class divisions created environments 
in which several factors converged to render the regimes ineffective and increasingly irrelevant. 
Decision makers within each state preferred short-term, relative gains over long-term, absolute 
gains – a defining characteristic of the Poulantzas view of capitalism in general. Economic classes 
and cross-class interests acting under this condition both acted within environments in which 
factionalization became less costly than unity under the regime.      
 Additionally, the process of diffusion already noted with regard to each regime’s place 
within the world capitalist economy was being reproduced on smaller scales domestically. Subjects 
would demand rights that would be afforded to them if they were, instead, citizens. The final end 
could not be continued dictatorship because the dictatorships as they had come to exist by the 
early-1970s had become unsustainable. However, the dissolution of the state could not be the end 
either, as this would require focus on longer-term goals, not on the day-to-day operations of the 
country. Achievement of short-term goals would prove ultimately more important than the 
preservation of the dictatorships in place. For this reason, the end most in line with the conditions 
already in place within the world of the 1970s was the continuance of the state under what 
Poulantzas held to be broader, West-European values.     
 Several points from this analysis are of help to begin the construction of a framework useful 
to understand the phenomenon of cost avoidance as it regards the expansion of political rights. 
First, no state acts in isolation. Leaders within Greece, Portugal, and Spain acted within a world 
environment that held rules that were vastly different from their own, in which others granted 
degrees of rights that they did not. Second, the interplay of domestic factions created situations in 
which elite self-preservation necessitated shifts in focus from long-term gains (here, the 
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preservation of the regimes) to short-term gains (here, the day-to-day maintenance of 
governmental grip on political and economic power). Third, people demanded rights that they had 
come to know that their neighbors enjoyed.       
 These conditions converged to create domestic environments in which those in power 
would pay less of a cost by ceding power than by retaining it. The restoration of the Greek 
monarchy became impractical in light of new calls for democratic rule following the detention of 
the Colonels, Caetano was opposed by his military (the world’s largest relative to its population 
size at the time), and therefore, the regime lacked the means that would have been necessary to 
quell the Carnation Revolution, and prior to his death, Franco had already begun to set up 
institutions that would prove inadvertently to be more conducive to democratic rule than to 
dictatorial or monarchical rule. In each case, a bloody revolution was forestalled through elite 
concession to demands for rights. One of Poulantzas’s conclusions from these cases (albeit a 
frequently overlooked conclusion) is that democracy, including all of the rights that it entails, is 
diffuse – through elite action to give up a limited measure of rights in order to avoid costs 
associated with a focus on the long-term maintenance of dictatorial power, each state will become 
increasingly democratic. In an environment of ever-increasing state interdependence, this fact 
would manifest itself within non-democratic states across the globe, thus leading to the expansion 
of political rights worldwide.16        
 The Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005) 
considers the idea that democracy, including the rights that it entails, may not diffuse as quickly 
or as certainly as a reading of Poulantzas would suggest. Elites may maintain power while avoiding 
                                                          
16 For Poulantzas and scholars of Poulantzas, the more important conclusion was that this type of concession by the 
state will forestall the expansion of communism, and will morph the ideal into what has become known as 
“Eurocommunism.” 
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the cost of full compliance with democratic norms by ceding incrementally to popular pressure. 
This course of action toward the expansion of rights may impose the lowest level of cost to elites 
repeatedly over the short term, and this outcome is demonstrated through the long course of ever-
expanding rights in Britain.          
 However, the course suggested by Poulantzas and demonstrated here in the case of Britain 
is only one among four possible elite strategies of cost-avoidant action, and country-specific 
ideational and economic conditions may combine to create a situation in which one of the other 
three courses of action will prove less costly in the short term.  As demonstrated in the case of 
Argentina, actions of those who would wish to take effort to overthrow a non-democratic 
government are shown to have been quelled by elite promises of action that would prove untenable 
over the long term as domestic social and economic conditions changed. Boons in wealth would 
be met with democratic advances, yet high levels of inequality that would cause alliances to shift 
as promises were broken in times of scarcity would leave the door open for the overthrow of the 
government by factions with little opposition from the majority, disenfranchised poor. Where 
income inequality is even more severe, and where elites judge that a revolution could prove both 
successful and imminent unless drastic measures are taken, elites are shown to have calculated the 
least costly course of action to entail the enactment of near universal oppression, as is demonstrated 
in the case of apartheid-era South Africa. Finally, in richer, more egalitarian states, elites are shown 
to have judged a democratic revolution highly unlikely under the condition that their actions may 
keep the masses both wealthy and incognizant of the comparatively minor income differences 
among them. This is demonstrated through the case of Singapore.     
 The framework I develop differs from the Acemoglu and Robinson framework in two 
important ways. More readily apparent, in legislating human rights conventions at the domestic 
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level, the idea of something akin to revolution is absent from the calculation. Action through what 
prove to be wealth-dependent promises to the masses, through repression, and through the 
promotion of a national mythology of wealth and equality will be of no use toward the avoidance 
of the cost of treaty compliance. Costs are imposed not only at the domestic level, but also by 
bodies that observe treaty compliance at the international level, including the United Nations and 
its constituent bodies, national and international courts, national and international human rights 
organizations, and the international press. So, in legislating treaty compliance mechanisms, elites 
seek not only to appease the masses within their borders, but also to signal intention to comply 
with the international normative standard to those watching from outside. Second, with the 
introduction of successfully consolidated, multi-party democracy as a condition for inclusion in 
this study, I hold constant elements of psychological motivation that would permit parallel 
differences as demonstrated the three alternative cases. All elites act so as to retain political power, 
but they do so within states that have retained democratic ideals over the entire temporal space 
under observation and are predicted to retain democratic rule into the foreseeable future.  
 Instead, the Acemoglu and Robinson framework is important for two reasons. First, it 
presents the idea of instrumental cost avoidance in a manner that avoids much of the Poulantzas 
emphasis on social class and the world capitalist system. Focus is instead placed on the expansion 
of rights to a degree not found in Poulantzas. Second, and more importantly, it presents the 
framework of incrementality as a means of evading the full potential cost of granting rights, but it 
does not propose this incrementality as the sole, unavoidable means of cost management, as does 
Poulantzas.           
 From here, the contrast I draw between the cases to be discussed in this chapter vs. those 
to be discussed in the following chapter is fundamentally different. The focus can be understood 
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as one of the content of domestic legislation, procedural rules, and enforcement mechanisms in 
terms of incremental gains (i.e., cost evasive strategy) as opposed to abrupt gains (i.e., cost 
acceptant strategy). In forging rules governing asylum, the expectation is that decision makers 
within most states will seek to avoid cost on matters pertaining to asylum. At the same time, it is 
entirely reasonable to expect that decision makers within some states will enact legislation that 
they judge to be politically important toward the avoidance of overall electoral costs, to include 
costs potentially not addressed within the content of the Refugee Convention or its implementing 
legislation. Under this condition, it becomes necessary to allow for the possibility that 
implementation and enforcement of these rules may greatly exceed the minimum cost of normative 
compliance. This chapter examines the former condition; the following chapter examines the latter. 
In short, within states to enact cost-avoidant instruments toward Convention implementation, these 
instruments create conditions under which applicant wait times to final status determination can 
be quite long (exceeding a decade in some instances), and these waits are only lengthened with 
further amendments to and revisions of mechanisms in place toward the enforcement of the 
relevant domestic legislation; within states to enact cost-acceptant instruments, these instruments 
may demonstrate the effect of drastically shortening the period of time under which the median 
asylum case remains pending.        
 In most states where the institution should allow us to understand observed outcomes, the 
rules drafted should accomplish the goal of instrumental cost avoidance. To follow, I show how 
this strategy works through examination of two exemplary case countries. I first present a brief 
history as it is useful to understand the background against which cost-avoidant strategies have 
played out differently within the two focus countries – through instrumental action in Austria, and 
through instrumental inaction in Greece. I then lay out the case that the specific configuration of 
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structural considerations inherent to the community of all states taking decisions will lead to the 
conclusion that the institution to be drawn, maintained, and enforced should be of use to understand 
asylum outcomes within these states. I expand on the domestic political considerations surrounding 
the fulfillment of the prediction of strategies of cost evasion – why is the issue of asylum grants 
sufficiently important in its own right to permit the prediction that both Austria and Greece will 
erect institutions toward the avoidance of cost on the issue of convention compliance, and not on 
another, potentially more salient issue, and how do Austria and Greece exemplify these two ideal-
typical paths toward evasion of the full cost of normative compliance? 
A Short History of Forced Migration in Austria*      
 In the years preceding Austria’s 2006 parliamentary election, the most recent (2001) census 
data reveals that of a population of nearly eight million, more than 730,000 were foreign residents. 
This high level of in-migration was not a new development and was widely accepted as forming 
part of a long, yet intermittent trend of acceptance and integration of the foreign born into the 
population.           
 During the years of the Austrian Empire (1804-1867) and throughout the hold of Austria-
Hungary (1867-1918) migration within the land area that fell under the Hapsburg monarchy 
(including today’s Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, the northern territory of Serbia including Belgrade, and parts of northern Italy, northern 
Moldova, and southern Ukraine) tended strongly to flow from the eastern territories to the western 
territories, with the large proportion of immigrants taking residence in the urban and centers of 
Prague and Vienna, and with the massive rebuilding following its 1910 earthquake, also Ljubljana. 
 Within the empire, migrants’ residency rights were based on their municipality of birth. 
                                                          
* All data within this section are taken from Jandl and Kraler’s 2003 report for the Migration Policy Institute,  “Austria: 
A Country of Immigration?” Much of the narrative structure follows that of applicable sections of the report as well.  
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The municipalities to which they had migrated held and often exercised the right to expel those 
deemed “alien residents,” often popularly viewed to take more from society than they were capable 
of contributing. Their legal status within their new homes was always under threat of revocation. 
In spite of this, by 1900, the populations of Prague (at around 80 percent) and Vienna (at around 
60 percent) were comprised largely of within-empire migrants. In fact, despite large population 
shifts to Germany, Switzerland, and the Americas throughout the pre-WWI period, no area within 
the republic’s boundaries was more affected by emigration than by these internal movements. For 
this reason, migration policy was almost exclusively drafted and implemented with the aim of 
regulating and enforcing in-migrant status, as opposed to addressing questions of entry to, exit 
from, or movement within the territory.       
 With the end of WWI, the monarchy was dissolved. New European states were formed, 
and populations shifted as successor states sought to define themselves in terms of national 
narratives. New states became progressively more homogenous in terms of ethnicity. 
Economically depressed Austria expelled nearly all of its 310,000 non-German-speaking 
“immigrants,” the vast majority of whom had come from other municipalities within Austria -
Hungary, and more than half of whom had fled to Austria’s urban and semi-suburban centers 
during WWI. With the onset of WWII, more than 80,000 Austrians left the country for the 
Americas, while many Jews fled to Palestine, many Communists fled to the USSR, and prior to 
Germany’s 1938 annexation of Austria, many Nazi supporters fled to Germany.   
 With the annexation, the remnants of the Hapsburg-era migration laws were replaced by 
then-current Nazi German legislation. Austria’s population evolved to become even more 
ethnically homogenous, in large part as a result of the murder or expatriation of nearly 192,500 
Austrian Jews. Still, at the conclusion of WWII, nearly 1.4 million foreigners remained within 
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Austria’s borders. Among this number were foreign laborers, prisoners of war, war refugees, and 
ethnic Germans who had resettled from across [mostly Eastern] Europe. Most of non-German 
descent were quickly repatriated, while most ethnic Germans were absorbed into the population. 
 In subsequent years, Austria became one of the main transit countries, temporarily housing 
around two million migrants, for those fleeing USSR-aligned states for the United States, Israel, 
and much of Western Europe during the Cold War; a comparatively much smaller number sought 
asylum status within the country’s territory. These included about 20,000 refugees from Hungary 
following the 1956 revolution, and similar numbers of Slovaks and Czechs in the aftermath of the 
1968 Prague Spring and Poles with successive measures to squelch the Solidarity Movement in 
the early 1980s. The influx of Poles, although initially greeted openly (nearly 20,000 of the 29,100 
asylum applications submitted on the part of those fleeing Poland were approved between 1981 
and 1982), was met with increasing resistance, and visa requirements were instituted for those 
entering Austria’s territory from Poland. This act would prove to form the starting point for 
political debates surrounding the current asylum regime within Austria, to be discussed in greater 
detail later in this chapter.         
 By the mid-1980s, Austria had become progressively less welcoming of new migrants, and 
asylum applications fell sharply in subsequent years as its geopolitical location became less 
relevant as a point of transit for those fleeing communist regimes. The number of applications rose 
briefly, albeit not to early Cold-War era levels, by the close of the 1980s, with an average number 
of 20,800 applications per year between 1988 and 1992. The majority of applicants during this 
period were seeking protection from Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Turkey, with application 
levels progressively rising from those fleeing Bangladesh, Iran, and Pakistan over the five-year 
period. The 1991 Law on the Reception of Asylum Seekers slashed the amount of state-provided 
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benefits for claimants, and the 1991 Asylum Act (effective 1992) introduced a list of safe countries 
of origin for the first time. Sanctions were levied against companies caught transporting 
undocumented migrants, and a further visa requirement was instituted for those entering Austria 
from Romania. These actions led to another steep drop in entry by forced migrants. In 1993, fewer 
than 5,000 asylum applications were initiated, and the number of new claims did not exceed 7,000 
for any of the next four years.         
 The October 1992 repatriation of 42 Kosovo Albanians from Austria and similar actions 
directed toward Kosovar immigrants by several other European receiving countries was answered 
with sharp scrutiny from the international community and several human rights organizations on 
further actions to be taken. The brunt of the castigation fell on Austria. In response, Austria 
instituted a special legal basis for the admission and residence of conflict refugees from the former 
Yugoslavia. By 1995, the majority of the nearly 95,000 war refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina 
were granted temporary protection in Austria, and by 1999, more than 70,000 had been granted 
long-term residence permits. The granting of these permissions fell outside of the country’s normal 
asylum procedures, but over time, the issuance of similar permits would become a unique, defining 
characteristic of the Austrian asylum procedure.        
 The Asylum Act was revised in 1997. The safe country of origin provisions were 
abandoned, and Austrian policy was reconfigured to fall in line with the terms of the Schengen 
Agreement and the Dublin Accord. The liberalization of the asylum framework was met by a sharp 
increase in the number of asylum claimants, and to date, numbers of claims filed within Austria 
have not fallen to pre-1997 levels for any subsequent year. In 2001, over 29,000 applications were 
filed, and in 2002, a then-record number of 36,900 claims were initiated. In response, the Ministry 
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of the Interior issued an internal order to further restrict access to state-provided benefits for those 
whose claims were deemed unlikely to be approved. 
A Short History of Forced Migration in Greece     
 Through most of the 20th century, Greece had been a country of net emigration. Many 
Greeks, most of them from rural areas and low education levels, left Greece to pursue greater 
opportunity within richer countries, with most arriving Australia, Canada, the United States, and 
Western Europe. The numbers of emigrants, primarily to Western European countries, increased 
during the 1967-1974 Regime of the Colonels.  By 1985, however, nearly half of Greece’s 
emigrants had repatriated (Migration Policy Institute 2012). These returns to Greece are largely 
attributable to the popularly perceived view of an increase in opportunity, which was driven in part 
by the inability on the part of many poorly educated, rural Greeks to assimilate into more 
traditionally western cultures. This period of incremental repatriation lasted over a decade, which 
notably encompasses both the country’s 1974 return to democracy and 1981 accession to the ECC, 
and it marks the first point in modern history in which Greece saw near-equal levels of in-migration 
and out-migration.            
 The collapse of the USSR and its influence on the politics of Central and Eastern Europe 
brought about the second modern wave of immigration to Greece, which until this point had still 
been incorrectly judged by policy makers as a country of mass emigration. This second shift, 
exacerbated by the movement of people permitted with the 2004 accessions of many poorer 
countries to the EU, created Greece’s status as one of net immigration for the first time in modern 
history. However, precisely because of its incremental nature, policy makers perceived little 
pressure to respond to what would prove to be the 21st century Greek reality.   
 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook (2010) reports that at the point of time that concludes this 
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study, 48,201 asylum cases remained pending decision. This is the highest number in Europe; at 
the point of time that concludes this study; greater numbers of pending claims are observed only 
in Ecuador, South Africa, and the United States.17 Greek borders became highly porous just as 
mass migration to Europe from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East began to take place in the early 
2000s. Greece’s geographic location, its membership in the EU, and the paucity of resources 
allocated to border control relative to the other European Union states on the Mediterranean 
converged to cement Greece’s status as the country of easiest access to what is seen by many 
migrants as the fortress that is Europe. Against this backdrop, native-born and immigrant 
populations began to face what would prove to be an ever-increasing competition for access to 
resources to include jobs, state-funded social provisions, guarantees of fair wages, and guarantees 
against discriminatory practices at all levels. Nativist sentiment rose in line with the perceived 
erosion of “Greekness” and the privileged position that it had ceased to confer, due first to 
European in-migration, and later (and much more significantly), to non-European in-migration. 
 Under the Dublin Accord, each signatory state assumes sole responsibility for the 
processing of asylum cases initiated by claimants who first entered the community of signatory 
states through its own border. Greece, largely because of its status as signatory to the protocol, has 
received upward of 25,000 asylum applications for each of the past eleven years. Of the 25,113 
applications lodged in Greece in 2007, the year of the first election cycle considered for this study, 
more than 20,000 were given a first instance hearing. At these initial hearings, only eight applicants 
were granted residence permits over the course of the year, and of the 6,448 applicants to appeal 
negative decisions, only 155 appeals were approved. In total, fewer than 2.5 percent of claims were 
                                                          
17 Although Ecuador does not meet the criteria for inclusion in this study, it is of note that both South Africa and the 
United States have met both the structural and the electoral conditions that permit the prediction of institutions that 
will effectively increase wait times to determination of final status. 
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granted, and nearly 5000 claims remained unheard into 2008 (Norwegian Association for Asylum 
Seekers, Norwegian Helsinki Committee, and Greek Helsinki Monitor, 2009).     
 The EU (primarily through Frontex – the European border management program), 
individual member states (notably Spain and Italy, but to a lesser degree, France), as well as net-
sending states Egypt and Libya, took measures to restrict undocumented entry to Europe through 
the militarized policing of the Mediterranean border. The large number of claims, combined with 
the new pan-European commitment of resources toward the protection of the Mediterranean Sea 
border, have served to increase migration into Europe through Greece’s land border with Turkey. 
The Greek Ministry of Citizen Protection (2011) estimates that 100,888 migrants crossed this land 
border illegally in the first nine months of 2010, the final year under consideration in the current 
work. Because of Greece’s status as host to the overwhelming plurality of Europe’s forced 
migrants, many of whom are unable to claim or to substantiate claims to have entered the Dublin 
II community through another state’s border, Greece has become the primary center for 
unnegotiated entry to Europe. As a result, Greece has held both Europe’s highest rate of asylum 
claims and Europe’s second (to Ireland) lowest rate of positive decisions on affirmative claims 
over the entire period of time considered. Because the framework for processing claims possesses 
many remnants of an antiquated, net-emigration-era system18, these factors have also converged 
to create a situation in which a very large number of asylum cases remain pending over long 
periods of time.          
 Each of these developments has unfolded in front of an audience. International human 
rights observers, immigrant rights advocates, the UNHCR, and international courts have been 
highly critical of Greece. The near-universal castigation targets Greece not on a lack of action by 
                                                          
18 I discuss many details of this system later in this chapter. 
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lawmakers and the civil service bodies responsible to process claims, but on a perceived lack of 
ability on the part of these groups to process the large numbers of claims with which they are faced. 
In response, many Dublin II community states have agreed to halt the protocol-mandated 
deportations to Greece, either of their own initiative following reports of the poor treatment and 
substandard levels of benefits afforded to claimants (Finland, Norway, and Sweden, prior to the 
ECHR ruling in MSS v. Belgium and Greece), by order of the European Court of Human Rights 
(Belgium) or by voluntary agreement following the ECHR ruling against Belgium (permanently 
in Austria, Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, France, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom, and on a temporary order which remained in effect through the end of 2012 in 
Germany).           
 In the following section, I lead the reader through the framework of conditions that 
converge to permit the prediction that the relevant legal, bureaucratic, and judicial institutions 
drawn should be of use to understand the resultant length of time to final status determination 
within Austria and Greece. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to the examination of 
strategies and outcomes of political contestation they are instructive toward an understanding of 
the drafting or maintenance of cost-avoidant institutions within these two states. The defining 
feature common to these cost avoidant strategies is the effective prolongation of the median 
applicant’s wait time to determination of refugee status. 
Austria and Greece—Why Should the Institution Matter?    
 As I have outlined in Chapter 2, the variables considered here have proven statistically 
significant toward answers to other questions. Although each has been employed to explain the 
distribution of asylum cases within subsets of advanced democracies, studies employing these 
variables have failed in their capability to reconcile the authors’ causation narratives to compliance 
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outcomes observed within many outlier states.       
 To address and to begin to correct for this weakness, I disaggregate the overall question – 
why do large numbers of pending asylum claims exist in their observed configurations – into two 
separate questions: where should legal, bureaucratic, and judicial setups prove predictive of 
asylum outcomes, and how should legal, bureaucratic, and judicial setups prove predictive of 
asylum outcomes. In Chapter 2, I set out a framework useful to understand where and how the 
institutions in place within each of the successfully consolidated, multi-party democracies 
considered should lend insight into the length of time to final status determination for asylum 
claimants within their borders. Along the x axis, I examine the presence of structural hierarchies 
inherent to inclusion within this community of states. To follow, I demonstrate how this dimension 
of analysis works within two exemplary case countries, the paths of which I propose to elucidate 
two ideal-typical poles of mechanistic cost evasion: instrumental action in Austria, and 
instrumental inaction in Greece.         
 Each stage of the decision sequence captures a state-level prediction of the likelihood that 
the median asylum claimant will advance to the following stage within the sequence “as if” 
informed by two input factors: the likelihood that the state will be expected pay the cost of its 
compliance mechanisms, and the number of fellow claimants among whom the median applicant 
is taking decisions. Answers to questions of structural hierarchies within the community of states 
will permit determination of the manner in which the median applicant will behave in interaction 
with the rules in place, and by extension, whether these rules should be important in their own 
right toward an understanding of the outcomes observed.     
 Because this dimension of analysis is concerned with the state-level prediction of how far 
the median claimant will advance within the process of securing asylum protection under the 
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Convention, I model this series of decisions after the process undertaken by the claimant in the 
attempt to access this protection. The first decision examines the question of where the median 
claimant will be expected to flee, and the second decision examines the question of whether the 
potential claimant will be able to cross the border into the host state’s territory. Subsequent 
decisions examine questions of claimant access to the asylum adjudication within the host state’s 
border, the state’s predilection to approve first-instance asylum claims, the cost to the state to 
hosting a denied claimant within its borders, and the Convention-mandated directive to permit 
access to the asylum appeals process for the denied claimant.     
 Where the median claimant is more likely to advance through the decision sequence, states 
will interpret real costs to be associated with this advance. Here, the compliance mechanisms 
should be most greatly predictive of outcomes – both because the state will be less able to perceive 
the ability to enact compliance instruments as costless signals, and because a greater proportion of 
all forced migrants within these states will be expected to access these instruments over longer 
periods of time. In subsequent sections, I demonstrate that within these two countries, the 
institutions in place should achieve and do achieve a common end – instrumental cost evasion 
through the effective increase in wait time to determination of final status of asylum claims. 
 First, I consider the hierarchy inherent to the division of wealth within the community of 
state decision makers, here measured as per-capita GNP.19 Accounting for the decline in marginal 
utilities attached to the maintenance of a country’s placement within the hierarchical structure, 
Austria and Greece both register positions logged at the upper end. World Bank (2011) reports this 
figure for Austria at $US 46,660, and for Greece at $US 26,842. In a departure from the Neumayer 
study, which holds that this figure should prove instructive as a discrete measure, I hold that this 
                                                          
19 Neumayer (2007) finds per-capita GNP to be the measure of wealth most accurately predictive of wealth of asylum 
seeker inflows. 
83 
 
 
 
figure proves particularly powerful as it permits the cardinalization of a utility useful to understand 
the first step within a multi-stage decision process. Here, the rule to be instituted, maintained, and 
enforced within these states is more likely to influence asylum outcomes precisely because it is 
within states registering totals at the upper end of the hierarchy that elites may take further 
decisions with the expectation that the institutions in place will impose real costs to be paid by the 
state. Calculations of state placement within these hierarchies are presented in Chapter 2, Table 2. 
 Whereas states at the lower end of the per-capita GNP hierarchy will be better able to 
engage in the construction or maintenance of institutions that may signal intention to comply 
without the expectation that the resulting costs will be paid in full, because of greater measures of 
wealth relative to other state decision makers, elites within Austria and Greece will be more likely 
to perceive that the median claimant will access the state’s compliance instruments, and therefore,  
that the state will be more likely to be called on to pay any costs to be associated with their domestic 
compliance instruments. As a secondary point, and one holding more closely to the justification 
of the use of per capita GNP to the Neumayer argument, when measures such as family relations 
and geographic contiguity and distance are held constant, the median claimant is more likely to 
find his way across the border of a comparatively wealthier state. For both of these reasons, the 
rule instituted should matter to asylum outcomes precisely because rule makers perceive the 
increased likelihood that they will be called on to pay any costs that will be associated with the 
rule. Austria and Greece continue the decision process into the second node.  
 Next, I consider the hierarchy inherent to relative measures of border openness among 
states. Where the median claimant is more likely to perceive an ability to enter a country’s territory, 
it becomes more likely that the median claimant will enter the territory. Under this condition, the 
receiving state will perceive a greater likelihood that it will face calls to pay any costs to be 
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associated with its compliance instruments. As such, the state will perceive its ability to use any 
potential outcome of the rule-construction process as cheap talk to be greatly reduced. 
Additionally, as higher numbers of unnegotiated entrants are reported, the possibility exists that 
the rule builders will face increasing pressure to construct, maintain, and enforce compliance 
instruments that should affect electorate perception of governmental action on questions regarding 
the openness of its borders.          
 Austria and Greece both register high totals of unnegotiated entrants relative to observed 
totals of registered entrants, with Greece forming the baseline against which all state totals are 
calculated (at 99% of all forced migrants). This measure is important as it points to the difference 
between those forced migrants who must claim protection under the terms of the Refugee 
Convention vs. those for whom entry has already been negotiated and for whom no individual 
asylum case must be initiated. Two outcomes follow: rule makers will perceive that they cannot 
use the rule-construction process as a means to signal intention without the expectation that they 
will be called on to pay any costs associated with the rule, and greater numbers of migrants will 
be expected to access any instruments to be defined by the rule.    
 For the next stratifying decision,20 each state weighs its predilection to issue positive 
decisions on affirmative asylum claims. I treat this measure using a logic that is fundamentally 
different from the logic that Hatton (2008) uses to justify inclusion of the same variable. For 
Hatton, the preponderance of positive decisions on affirmative asylum claims is treated as 
predictive of the number of forced migrants to lodge claims in subsequent years. In states where 
                                                          
20 In order to effect an examination using a number of decisions equal to the number to be taken within the sequence 
mapped along the y axis, I have introduced moves at the third and sixth nodes, which I refer to for the remainder of 
this work as “non-stratifying.” At these points in the sequence, all states reap payoffs that do not produce hierarchical 
orderings; the first captures the utility perceived by median applicant’s decision to initiate the asylum adjudication 
process, and the second captures the state’s commitment to the adoption of norms as evidenced by Convention 
signatory status.  
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greater numbers of claims are granted at T1, a greater numbers of claims will be initiated at T2 and 
beyond. Instead, I hold that to treat this measure as a discrete variable will prove uninstructive 
toward the question of why the institution built should facilitate an understanding of the length of 
time to final status determination.         
 With the exceptions of Dominican Republic, Israel, Peru, Slovenia, and non-Convention 
signatory Indonesia, judicial and bureaucratic bodies within all states have demonstrated histories 
of denying far more affirmative asylum claims than they approve over the entire period  considered 
in this study. Because bodies within most states deny most claims, I embed the prediction of claim 
denial into the logic of the decision sequence, and I continue to calculate utilities only for states 
that have demonstrated this course of action.       
 The median claimant will perceive a greater incentive to continue the decision process at 
greater cost to the receiving state within those states having issued higher numbers of denied 
claims. This holds because the claimant will be more likely to access the appeals process following 
a negative decision or deportation order. For this reason, the state will perceive greater costs as the 
median claimant advances to subsequent stages within the sequence. These increased costs will be 
associated with the asylum appeals process itself, as well as with the deportation process where it 
is practiced. Additionally, states will anticipate an increase in the expense of state resources to the 
denied claimant during the period of time that the appeals process is underway. Finally, states will 
also perceive inestimable costs as they may be attached to the possibility that a denied claimant 
will be unable or unwilling to repatriate in the case of a negative first-instance decision that is not 
appealed. For these reasons, a state’s previous record of higher relative numbers of negative 
decisions on asylum claims will create a unique condition that will not exist under the scenario of 
lower relative numbers of negative decisions on asylum claims – the state’s calculation of its 
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practical need to pay any potential costs to be associated with a state’s compliance mechanisms 
will increase as state predilection to deny claims increases.       
 Over 98% of claims were denied over the temporal space considered in this study in 
Greece, while nearly 83% of claims were denied over the same temporal space in Austria. Because 
of this, compliance mechanisms in place will be judged by their framers and by those charged with 
their enforcement and adjudication to impose real costs on both states for three reasons: they will 
be instituted, maintained, and enforced informed by the predictions that they will engender costly 
signals, that they are more likely to be accessed by the median claimant, and that this access will 
be observed and will carry costs to the state over what the state should reasonably expect to be a 
longer period of time.          
 For the final stratifying decision, states consider costs to be associated with hosting those 
who access compliance protections following negative decisions on their asylum claims. Based on 
the number of claimants present per $US 1 GNP at the point of time that concludes this study, it 
is important to note that of the states considered, only South Africa attaches a cost greater than that 
observed in Greece to hosting these claimants, and only South Africa, Greece, France, and Canada 
attach costs greater than the total observed in Austria. Elites and electorates become more acutely 
aware of these costs as these costs increase precisely because the costs are associated with numbers 
of people among whom the state’s wealth is divided. This fact places pressure on elites to create 
rules that address the division of wealth between the native and voluntary immigrant populations 
and the claimant population in a manner that will address voter concerns over the “other” within 
their country’s borders. Under this condition, elites may perceive that they will be better able to 
secure their own electoral survival when these voter concerns are met and addressed.21 Because of 
                                                          
21 With reference to the question of where the institutional output should matter to outcomes, I do not attempt to 
account for actions demonstrative of how elites should be expected to respond to electorate perceptions. Instead, I 
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this, the institution in place will be much more likely to be useful toward an understanding of 
asylum outcomes. The rule construction, maintenance, and enforcement processes cannot be 
instituted toward the conveyance of costless signals for two reasons: because the rule makers will 
play to voters who will expect for rules to bring results, and because greater numbers of claimants 
are observed to access the instruments defined within these rules and are expected to do the same 
into the future. 
The Domestic Politics of Rule Construction – How Should the Institution Matter? 
 Within both Austria and Greece, the specific instruments instituted toward compliance with 
the Refugee Convention and its Protocol should be of use to understand asylum outcomes, 
specifically as they relate to length of time to final status determination for those with claims 
pending decision. Institutions will be built, maintained, and enforced under the expectations that 
the state will be relatively more capable to pay associated costs, that rule makers will play to 
electorates who may be more acutely attuned to the presence of the asylum seeker within their 
borders, and that legal, bureaucratic, and judicial bodies will expect to extend the costs associated 
with compliance to greater numbers of claimants over longer periods of time. To follow, I outline 
the domestic political conditions within both states as these conditions are useful to understand the 
process by which each has come to settle on what is the more intuitive and more frequently 
observed rule construction, maintenance, and enforcement scenario – the instrumental evasion of 
cost through the implementation of cost-avoidant compliance institutions.     
 Each stage of the decision sequence points to expectations of cost to elites as they strive to 
achieve or maintain personal, party, or coalitional survival within a competitive democratic 
environment. Because this is the case, I do not model the logic underlying the sequential ordering 
                                                          
focus here on an additional condition that addresses the degree to which elites may perceive a popular mandate to 
respond. The “how” question is addressed along the second dimension of analysis. 
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of decisions after an applicant-specific process. Instead, the sequence follows each state through 
the run-up process and electoral outcomes associated with the two most-recent pre-2010 election 
cycles.            
 At the first node, I account for the state’s status as signatory or non-signatory to the 
Convention. This decision does not create a hierarchical ordering; instead, with this decision, I 
create a binary necessary to exclude further examination of states for which no compliance 
institutions may be measured because no agreement to forge compliance mechanisms has been 
undertaken. With this chapter and the following two chapters, I use treatment of this first question 
to explicate the exact compliance protections that each of the focus signatory states has bound 
itself to uphold by virtue of its own domestic-level agreement to comply with the UN mandate. I 
accomplish this through an examination of each focus state’s history of action on domestic 
ratification or accession and of further relevant bilateral state-UN negotiations, from the point in 
time that the Convention was drafted at Geneva in 1951, and leading up to the year of the first 
observed election cycle. For each focus state, the ratification procedure becomes important 
because in the process of ratification, each state is observed to have registered reservations in 
answer to specific items of text within the Convention. These reservations enumerate the specific 
protections from which the state may derogate while still maintaining its status as upholder of the 
normative standard defined within the text.        
 In this chapter, subsequent decisions are taken along two separate branches.22 I first report 
for each state an estimate of elite ability to influence the voting public. Can those who wish to 
maintain personal, party, or coalitional electoral viability better accomplish this goal by bending 
                                                          
22 The use of two separate means to estimate state-level utilities for the purpose of this chapter results from the fact 
that Austria and Greece are observed to have taken separate decisions at the second node along the dimension of 
analysis, to be discussed below. In Chapters 4 and 5, utilities are estimated in an identical manner because the focus 
states observed take the same decision at the second node. 
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to public sentiment, or by attempting to shape public sentiment? Where elites may take action “as 
if” having interpreted the highest level of ability to shape public sentiment (i.e., under the condition 
of top-down influence), estimates at subsequent nodes are taken based solely on the election and 
reelection or ouster of parties to have introduced, to have advocated for, or to have voted in favor 
of strict policies on questions of immigration and the presence of the other within the country’s 
territory. This outcome and this course of calculating utility estimates from this point forward is 
observed in only five of the 41 signatory states discussed in this work; this group of five countries 
includes Austria.           
 In the majority of countries, elite-mass influence is observed not to meet the strict criteria 
introduced in Chapter 2 for top-down direction. For Greece, utilities in subsequent sections are 
estimated based on election data compounded with and supplemented by data on measures of 
xenophobic sentiment, public-sector employment, strength of bureaucracy, and observed 
unemployment levels, as appropriate. These factors point to the predilection on the part of the elite 
seeking electoral survival within the state to reap the dual benefit of being seen to take action 
toward achieving full employment at home, while also gaining the opportunity to extend the 
median applicant’s wait to final status determination by essentially losing the applicant within 
processes inherent to newly expanded, newly complicated legal and bureaucratic systems. At the 
final node of analysis for both Austria and Greece, I report the electorate’s confidence in its 
government as revealed as a function of the positive or negative gains made by the parties to have 
won election during first observed election cycle, for the second election cycle. I follow with a 
section outlining developments within both Austria and Greece after the second observed election 
cycle.              
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1. Austria and Greece at T1: What Protections Have They Agreed to Uphold?                    
The period of time considered with this study begins with the run-up to the second pre-
2010 legislative election within each state observed. For Austria, I begin with the process leading 
up to the 2006 legislative election; for Greece, I begin with the process leading up to the 2007 
legislative election. At the relevant points in time, both Austria and Greece had signaled intent to 
comply with the terms of both the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol.    
 Both states were among the 26 to present delegates at the drafting of the 1951 Convention, 
and both were among its 18 original signatory states.23 The Convention and its instruments were 
given the force of law domestically through ratification in Austria in November 1954, and in 
Greece in April 1960. At the time of domestic ratification, both Austria and Greece communicated 
and registered reservations to specific items of text within the Convention. Those reservations not 
officially withdrawn at the point of time that begins this study are discussed in the body of the text 
below; withdrawn reservations are noted in footnote 25.      
 The Austrian delegation registered its reservation relating to Article 17, Paragraphs 1-2, 
which outlines conditions to be attached to the possible revocation of the right of those who have 
been granted asylum to engage in wage-earning employment. Pursuant to the text of Article 17, 
the right to earn a wage cannot be revoked by the host state if the asylee has resided without 
interruption within the country’s territory for three consecutive years, has become parent to a child 
holding the host-state nationality, or has been abandoned by a spouse who holds host-state 
nationality. Austria’s reservation stipulated that the three conditions outlined to prohibit the 
revocation of Article 17 rights would be understood as suggestions, and that these suggestions will 
                                                          
23 145 states have ratified or acceded to the Convention as of December 2015, with an additional three states having 
agreed to hold to the terms of the Convention by virtue of their status as signatory to the 1967 Protocol. 
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not bind Austrian lawmakers from setting their own more expansive24 criteria for the possible 
revocation of these rights.         
 The Austrian delegation also registered its reservation in answer to Article 22, Paragraph 
1, which guarantees the right of children of asylees to access any publicly available elementary-
level education. This reservation stipulated that acceptance of the instruments defined in Article 
22 does not imply the right of asylees to establish private elementary schools.   
 Austria’s reservation relating to Article 23, stipulating that the right to access public 
welfare assistance protocols must be accorded to asylees on the same level as it is accorded to 
nationals of the host state, expressed that the prohibition against differentiating between asylees 
and nationals in the provision of public assistance would only be applicable to public funds 
managed and paid at the federal level, and not to those funds managed or paid at the level of the 
Lander.            
 Austria also registered its reservation relating to Article 25, Paragraphs 2-3, which confers 
on the state the duty to provide and deliver or facilitate the provision and delivery of “documents 
and certifications” to any asylee who would otherwise “require the assistance of authorities of a 
foreign country to whom he cannot have recourse” as would be otherwise necessary for the asylee 
to access any right outlined in the Convention. This reservation stipulated that the language 
“documents and certifications” would be interpreted to include only refugee identity documents as 
were already being issued by the state.       
 The Greek delegation registered reservations in answer to nine instruments defined within 
the Convention, although only one reservation remained in place at the point of time that begins 
                                                          
24 Less expansive criteria for the revocation of Article 17 rights are explicitly permitted in the text of the Convention. 
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this study.25 This reservation is in answer to Article 26, which stipulates that an asylee’s freedom 
of movement and right to choose his place of residence may be “subject [only to those] regulations 
[that are] applicable to aliens generally.” The reservation notes that Greek authorities reserve the 
right to derogate from the enumerated protections in the event of a national emergency.  
 Apart from these reservations, Austria and Greece have agreed to be bound by the 
imperative to uphold all protections defined within the Convention and its Protocol.26  For the 
purpose of the theoretical model, these protections are understood to count among the states’ 
“preliminary endowments,” as the term is used in Chapter 2 with reference to the rationality 
assumption. At this point of the sequence, signatory state agreement to uphold these protections 
does not inform a hierarchical ordering and is understood as a non-stratifying decision. As for all 
states to have ratified or acceded to the Convention and its Protocol at the point of time that begins 
this study, the sequence continues for Austria and Greece.  
 2. Party Politics and the Ability to Shape Electorate Preferences 
For the decision at the first stratifying node, states weigh elite propensity to take action that 
may or may not reflect the wishes of the electorate. This is an imperfect measure, but a necessary 
one, and it has been established as a measure that is particularly lacking in the literature relating 
to electorate reception of elite strategies on dealing with populations of forced migrants. 
Importantly, Ivarsflaten (2005) finds strong support for the hypothesis that “…a larger proportion 
                                                          
25 In 1978, Greece officially withdrew its reservations to Article 11, relating to preferential treatment to refugee 
seamen, to Article 13, relating to the right of asylees to engage in leases and contracts, to Article 24, Paragraph 3, 
relating to the rights of asylees to access any future protections to be defined within bilateral agreements which may 
later be forged between the host state and a fellow signatory state, to Article 28, relating to the issuance of travel 
documents, to Article 31, guaranteeing immunity from prosecution on account of illegal entry for the purpose of 
initiating an asylum claim, to Article 32, guaranteeing due process rights to all claimants under threat of deportation, 
and to Article 34, conferring the duty upon the host state to expedite naturalization procedures for those granted 
asylum. In 1995, Greece withdrew its reservation to Article 17, relating to the prohibition against denying an asylee’s 
right to engage in wage-earning employment. Conditions under which Article 17 protections may not be revoked are 
discussed above in the case of Austria, for which the reservation remains on file. 
26 The Protocol was ratified without reservation in both states. 
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of the public will see restrictive immigration and asylum policies as an appropriate response to a 
larger variety of their concerns if a highly visible elite actor repeatedly argues that such 
connections exist” (Ivarsflaten 2005, p. 25).         
 Beginning with this idea, I embed into the sequence the very real possibility that electorates 
within some states may be more receptive than electorates within other states to respond to these 
cues. I attempt at this stage to account for the propensity to follow elite cues in general. It is a 
problematic restriction, and for this reason, I hold only those states scoring in the top 5% 
(Denmark, Italy, Latvia, and New Zealand, and as important for this chapter, Austria) on this 
measure as estimated in Chapter 2, Table 9 to further decisions under which this condition holds.  
For those states that do not register totals within the top 5% of all states (the 36 states remaining 
to take decisions, including Greece), I permit the possibility that measures of both elite and 
electorate views of the costs to be associated with the construction, maintenance, and enforcement 
of asylum policy will hold a greater level of importance than merely the electorate decision to 
ouster or to reseat the government that has taken action with regard to the relevant policies.  
 To follow, I outline role of public debates on issues of asylum at the point in time leading 
up to the 2006 Austrian legislative election and the 2007 Greek legislative election. In the case of 
Austria, issues of forced migration proved to be highly polarizing, and visible elites did attempt to 
shape the dialogue. Meyer and Rosenberger (2015) demonstrate that issues relating to migration 
became progressively more salient, and opinions became much and more polarized over the period 
from 1995 to 2009. To result was the implementation of a complicated web of policies that had 
the effect of incrementalizing any progress that would ultimately be made toward compliance with 
the normative standard through lengthening the wait time to final status determination. In Greece, 
issues of immigration were neither comparatively salient nor comparatively polarizing, as each of 
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the two mainline parties had since the mid-1990s engaged in movement toward the political center. 
By 2007, both ND and PASOK had long been observed to embrace and advocate most loudly for 
policy stances that were judged to be non-controversial and non-sectarian. Here, by sustaining and 
reshuffling mechanisms inherent to the unenforceable police and bureaucratic policies that were 
already in place while simultaneously engaging in de jure liberalization without protest in accord 
with EU directives, elites within Greece secured for themselves the opportunity to shift the 
migration dialogue. By taking no action to repair or update an antiquated system for processing 
claims, and then by blaming the very process of liberalization at the EU level for any problems 
that the electorate would perceive with regard to the influx of forced migrants, actors within each 
of the two mainstream parties were able to blame actors within the other for supporting costly EU 
regulations. This tactic was employed by actors on both sides of the aisle for short-term gain, and 
its use resulted in the slowing of progress toward the normative standard, also carrying the effect 
of lengthening the median applicant’s wait time to a final decision.     
 I follow with a treatment of the responsibility of the parties holding power, either as a 
government coalition member highly vocal on relevant issues (in Austria), or in the majority (in 
Greece) leading up to T1. Toward what political ends and with what political effects were the 
differing forms of relevant policies established or maintained?   
 Austria. Zaslove (2004) notes that within most West European countries, including Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, at least one radical right party had 
received at least 10% of the popular vote share in one or more national, regional, or local elections 
between 1990 and 2001. In Austria, the emergence of the FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria) as a 
radical right, anti-immigrant, nativist party had begun four years earlier with Jörg Haider’s 
September 1986 defeat of liberal Vice Chancellor Norbert Steger for the party leadership post at 
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the FPÖ party convention in Innsbruck. By this point in time, Haider had established a long, strong, 
and vocal record of perpetuating nativist sentiment during his tenure as leader of the FPÖ in the 
province of Carthinia, and he had written and spoken extensively on his nativist views. The bulk 
of Haider’s nativist rhetoric focused on exploiting fears over immigration (Art 2007).   
 Prior to the convention, FPÖ had been in government as the minority member in coalition 
with the social democratic SPÖ; following Haider’s election to the party leadership post, SPÖ 
immediately terminated the coalition and called for new elections. Following the election, FPÖ 
was excluded from government, but the party began to experience growth in both membership and 
the number of public offices held. The party’s ideology was greatly radicalized under Haider, and 
as party leader, Haider allowed many with links to right-wing extremist organizations to appear 
on party lists and to hold office at the local and regional levels. As a result, FPÖ is noted to have 
met castigation by the mainstream parties as a dangerous right-wing pariah (Luther 2000).  
 In opposition after the 1986 election, FPÖ was still able to influence the political agenda 
to suit its post-Steger era aims. Under Haider’s leadership, the party forcefully emphasized and 
intentionally conflated the issues of immigration and crime to the extent that the two issues became 
fused in the mind of the voting public into the single issue of “immigrant crime” (Zaslove 2004). 
Immigration was argued to be the cause behind not only growing crime rates, but also behind the 
creation of slums, the shortage of housing, growing levels of unemployment, and classroom 
overcrowding. Haider had written as early as 1993 that these developments were   
“especially striking in the large cities where one does not know one’s neighborhood 
 anymore, where old people must spend the twilight of their lives in complete 
 isolation and  loneliness, and where young people satisfy their longing for 
 community too often in criminal gangs and drug circles” (Haider 1993, p. 86; 
 translation in Zaslove 2004).  
 
96 
 
 
 
This quote was used widely within the party – first to call for stricter immigration laws, and later, 
to call for stricter laws pertaining to asylum in order to put an end to what the party claimed to be 
widespread abuse of human rights protection procedures.27     
 The mainstream parties were able to keep Haider’s FPÖ out of government for over 13 
years. Although SPÖ had long ruled out entering into another coalition with FPÖ, the other 
mainstream party, the center-right ÖVP (Austrian People’s Party) had long been engaged in 
intermittent, behind-the-scenes talks with FP Ö leadership regarding the possibility of uniting the 
two parties under a broader, anti-social-democratic banner should the opportunity present itself 
(Luther 2000). FPÖ emerged as the second most popular party during the 1999 election, followed 
by ÖVP in third. Following the election and a three-month negotiation procedure, a new FPÖ- 
ÖVP government was formed despite the SPÖ receipt of the largest overall vote share, and over 
the president’s vocal objection due to fear of the inclusion of a radical-right party in government. 
The EU-14 (the EU-15 minus Austria) and the United States voiced further objections, all declaring 
that bilateral ministerial contacts would be suspended and that no Austrian candidates would be 
supported for positions in international organizations. Also, Israel withdrew its ambassador to 
Austria and banned Haider from entry to its territory.28      
 During the run-up to the 1999 election, the FPÖ anti-immigration stance was considered 
to be well known, and it did not figure prominently in the campaign outside of Vienna. In Vienna, 
however, anti-immigration became one of the party’s top issues due both to the calculation that it 
would play well in the urban center that was home to the majority of the country’s undocumented 
immigrants and to local competition from a new right-wing spinoff party, the DU (The 
                                                          
27 In the same text, Haider argues that Islam cannot be viewed as compatible with West European values, and that 
immigration and asylum protection cannot be delinked from cultural compatibility (p. 176). 
28 By September 2000, all EU-14, US, and Israeli sanctions were lifted (Muller and Fallend 2004). 
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Independents). Still, 47% percent of FPÖ voters listed the party’s anti-immigration stand as a 
factor important to their decision to cast a ballot for the party (Muller 2000). Luther (2000) reports 
that party leadership took the calculation that blaming high levels of immigration on industry and 
its complicity in hiring undocumented immigrants would attract these working class voters. This 
seems to have turned out to be correct; by 1999, FPÖ membership was disproportionately 
represented by over 25% of blue-collar workers and over 55% of voters holding only a vocational 
education (Luther 2000).          
 This period of FPÖ as party in government saw a continuation of the trend of issues of 
immigration and asylum becoming increasingly contentious. Public debates became increasingly 
intense, and policy became increasingly restrictive (Peintinger 2012). By 2005, due to the growing 
importance of issues of asylum abuse in particular, both the ÖVP and the SPÖ had come to 
advocate and vote for more restrictive asylum policies. In debate over the drafting of Austria’s 
October 2001 Law on Integration, FPÖ leadership argued that protection under the Refugee 
Convention was easily manipulated by criminals, murderers, and terrorists. Haider had personally 
sought to encode the stipulation that only those of European birth should be permitted to access 
Austrian asylum protection, while its drafters in the ÖVP objected that such a restriction was 
forbidden within the text of the Convention itself (Zaslove 2004). The FPÖ-ÖVP compromise 
legislation included the harsh and nearly unprecedented stipulation that in order to be judged 
worthy of asylum protection, the applicant must meet an additional legal burden – to prove 
country-of-origin complicity in the applicant’s persecution. Prior to the 2001 law, among 
Convention signatory states, this burden of proof on the asylum applicant had been mandated only 
in Switzerland.          
 The process of applying for asylum is an administrative procedure that confers the right to 
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appeal to a judicial body. Until 2003, all negative decisions, both at first instance and on appeal, 
carried automatic suspensive effect.29 The 2001 Law on Integration was amended in 2003 to 
stipulate that this suspensive effect would no longer be understood as automatic; while still 
permitted, suspensive effect must be applied for through a separate bureaucratic procedure. 
 This new bureaucratic procedure became burdensome, and this new burden on the state 
was addressed in small part with the Settlement and Residence Act of 2005. At any point after an 
immigrant’s entry to Austrian territory, irrespective of whether the immigrant has filed an asylum 
claim, has a claim proceeding, or has been denied asylum at first instance or on appeal, the 
government may grant to individuals permits for permanent settlement on humanitarian grounds. 
This became problematic as well due to the fact that no procedure for applying for the permit was 
written into the 2005 law; accordingly, these permits were granted solely on an ex-officio basis.30 
The law passed with overwhelming support of both coalition parties as well as the SPÖ on the 
basis that the grant of residence on humanitarian grounds would prove to form the basis for later 
steps to fight fraudulent asylum claims (Rosenberger and Konig 2011).    
 In its 2006 Operational Goals for Austria, UNHCR (2006a) listed the imperatives to 
increase access to Austrian territory for potential asylum claimants, to respect the principle of non-
refoulement, and to decrease media coverage of xenophobic statements. Where xenophobic 
statements were made and covered by media outlets, they were to be answered by commentary 
that the statements were provocative and problematic. Against this backdrop, the FPÖ saw its 
membership dwindle to 10% of the electorate. In order to possibly maintain the coalition following 
                                                          
29 “Suspensive effect” denotes the condition under which a decision is considered final pending later appeal. Prior to 
2003, negative decisions could not result in deportation orders because it was assumed under the law that an appeal 
was pending. Following the 2003 amendment, after a negative decision is issued, the denied claimant may still apply 
for suspensive effect through a separate procedure, but until this effect is granted, a deportation order may be issued. 
30 The Settlement and Residence Act of 2005 was amended in 2009 to outline a new process for applying for protection 
on humanitarian grounds. This procedure lies entirely outside the country’s asylum framework, and is treated under 
law as a completely separate procedure. 
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the 2007 election, Haider was able to wrest promises of concessions on issues unrelated to 
immigration under the tacit understanding that the ÖVP had largely taken over the issue (Muller 
2004).             
 This history established, I use further treatment of the Austrian case to explicate points two 
through six along the second dimension of analysis as presented in Chapter 2. This treatment 
begins with the 2007 Austrian legislative election.      
 Greece. In Greece, PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) named Kostas Simitis party 
leader in 1996. Simitis had been an outspoken advocate for moving the party to the center by 
gradually deemphasizing its earlier socialist agenda in favor of emphasis on EU cooperation and 
the need for greater interaction between all members of the state in order to achieve goals that 
would be favored by the entire population. In this effort, Simitis branded PASOK as “the anti-
populist party,” and he worked to create and popularize an understanding in which populist 
interests were equated with sectarian interests. To those receiving this narrative, members of ND 
(New Democracy, the previously right party, soon also to move to the center) were to be seen as 
the populists and sectarians (Spourdalakis and Tassis 2006). Despite clear and pervasive anti-right, 
anti-ND rhetoric, no attempt was made to reach out to traditionally left parties or their voters 
through subsequent electoral campaigns or through any discernable pattern of policy promotion or 
voting in parliament.          
 In early 1997, ND held its Fourth Party Congress, at which Kostas Karamanlis was elected 
party leader. Karamanlis was inexperienced, never having held any ministerial post, yet he was 
unburdened by popular notion of the party’s previous farther-to-the-right past. Over the next seven 
years, Karamanlis worked to answer PASOK rhetoric with his own party’s move to the center, 
notably coopting the coupling of the practice of center-policy advocacy with anti-socialist, anti-
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PASOK dialogue. Center-policy advocacy included a political program that emphasized 
education, social order, state efficiency, combatting issues of tax evasion and corruption, and  
protection of the environment.        
 In this race-to-the-center environment, both mainstream parties avoided talk on issues that 
were seen to be divisive. As important to this work, these divisive issues included any possible 
solutions to questions of high levels of undocumented migration. Members of both parties 
established talking points that addressed these issues of migration on two grounds – first, that the 
EU was to blame for Greece’s problems with undocumented migration (largely resulting from the 
Dublin Accord definition of the state responsible to handle a potential asylee’s claim), and second, 
that members of the opposing party were responsible for allowing the EU to impose its will on 
Greece. Karamanidou (2015) notes that during debate on Greece’s 2001 Immigration Law,31 the 
PASOK Minister of the Interior was quoted as saying that the “mass entry of migrants was proven 
to be an unviable solution by the unsuccessful policy [concessions to the EU by the] ND in the 
period 1990 to 1993,” to which an ND MP countered that “the ‘fenceless vine’ was [PASOK’s] 
construction between 1994 and 2001”32 (Hellenic Parliament 2001, p. 5604; quoted and translated 
in Karamanidou 2015).         
 In January 2004, Simitis stepped down as party leader, as polls had begun to indicate that 
there was no scenario under which PASOK would be able to participate in government following 
                                                          
31 2001 law: (Law No. 2910/2001) Provided a new opportunity for previously undocumented entrants to access asylum 
protection, under the condition that they could provide proof of 12-months continued residence in Greece. 
32 The “fenceless vine” refers to a well-known Greek idiom that relates to an injury that cannot be halted or controlled 
due to a lack of preparation on the part of those who should have taken care to prevent the injury. The full idiom can 
be translated to English as “like a dog at a fenceless vine.” It is understood to refer to a situation similar to one in 
which a vine has grown too close to the ground because no fence was erected on which the vine was able to climb; 
the injury itself is understood to have been committed by a dog that was, therefore, able to eat all of the vine’s fruits. 
As it relates here, the immigrants are understood as the dogs, and the lack of needed infrastructure to prevent their 
entry is understood as the “fenceless vine.”   
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the April 2004 election. He was replaced by Georgios Papandreou, who was observed to send 
ambivalent ideological messages and to perform poorly in the pre-election debates, and was 
therefore unable to reverse PASOK’s fate in time for the upcoming election. During the shift in 
PASOK leadership, ND dialogue focused heavily on social fatigue resulting from PASOK’s long 
tenure of power (Pappas and Dinas 2006). ND regained power in 2004. During this time, 0.9% of 
asylum claims were approved in 2004; EU member state average for the approval of claims was 
at 26.4%. In all of 2005, only two asylum claims were granted at first instance; denied claims 
included those initiated by medically certified torture survivors (UNHCR 2006b).   
 Up to this point, both mainstream parties had addressed immigration solely as a security 
issue, and border controls were advocated as the sole response to immigration issues by both 
parties. The border control dialogue itself became more centrist, with the more notable shift having 
taken place by members of the previously-right wing ND. Now in government, ND advanced the 
2005 Immigration Law, which it framed in terms of ensuring “equal participation of migrants in 
economic development” (Hellenic Parliament 2005, p. 650; translated in Karamanidou 2015). The 
Immigration Law provided an opportunity for undocumented entrants to access asylum protection 
mechanisms provided that they could prove that they had entered Greece prior to December 31, 
2004. The law also incorporated EU directives regarding family reunification and long-term 
resident immigrants (Migration Policy Institute 2012).      
 At the end of 2005, EC Council Directive 2005/85/EC articulated several items in partial 
response to Greek issues with managing its large number of claimants, as these were not being 
addressed in Greek domestic law. These include the following, as reported in the Official Journal 
of the European Union (2005): 
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Chapter 3, Section II, Article 26 – “A country can be considered to be a first country of 
asylum for a particular applicant if: a.) he/she has been recognized in that country as a 
refugee and he/she can still avail himself/herself of that protection; or, b.) he/she 
otherwise enjoys sufficient protection in that country, including benefitting from the 
principle of non-refoulement; provided that he/she will be readmitted to that country.” 
Chapter 3, Section II, Article 27 – “Member states may apply the safe third country 
concept only where the competent authorities are satisfied are satisfied that a person 
seeking asylum will be treated in accordance with the following principles in the third 
country concerned: b.) non-refoulement; c.) prohibition against cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment as laid down in international law is respected.”  
The goal was not to force Greece to comply with instruments of the Convention or the Dublin 
Accord; instead, the goal was to prepare other European states to address shortfalls in the Greek 
procedures, as no effort to correct these shortfalls was being taken by the Greek parliament. 
 In March 2006, UNHCR launched a campaign to highlight the difficulties of being an 
asylum seeker in Greece. The campaign focused on the difficulties that potential seekers face when 
trying to cross the border and to apply for asylum, the low number of asylum grants, and the lack 
of measures in place for the protection of vulnerable groups, such as women, children, torture 
survivors, and land-mine victims.         
 The situation in both of these countries clarifies the corresponding move within the model 
I develop in Chapter 2. In Austria, under the condition of top-down direction of influence, and 
providing support for the Ivarsflaten hypothesis, where a vocal elite argues that immigration and 
asylum are causal to a wide variety of perceived social ills, the electorate will take the cue. In 
Greece, where no such vocal elite existed, and under the condition of bottom-up influence, and 
where issues of immigration and asylum are not perceived as important as discrete issues, the elite 
face no pressure to respond with policy. 
3. Election Results         
 The Austrian parliamentary election was held on October 1, 2006. At the end of a three-
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month negotiation period, the two mainline parties, ÖVP and SPÖ, formed a grand coalition. 
Although ÖVP and SPÖ had both suffered losses in the number of parliamentary seats (with a loss 
of 13 seats previously held by ÖVP and one seat previously held by SPÖ) the two mainline parties 
together maintained 134 of 183 seats. Despite its increase of three seats, the FPÖ was excluded 
from government. However, anti-immigration and anti-asylum abuse remained important in the 
minds of voters, and both mainline parties had by this time incorporated aspects of the FPÖ agenda 
into their party programs. Although this would count by any metric as a left-shift in government, 
it is important to note that on issues of immigration and asylum, both the left- and right- members 
of the new government coalition had moved markedly to the right.     
 The Greek parliamentary election was held on September 16, 2007. ND won its second 
term of government with 41.83% of the vote despite its loss of 13 of parliamentary seats, followed 
by PASOK with 38.10% of the vote and its resulting loss of 15 parliamentary seats. Although 
immigration and asylum issues were not important to voters as discrete issues the increase in vote 
share for ND does constitute a right-move in government.      
 For Greece, as for all countries observed in this study for which the criteria set forth for the 
condition of top-down influence is not met, this measure is compounded for the purpose of the 
model with a measure of xenophobic sentiment, as captured in the Fourth Wave of the World 
Values Survey as outlined in Chapter 2. Xenophobic sentiment is measured by a question asking 
the respondent to identify those whom s/he would not wish to have as neighbors; percentages of 
those identifying “immigrants and foreign workers” are reported and calculated against Romania’s 
baseline of 21.8%. Greece did not participate in the Wave Four survey; I report the mean value of 
all observed states (at 13.8%) for Greece as for all states for which no survey data were available. 
This estimate is likely a conservative estimate for Greece, and as such, it poses no threat to the 
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logic of Greek placement on this measure within the model. In its 2007 report, “Racism and 
Xenophobia in the EU,” the European Agency for Fundamental Rights reports that from 2005-
2006, the Greek Ombudsman had “received a substantial number of complaints,” and that of this 
number in 2005, 47% concerned discrimination on racial or ethnic origin, and that of this number 
in 2006, 45% concerned discrimination on racial or ethnic origin (EAFR 2007).   
 Due to the right shift, either in policy advocacy in Austria or in party movement in Greece, 
and because the country’s holder of a value at or above the mean value of xenophobic sentiment 
reported for Greece under its condition of bottom-up influence, both states move on to take 
calculations and collect utilities at subsequent nodes.     
 4. Following Through with Policy 
Following Austria’s 2006 election, the SPÖ-ÖVP grand coalition took control of 
government. Although both parties had implemented aspects of the FPÖ program into their own 
programs as they related to issues of immigration and asylum, it is important to note that during 
the entire first two years of the coalition (between the 2006 and 2008 elections), no new laws were 
introduced governing immigration or asylum policy. In fact, the period from late 2006 to late 2008 
marks the only period during the entire decade in which asylum access was not further restricted. 
This may be attributed to the fact that during this period, the further-right ÖVP sought to distance 
itself from its history of cooperation with the FPÖ, and immigration and asylum had long been the 
issues that defined the FPÖ in the minds of Austrian voters. In 2007, Austria received 11,974 
asylum applications; in 2008, Austria received 12,801 asylum applications.    
 By contrast, in the year of the ND victory in the Greek legislative election, Greece received 
25,113 asylum applications, and in the following year, Greece received 19,884 applications 
(UNHCR 2009b). At this point in time, the process of applying for asylum in Greece involved 
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lining up outside the Attica Police Department to wait to plead the applicant’s case for a first 
instance hearing. Up to 2000 people would line up outside the police department every Saturday 
waiting for one of an average of 20 interview slots. Many are reported to have stood in line every 
week for several months for the opportunity to file their claims and plead their cases for a first -
instance hearing. If the applicant was to make it through the line to claim one of the 20 slots, the 
applicant was to provide a physical address in Greece – a problematic restriction due to the fact 
that the applicant may not have had the opportunity to have secured housing. Yet failure to provide 
an address created a situation in which it was impossible for the state to notify the claimant of 
developments in and deadlines for important procedural steps relating to his or her case; the system 
had built in no mechanism for dealing with this difficulty (UNHCR 2009b).   
 As of 2008, despite the Convention-mandated access to legal assistance for potential 
claimants, no provision for access to such assistance was legislated for first-instance hearings. The 
Greek government did recognize the need for the denied claimant to access legal assistance after 
an appeal of a negative decision had been filed, although there was no provision for funding this 
assistance at the state level. As a result, all legal aid not paid for by the applicant was provided 
free-of charge by NGOs (Karamanidou and Schuster 2012), with the largest share of assistance 
being provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross.   
 Creating an additional problem for Greece in dealing with high numbers of undocumented 
immigration is the allocation of Frontex resources to the Mediterranean Sea border with Europe. 
In practice, this has forced the majority of people fleeing and subsequently reaching Greek territory 
to enter through the country’s land border with Turkey. Greek authorities have assumed the share 
of the land-border security work, and have largely ignored the Convention-mandated provision 
barring refoulement. Turning an applicant back across the Turkish border creates problems 
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stemming from the fact that Turkey, although a signatory to the 1951 Convention, has not adopted 
the 1967 Protocol. Importantly, the Protocol expanded the Convention definition of “asylee” to 
include potential claimants who are not fleeing war in Europe (originally narrowly conceived, 
following the end of and potential reemergence of hostilities after WWII) or protection based on 
tensions stemming from the Cold War (Karamanidou and Schuster 2012). Therefore, those sent 
back to Turkey are not recognized as holders of standing under the Convention, and no Convention-
mandated protections are applied.        
 Beginning in March 2008, Amnesty International called on EU member states to invoke 
the “sovereignty clause” under Article 3.2 of the Dublin Accord. This clause allows for the 
prospect that a state may hear an asylum claim, even if such an examination is not the state’s legal 
responsibility under the Accord, for reasons that include circumventing the possibility that a 
transfer would result in the applicant’s treatment under unfair asylum procedures or reception 
conditions. As with the 2005 EC Council Directive, the aim of this call was to place pressure on 
other European states to address deficiencies in the Greek asylum procedure by allowing applicant 
access to their own domestic asylum procedures under the condition that the applicant had entered 
the community Dublin Accord signatory states through Greece.     
 Due to Austria’s selection as one of five states to have met the criteria for top-down 
direction of influence, the utility reported for its right-shift in policy advocacy at the previous node 
is duplicated at this node. For Greece, the optimal move strategy is calculated as a function of the 
percentage of the vote-eligible public employed in the public sector. Greece has demonstrated a 
history of fostering job growth through provisions that have expanded its bureaucratic and law 
enforcement institutions, and problems associated with asylum in Greece are due to the 
maintenance and subsequent understaffing of its police and bureaucratic procedures within the 
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increasingly overburdened and increasingly archaic net-emigration era asylum procedures. For 
these reasons, I hold that most viable potential benefit to Greece’s increasingly centrist parties can 
be reaped through promises of addition staff to its already existing public service force. On this 
measure, a higher score is reported only for Sweden. Both states continue to collect utilities into 
the subsequent node. 
 5. Maintaining / Advancing the Party Line 
Again at this node, Austria’s SPÖ-ÖVP grand coalition maintains power; no new laws on 
asylum are passed during the two-year period between the 2006 and 2008 elections. However, 
sensing both the increasing salience of questions relating to the presence of the outsider within 
Austria’s borders and the lack of dialogue being advanced by the SPÖ and the ÖVP in answer to 
still-rising public concern on the matter, the FPÖ successor party, BZÖ (Alliance for the Future of 
Austria) begins to step up its rhetoric on issues of asylum.     
 Headed by Jörg Haider, the BZÖ assumed the FPÖ position in coalition with the ÖVP in 
2005 for its last year in government. The party had moderated its nativist views following Haider’s 
death in an automobile accident only weeks after the 2006 election, but later took advantage of the 
new government coalition’s lack of response to mass concerns over the presence of the asylum 
seeker in Austria. BZÖ rhetoric on asylum took a turn even more public and blatant than 
predecessor party FPÖ rhetoric had taken with the run-up to Austria’s 2008 election; this will be 
discussed in detail in the following section.       
 In Greece, the ND government issued Presidential Decree 90/2008. To address concerns 
raised by the EU in 2005 and by Amnesty International earlier in 2008, this decree proclaimed that 
the Aliens’ Directorates of Attica (Athens) and Thessaloniki, the security departments at all of the 
country’s airports, and Police Directorates within each of the country’s 53 counties had now been 
staffed, trained, and judged “competent … to receive and register asylum claims” (Presidential 
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Decree 90/2008, quoted in UNHCR 2009b). However, it remained nearly impossible for a 
potential applicant to file a claim outside of Athens. Sea and land entry points and most police 
departments remained unstaffed or understaffed, and the Aliens’ Directorates remained practically 
inaccessible to potential claimants, as many had no information on how to reach the relevant 
Directorates. The Athens airport was staffed with those competent to initiate the asylum claims 
procedure, but no interpretation services or legal counsel were provided. In practice, nearly 90% 
of all claims following the Presidential Decree were still to be filed with the Attica Police 
Department (UNHCR 2009b).        
 For Austria, the utility reported in the previous two nodes is duplicated at the current node. 
For Greece, the utility reported is calculated as a second function of the impetus to create jobs 
within the newly expanded bureaucratic and law enforcement mechanism. As I outline in Chapter 
2, because the most saleable benefit for the expansion of these mechanisms is its capacity to create 
jobs, Greece collects a utility calculated as a function of its mean observed unemployment level 
for the two-year interim between the two election cycles observed. Among the 12 states still 
remaining to take decisions at this node under the condition of bottom-up influence, only the 
Dominican Republic reports a mean unemployment level higher than that observed in Greece.  
Both Austria and Greece continue to collect utilities into the final node.   
 6. Keep The Rule Makers in Office? 
In the run-up to the 2008 election, the most vocal proponent of anti-asylum seeker 
sentiment was the FPÖ splinter party, the BZÖ. The BZÖ circulated its own campaign capitalizing 
on the lack of government attention to issues of asylum during the two-year period of the SPÖ-
ÖVP grand coalition (Richardson and Wodak 2009). Examples are seen in Figures 6 and 7, below.
 In part as a result of this campaign, the BZÖ won a greater increase in parliamentary seats 
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than any other party for the September 28, 2008 election. The only other party to experience an 
increase in seats was a newly reimagined FPÖ. The SPÖ received only 29.26% of the vote share,  
resulting in a loss of 11 seats in parliament; the ÖVP received only 25.98% of the vote, resulting 
in the loss of 15 seats in parliament. Although the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition remained in government 
following the election, the result of the vote was read widely by media observers and political 
pundits as a referendum on anti-immigration and anti-asylum policy, which the far right had won. 
The government coalition would use this perceived mandate to further complicate asylum access 
throughout its term in office, as I discuss in the following section. 
           
  
Figure 6. “We are cleansing Graz!” Peter Westenthaler & Gerald Grosz. They are cleansing Graz of 
“political corruption,” “asylum abuse,” “beggars,” and “foreign criminality” (Translation in Richardson 
and Wodak).  
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Figure 7. A man named as Amir Z is labeled as “asylum seeker and drug dealer.” Quoted as saying “Please 
do not vote for the BZÖ because I would like to continue with my business dealings” (Translation in 
Richardson and Wodak). 
 
 In Greece, PASOK replaced ND in government with an absolute but narrow majority in 
parliamentary seats in what was judged to be a landslide election (Kovras 2009). PASOK won all 
13 Greek regions and won an increase of 58 seats in parliament, having earned 43.92% of the vote. 
ND was popularly seen by this time as highly corrupt, and as a result, lost 61 seats in parliament, 
having earned only 33.47% of the vote.        
 In the preceding sections, I have led the reader through the Chapter 2 model with reference 
to two countries for which the configuration of compliance institutions is most strongly predicted 
to permit an understanding of asylum outcomes, specifically as these outcomes are understood 
through the median applicant wait time to final status determination. In both Austria and Greece, 
these institutions have been constructed or maintained with the end of instrumental cost evasion 
through the incrementalizing of progress toward the normative goal enumerated within the 
Convention. I have recast many of the input factors previously held as causal to the distribution of 
pending asylum claims as markers of structure and potentially useful toward answers to questions 
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of where the institution should matter. Then in subsequent sections, I have outlined the domestic 
political environments within these two states in order to lend clarity to the model as it addresses 
a second question – how should the institution matter? Through each point along this second 
dimension of analysis, I have shown how the time-specific debate (in Austria) or non-debate (in 
Greece) has played out to inform the conclusion that elites within both states have avoided cost 
through two separate means – instrumental action in Austria, and instrumental inaction in Greece. 
In the following section, I discuss developments as they have occurred in both focus countries 
following the second observed election cycle. 
After the Elections: Continued Problems in Austria and Greece  
 Austria. Following the BZÖ campaign and the rise of the radical right element as a result 
of the 2008 election, in February 2009, UNHCR launched a campaign to debunk myths about 
asylum seekers. With the aim to show the helplessness of those who had been forced to flee to 
Austria, this campaign set out to popularize the slogan “Flucht ist nie freiwillig” (Fleeing is never 
voluntary; translation in UNHCR press release.) This campaign made use of a 25-second spot, 
which aired widely on television and radio and was screened in cinemas and during a soccer match 
in Salzburg. Cards carrying the slogan were distributed across university campuses and in campus-
area bars throughout Austria, and billboards displaying the slogan were employed across the 
country. The campaign ran from mid-February through the end of March 2009 (UNHCR 2009). 
 In 2010, Austrian police hired officers and assigned to them the sole task of tracking down 
immigrants and asylum seekers thought to be illegally claiming humanitarian protection. These 
officers received special training with regard to the conduct of nighttime raids on refugee centers 
and buildings known to house asylum seekers. To justify the program, ÖVP Interior Minister 
Maria Fekter is quoted as follows: 
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 “Some of them are operating illegal vehicle workshops. There are some who have 
 registered dozens of vehicles. And so we are investigating the details to see if these 
 people really require aid” (Translation in Skyring). 
Fekter estimates the cost of providing basic necessities for the country’s asylum seekers at €100-
million (roughly equivalent to US$ 130-million) per year (Skyring 2010).   
 I close discussion of Austria with a note on case #S11 408.911/2009/3E (Austrian Asylum 
Court 2009). Although this discussion is clearly anecdotal, its inclusion here suggests and clearly 
highlights problems in normative compliance inherent to the Austrian asylum system insofar 
these problems result from increasing complexities to Austrian investigative, bureaucratic, and 
judicial processes.           
 The Austrian Asylum Court heard the appeal of a Chechen applicant and his family who 
were seeking asylum protection from Russia. The husband’s case had been ordered by the Federal 
Asylum Office to be out of its scope and demanded the applicant’s case transferred to Poland, 
while the same ruling had demanded that the case involving the applicant’s wife and two children 
be transferred to the Czech Republic. The Court’s ruling noted that the bureaucratic mechanisms 
in place for investigating the husband’s case separately from that of the rest of his family based 
on their dates of entry to Austria were inadequate and conducted in an arbitrary manner, that the 
separate determinations were based on investigations conducted by bodies that did not consult 
with each other during the period of investigation, and that the Asylum Office ruling violated 
binding EU principles of family maintenance and reunification procedures with regard to asylum 
seekers.          
 Following the court’s ruling, the decision on the applicants’ case was remanded to the 
Federal Asylum Office. Here, the Asylum Office demanded that the husband prove that he was 
the biological father of his two children by submitting the three to a DNA test; this test was to be 
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paid for at the husband’s expense. The husband appealed this decision, claiming that he did not 
have the €1000 needed to pay for the test. This appeal was denied. By the time the husband had 
collected enough money to pay for the test, his wife and two children had already been deported 
to the Czech Republic. After the tests were conducted (at an even greater expense, due to the 
distance between the husband and his children), it was determined that the two children were 
biologically his own, and the wife and children were permitted to return to Austria to initiate a 
new asylum claim.          
 This new claim was denied by the Federal Asylum Office, and the decision was again 
appealed to the Asylum Court. On appeal in the summer of 2012, the family was recognized as 
asylees in Austria. In total, the procedure from first hearing to final hearing included eight series 
of interviews, three appeals, three deportation orders, eight separate decisions issued by the 
Federal Asylum Office, and eight separate decisions issued by the Asylum Court. 
 Greece. At the end of 2009, the newly elected PASOK government acknowledged 
problems in processing claims and announced that changes would be necessary. Among the 
proposed plans were to be the eventual transfer of the decision procedure from the hands of local 
police departments to the Central Asylum Service (Amnesty International 2010a). This new 
bureaucracy would only become established in late 2011. Among the changes to be implemented 
immediately was the abolition of the Independent Asylum Appeals Board and its replacement 
with a judicial review process before the Council of State. Judicial decisions were merely 
advisory opinions, pending official decision to be issued following a review of the proceeding 
by the office of the Alternate Minister of Public Order.     
 Procedurally, little has changed in Greece. In 2015, the Central Asylum Office 
implemented a new system that replaced the requirement that the potential asylee wait outside a 
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local police department for a first-instance claim evaluation with a system that relies on Skype 
to conduct these evaluations with the office’s own representatives. However, access is 
problematic, and the system itself is understaffed and insufficiently funded (Owens 2016). 
Internet service is not provided at refugee housing centers; instead, those wishing to keep their 
appointments for evaluation are given directions to an access point which is, in some cases, over 
an hour away from where the potential asylee is living. As of May 2016, there are reports of 
seekers receiving busy signals or waiting on hold for hours at a time to have their initial claims 
evaluated. 
Conclusion: Polar Ideal Types and the Domestic Politics of Cost Evasion  
 States will perceive that any compliance mechanism to be written into domestic law will 
carry real and significant costs to the state under three conditions. Where these conditions are met, 
the content of the state-instituted rules will display the greatest effect on outcomes. First, the rule 
to be constructed, maintained, and enforced will be more likely to carry real costs because states 
will be more able to or will be more likely be called on to pay any costs to be associated with the 
rule. The rule building process itself cannot be used to communicate costless signals because 
within these states, it is understood that the states will inevitably be forced to pay whatever costs 
they promise to pay. Second, these costs will be paid to higher numbers in-migrants in states 
hosting lower ratios of entrants whose presence had not been previously negotiated by UNHCR or 
other human rights bodies to those whose presence within the country had been either documented 
or negotiated by these bodies. Third, these costs will be paid over longer periods of time as 
applicants appeal negative decisions, fight deportation orders, and continue to access state 
resources while residing in these countries. Given that these states can be understood to have 
erected institutions informed by the expectation that the outcomes of the rule-building process 
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would carry real costs, elites are shown to have implemented procedures that would display 
measurable effects on the length of time to final status determination.       
 Through the cases of Austria and Greece, I have elucidated the conditions under which the 
tactic of cost avoidance through an increase in the effective length of time to final status 
determination can be understood as the most likely course of action in creating, maintaining, and 
enforcing a state’s domestic compliance institutions. These two states exemplify two opposing 
means of evading cost: instrumental action in Austria, and instrumental inaction in Greece. Austria 
has revised its policies numerous times, particularly over the course of the 2000s. These revisions 
have had the effect of further complicating processes that the potential asylee must undertake, 
while subsequently permitting suspensive effect on negative decisions and effectively losing many 
claimants within webs of bureaucratic and judicial processes. In short, Austria was forced to take 
action in order to accomplish these ends, and its domestic political environment facilitated this 
action. Greece, by contrast, has maintained and further embedded aspects of its net-emigration era 
system; no action was necessary, and its domestic political environment encouraged this lack of 
action. Policies regarding the processing of forced migrants were judged not to be particularly 
salient to Greek voters as discrete issues, and at the same time, both of the main parties are noted 
to have engaged in race-to-the-center politics during the period of time under consideration. In this 
environment, instrumental inaction is shown to have proven less costly to elites who have been 
able to retain and strengthen political power by two means: by not explicitly advocating change or 
addressing the lack of change to the net-emigration era system, and by assigning culpability for 
the country’s high number of potential asylees on the process of EU liberalization and the opposing 
party’s complicity with EU mandated liberalization processes.    
 Through an understanding of these two poles of cost-evasive behavior, I suggest that future 
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research will be better able to abstract, measure, and predict practices undertaken toward the goal 
of cost avoidance on issues of Convention implementation, maintenance, and enforcement. Among 
states seeking to avoid anticipated costs specifically related to issues of compliance, to which mode 
of cost-evasive behavior will the state comply more fully? Will the greater output of a state’s work 
be better understood through the instrumental enactment of procedures resulting to greater 
complicate processes that the median applicant must undertake, or will the greater output of a 
state’s work be better understood through the instrumental reliance on strengthening and further 
embedding existing, yet demonstrably ineffective compliance mechanisms?  
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CHAPTER 4 – COST ACCEPTANCE AND EXPEDIENT GAINS: 
INSTRUMENTALIZING PRESSURES FROM THE OUTSIDE VS. PRESSURES FROM 
THE INSIDE 
With the previous chapter, I have discussed the workings of the Chapter 2 model as they 
relate to two countries for which institutional output is suggested to display measurable effects on 
the length of time to final status determination for the median applicant awaiting decision on an 
asylum claim. In Austria and Greece, the more intuitive scenario – cost avoidance – is observed 
through the construction, maintenance, and enforcement of implementing procedures that have 
served to lengthen applicant wait to final status determination. The outcome is the diminishment 
of the effective cost to be paid by the state, and achievement of this effect is demonstrated to have 
taken form through the implementation of two discrete modes of state behavior – instrumental 
action in Austria, and instrumental inaction in Greece.       
 With this chapter, the aim is to present the workings of calculations taken toward the 
achievement of the opposite effect. Where it is understood that the state’s institutional output will 
prove predictive of the number of pending asylum claims within the host state, but elites within 
the host state perceive neither the political will nor the practical ability to decrease future payout 
on costs relating to asylum, elites may seek opportunities to instrumentalize pressures on other 
issues toward the achievement of policy that results in the reduction of applicant wait time to final 
status determination. Through action to address these pressures, losses to be assumed through the 
payout of higher costs on asylum processing may be taken instrumentally toward goals that are 
necessary to achieve greater legitimacy for elites in the struggle to maintain policy influence and 
electoral power.         
 Because the end goal of elites acting under the condition that the avoidance of cost will be 
impractical necessarily suggests the payout of greater costs, elite behavior must encourage this 
greater payout. Any decrease in median applicant wait time to final status determination to result 
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will be achieved through mechanisms that effectively expedite asylum processing. Because of this, 
instrumental inaction through the avoidance of dialogue and action on measures already in place, 
as observed in Greece in the previous chapter, will not be useful toward elite goals. Instead, the 
contrast I draw with this chapter involves types of action taken through the instrumental use and 
broadcast of calls to expedite asylum procedures from two discrete audiences – the international 
community, as I demonstrate through the case of Belgium, and the domestic electorate, as I 
demonstrate through the case of South Korea. 
Belgium and South Korea: A Note on Case Selection 
Toward the aim of cost acceptance, two discrete theoretical motivations may be observed. 
The first speaks to March and Olsen’s (1998) framework delineating differences in state action 
based on logics of appropriateness vs. expected consequences. Understood with reference to 
implementation of the Refugee Convention and its Protocol, I classify possible action resulting 
from motivation to accept cost because such action is seen as “virtuous,” and therefore, “need not 
attend to consequences, but … [attends to] ethical dimensions, targets, and aspirations” (March 
and Olsen p.951), as an expression of a second-order preference – a preference that the decision 
maker “prefers to prefer.” For the purpose of this work, I hold that explanations of state action 
based on second-order preferences will prove less than useful to an understanding of where and 
how institutional output will be predictive of outcomes for two reasons. First, the possible use of 
institution building, implementation, and enforcement as an expression of “virtue” presupposes a 
sociological perspective that must be based on the identity of the individual state decision maker 
within the community of state decision makers. From this perspective, it  becomes difficult, if not 
impossible, to reach generalizable conclusions applicable across large numbers of cases, where 
these cases are states that each hold a separate perception of self and of that self’s role in the 
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international community. Second, states to which this logic of appropriateness may apply most 
obviously to questions of asylum procedure are limited to the cases of Norway and Sweden. The 
laws of both states have long been held as the historical exemplars of humanitarianism in terms of 
asylum provision, yet the relevant codes within these states predate the point in time that begins 
this study.            
 For this reason, I observe two state cases that I classify under the second possible 
theoretical motivation – the perceived instrumentally inherent to the nesting of acceptance of the 
full potential cost of Convention compliance within the overall game of electoral survival, as such 
action may be used toward the achievement of greater legitimacy, either on the international stage 
or within the domestic electorate. Observation and explication of state cases acting as if in response 
to this second motivation provides two practical benefits. First, I am able to use the configuration 
of instruments common to the relevant Norwegian and Swedish legislations as a conceptual 
constant. This permits the opportunity to explicate the adoption of similar instruments into the 
state’s domestic legislation in cases where a logic of appropriateness may not necessarily be 
assumed based on the ideational conditions that preceded their implementation. Second, I am able 
to observe state-specific structural and ideational conditions leading up to the passage of the 
relevant domestic implementing procedures as these conditions unfolded during the temporal 
frame observed in this study. I narrate the domestic structural and political conditions of two 
countries that I hold to adhere to this second motivation – Belgium and South Korea.  
 Of the 44 states considered within this study, the likelihood of implementing cost-acceptant 
strategies that will prove predictive of length of time to final status determination is suggested 
most strongly within four states: Belgium, Norway, Sweden, and South Korea. This is shown in 
Chapter 2, Figure 5. Because analysis of Norway and Sweden will prove impractical toward the 
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creation of generalizable precepts addressing questions of the two concepts fundamental to this 
work – where and how should institutional output matter to outcomes – I have chosen to focus on 
the institutional output of Belgium and South Korea. In contrast to the cases of Greece and Austria, 
discussed in the previous chapter, and of Chile and the United Kingdom, to be discussed in the 
following chapter, the relevant institutions within Belgium and South Korea were encoded and 
assumed force following the first pre-2010 election cycle within the two focus states. However, 
the conditions that have led to the suggestion that elites within these two states would seek 
opportunities to instrumentalize the implementation of cost-acceptant institutions are readily 
observable during the temporal frame encompassed in this study. For this reason, sections narrating 
state placement on the Chapter 2 model will not address the institutional output of Belgium and 
South Korea. Instead, these sections will address structural and ideational conditions as they are 
useful to understand the prediction that Belgium and South Korea would seek to adopt cost-
acceptant compliance institutions at a later point in time. Following the explication of conditions 
that have converged to inform this prediction within both states, I address the cost-acceptant 
institutional output of these two states in a separate section.     
 To follow, I present the theoretical framework that guides the remainder of the current 
chapter and establishes the conditions necessary to suggest that elites within both Belgium and 
South Korea will implement cost-acceptant strategies toward the condition of full compliance with 
the Refugee Convention and its Protocol.  How and why should we expect that elites will gain 
electorally from moves to accept the full potential cost of asylum processing, as opposed to moves 
to avoid these costs? 
Cost Acceptance and Rationality       
 Fundamental to works employing a rational-choice approach toward the abstraction of 
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causal mechanisms is the assumption that rational decision makers will act so as to avoid cost on 
some level. Putnam (1988) addresses the difficulty in predicting the stage on which elected rule 
makers will choose to avoid cost on issues of international agreements. Putnam focuses 
specifically on the role of negotiators who are playing to two audiences simultaneously. 
Domestically, these negotiators must answer to pressure groups who are attempting to protect their 
own interests against the interests of other parties, while internationally, these negotiators must 
answer to actors who are negotiating on the behalf of other states with their own domestic 
audiences. Here, gains to be realized at one negotiating table are often characterized as losses at 
the other. In this environment, the actor will seek to gain the largest “win set” – the outcome that 
will effect the lowest overall cost to the state, given the necessity of taking smaller losses in order 
to achieve a final agreement with players acting under the same calculus in the representation of 
other states.           
 Tsebelis (1990) also considers the zero-sum nature of gains to be made as negotiators 
appear at separate game boards, albeit at the domestic level. For Tsebelis, however, these games 
exist within hierarchies that may not be readily apparent to the outside observer. Unlike the Putnam 
argument, which suggests that the larger win set will necessarily result from moves to preserve 
overall gains on the part of one specific constituency (the domestic), Tsebelis suggests that the 
audience for whom the actor must preserve the largest win set is highly variable, and this variation 
may be understood through means that are predictable on the basis of measures of the strengths of 
the constituent group. In short, based on measurable input factors relating to the efficacy, 
relevance, and ultimate importance of competing constituent groups, some games will be 
perceived as “larger” than others, and smaller games will be perceived as “nested” within these 
larger games. Under this condition, players will take action to secure gains on the larger game 
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board, and this action may necessarily entail taking losses on the smaller game board.  
 The theoretic argument I draw with this chapter borrows from aspects of both the Putnam 
argument and the Tsebelis argument. Following Putnam, I hold that the largest win set will be 
interpreted from gains achieved on the part of the domestic audience, as opposed to the 
international audience. This holds in the case of Convention compliance because the international 
agreement serves as a temporal prior to the drafting of its domestic implementing legislation within 
each signatory state; the negotiator is not playing to two audiences simultaneously. While the 
decision maker (here, conceptualized as the state) must comply with the mandates to which the 
state has accepted responsibility and oversight, the decision maker is not engaged in a concurrent 
process of negotiating the terms of the international normative standard. Therefore, all conceivable 
games of relevance are not games played simultaneously between the negotiator and either the 
international or the domestic constituent group, but are games played between elites and 
electorates within the state. Following Tsebelis, I hold that among cases where the configuration 
of structural inputs is sufficient to permit the prediction that the content of the institution will allow 
insight into observed outcomes, measureable phenomena will permit determination of which 
domestic game is “larger,” and which domestic game is “nested” within the larger game.   
 Within these states, the model I develop in Chapter 2 allows for the possibility of two 
separate “larger” games. In Chapter 3, I use the cases of Austria and Greece to explicate the 
scenario that unfolds as the more intuitive and more frequently observed larger game plays out. 
Here, the game entails the instrumental incrementalization of gains toward the normative standard 
in order to satisfy the condition of full Convention compliance while avoiding its full potential 
cost. In this chapter, I use the cases of Belgium and South Korea to explicate the scenario that 
unfolds as a comparatively less frequently observed scenario plays out. In these cases, the larger 
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game entails the securing for elites an increased perception of legitimacy through the expedition 
of gains toward the normative standard. This is achieved through losses taken in the smaller, 
“nested” game of forging compliance institutions through the instrumental acceptance of cost.  
 The phenomenon I measure in order to permit determination of the type of game in which 
the state actor is more pragmatically invested (i.e., the larger game) is the perceived ability on the 
part of the state to expand its procedural mechanisms to accommodate or to further embed 
instruments that will permit the state to avoid the full potential cost of compliance. Cases in which 
states have taken decisions in such a manner as if to suggest perception of the ability to avoid cost 
are discussed in Chapter 3; cases in which states have taken decisions as if suggest perception of 
the inability to avoid cost are discussed in this chapter.      
 The goal I undertake with this chapter is the identification of means through which elites 
who will be unable to avoid cost may be understood to have nested the game of Convention 
compliance within the larger game of electoral survival. Where elites may perceive a practical 
inability to avoid costs, yet the issue of costs to be paid by the state is sufficiently salient to suggest 
that domestic electorates may call elite stewardship of public funds into question, elites may frame 
the increased expenditure as necessary toward the achievement of other, more important gains. 
Alternatively, where the issue of increased costs is neither controversial nor important to 
electorates, but the call to increase costs has been long, yet unsuccessfully advocated on 
humanitarian grounds, the impetus to remain in power may lead elites who are concerned with 
making humanitarian gains to seek the opportunity to frame the increase of cost on asylum 
processing as beneficial to the electorate toward other, more salient issues. I demonstrate the 
workings of this first scenario through the case of Belgium; I demonstrate the workings of this 
second scenario through the case of South Korea.       
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 Importantly for the purpose of this chapter, the framework I present with this work 
considers increased costs exclusively as funds are expended toward the processing of applicants 
whose claims remain pending. In investing state funds toward claimant housing, translation 
services, medical benefits, legal assistance, and general welfare aid, the state creates and actively 
encourages a condition under which it faces financial pressure to decide asylum claims quickly. 
Importantly, moves to invest in claimant processing do not suggest that the state undertaking these 
investments will be more likely to approve asylum claims or less likely to deport denied claimants 
following the exhaustion of all permitted appeals. As I note in Chapter 1, legal decisions on asylum 
claims must be issued on a case-by-case basis, and therefore, individual rulings fall outside the 
purview of legislative action.33 Therefore, reference to action toward gains made to advance the 
normative standard are not to be understood to imply “generosity” toward the individual escapee, 
but merely to address gains made toward efficiency in processing claimants and improvement in 
treatment of those with claims awaiting final ruling.       
 To follow, I present a brief history as it is useful to understand the domestic backdrops 
against which debates surrounding the adoption of cost acceptant institutions had started to take 
shape in both Belgium and South Korea at the point in time that begins this study. 
A Short History of Forced Migration in Belgium 
For nearly a century, Belgium has retained a status of net-immigration. Occupied by 
Germany for nearly the entire course of WWI, the country suffered devastating losses in both life 
and infrastructure. Throughout this period, Belgians attempted to flee (most notably, to the United 
Kingdom), yet the large numbers of occupying troops and support personnel exceeded the number 
                                                          
33 As I discuss in the previous chapter in the case of Austria, legislatures may take action to raise the legal burden 
necessary for the claimant to establish a case for asylum. Actions of this type are taken infrequently within democratic 
states, and of the focus countries I consider with this work, only Austria has taken this type of action during the time 
period considered with this study. For similar actions taken in Australia and Canada, see Mountz (2010). 
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of Belgians who were able to make their way out of the country. With the end of WWI and the 
exit of German workers, the newly restored government engaged in active recruitment of 
immigrant laborers, both for the purpose of rebuilding and repairing lost infrastructure, and for the 
purpose of reestablishing the coal and steel mining industries in Wallonia. Having suffered such 
great losses during WWI, the Belgian government established a policy of neutrality with the onset 
of WWII. During the first seven months following the Nazi invasion of Poland and subsequent 
declarations of war against Germany by France and the United Kingdom, nearly 28,000 German 
Jews fled to Belgium (Jewish Virtual Library, n.d.). However, the peace hoped for through the 
declaration of Belgian neutrality was realized only briefly, as Germany would once again occupy 
the Belgian territory in May 1940.          
 After even more significant losses to life and property experienced in WWII, Belgium was 
again in need of laborers. Beginning in the 1950s, the Belgian government actively recruited 
immigrant workers from Greece, Portugal and Spain. With the rebuilding facilitated by the 
Southern European immigrants, Belgium began to experience a significant economic boon, which 
mandated calls for even more immigrant workers. Moroccan and Turkish workers began to settle 
in the country, and over the course of the 1960s, the number of migrants, especially those from 
Morocco, incrementally increased. By 1970, more Moroccan laborers than Southern European 
immigrants were present within Belgium. In 1974, the government stopped recruiting workers. 
However, it became clear that the majority of those whom the government had brought to the 
country to work were not intent on returning, and that most had effectively established new lives 
in the country. The ease of gaining Belgian citizenship encouraged permanent settlement, and the 
influx of immigrants continued as liberal reunification procedures permitted recruited workers to 
reunite their families within Belgium (Vangoidsenhoven and Pilet 2015).     
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 Until this point, despite having long been a country of net immigration, few accessed 
asylum protection within Belgium. Entry to the country and to the workforce was easy due to 
government efforts to recruit outsiders, and on this basis, practical need on the part of immigrants 
to invoke Belgian legislative provisions for entry as asylum seekers was rarely realized.  
 By the 1970s, Belgium had begun to establish a reputation on the international stage as a 
country of negotiated entry. Under the condition of negotiated entry, a government commits to 
take in a set number of refugees fleeing from a specific country; on behalf of these refugees, no 
individual asylum claims must be initiated or heard, and protections under the Refugee Convention 
are not invoked. In 1972, 400 Asians were resettled following their expulsion from Amin’s 
Uganda. In 1973, 1,100 Chileans fleeing Pinochet’s Chile were admitted, and in 1975, 2,500 boat 
people from Vietnam and Cambodia were resettled. This pattern of encouraging negotiated entry 
to Belgian territory continued into the 1990s. The government resettled 200 Bosnians in 1992, and 
1,200 Kosovars in 1999 (Resettlement Belgium, n.d.). Belgium’s actions to take in 
disproportionately large numbers negotiated entrants, coupled with its history of highly liberal 
immigration procedures, created a situation in which the country’s system for processing 
individual asylum claims remained underutilized and largely untested into the early 2000s. 
A Short History of Forced Migration in South Korea 
Deutsche Welle (2014) notes that East Asian countries tend to display highly restrictionist 
interpretations of the Refugee Convention. South Korea is no exception to this trend. The nearest 
net refugee sending state, North Korea, is treated under all domestic law as an occupied territory 
of the Korean Republic, and because of this, potential asylees may exercise no claim to standing 
under the terms of the Convention. At the same time, claims on the behalf of those fleeing China 
are almost invariably denied. Because of the potential for interpretation of a broadcast of the 
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Chinese regime’s illegitimacy following possible Korean grants of refuge from those escaping 
China, Lee (2010) attributes this trend to the fear on the part of Korean lawmakers that diplomatic 
relations will suffer. As a result of both the lack of standing afforded to North Korean escapees 
and the knowledge that South Korean courts regularly deny claims on the behalf of Chinese 
escapees, Chinese and North Koreans are noted to defect in large numbers to other states, including 
Thailand, Mongolia, and Myanmar, as transit countries, and to access South Korean territory on 
the basis of having fled these third states (Park 2004).       
 Relative to the other focus countries considered in this study, recognition of the right to 
take political flight to South Korea is a new phenomenon. South Korea did not accede to the 
Refugee Convention until 1992, and its government did not process its first asylum claim or 
recognize its first refugee until 1994. In a 2014 interview, University of London Associate 
Professor Kristin Surak attributes the closed nature of East Asian state borders to asylum seekers 
to historical factors: “These countries keep their doors largely closed because they didn’t respond 
to the after-effects of World War II and genocide in the same way as their European counterparts 
when they were drafting the 1951 UN Refugee Convention” (Surak 2014, quoted in Deutsche  
Welle 2014). 
Belgium and South Korea: Why Should the Institution Matter?   
 To follow, I lead the reader through a treatment of questions taken along the horizontal 
dimension of the Chapter 2 model. These questions are useful to understand the configuration of 
Belgian and South Korean inputs informing placement within structural hierarchies inherent to the 
community of states forging Convention compliance institutions. Similar to Austria and Greece in 
the previous chapter, state placement within these hierarchies permits the prediction that any 
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compliance institution to be drawn in Belgium and South Korea will be useful to an understanding 
of asylum outcomes as they relate to median applicant wait time to final status determination.  
I use the decision at the first node to address the hierarchy inherent to the division of wealth 
among the 44 states observed with this study. For each state, I report a measure calculated as a 
function of its per-capita GNP during the year of the run-up to the first election cycle observed. 
State placement within this hierarchy is of use to determine a first measure of the degree to which 
decision makers may interpret that they will ultimately be called on to pay out on any costs that 
will be associated with the instruments to be embedded within the state’s implementing legislation. 
For the purpose of the Chapter 2 model, I hold that richer states will interpret a greater likelihood 
that they will face calls to assume the full cost of any legislation to be drafted for two reasons.  
First, these states will be deemed more capable of paying out on the costs of any procedures 
instituted. Here, the possibility of compliance implementation toward the goal costless signaling 
will be greatly reduced. Second, because asylum applicants are more likely to make their way 
across the borders of comparatively wealthy states, states at the upper end of the hierarchy should 
expect to pay these costs on the behalf of greater numbers of claimants.   
 World Bank (2011) reports figure for Belgium at 2011 $US 36,615, and for South Korea 
at 2011 $US 27,269. The mean figure for all states observed is $US 27,522. The Belgian measure 
on this indicator falls clearly at the upper end, while the South Korean measure falls just short of 
the mean. The difference between the measure for South Korea and the measure for New Zealand 
(the state registering the lowest figure above the mean) is $US 507. Although this figure is useful 
to an understanding of decisions to be taken at further nodes, because I interpret no justifiable 
theoretical basis for differentiating states registering indicators just above the mean from those 
registering indicators just below the mean, I do not use this measure to create a binary that will 
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preclude the calculation of utilities on decisions at subsequent nodes for comparatively poorer 
states. For this reason, all states, including Belgium and South Korea, continue to take decisions 
on further questions.           
 For the second decision, I consider the hierarchy inherent to comparative levels of border 
openness among states observed. As a proxy for border openness, I employ a figure calculated as 
a function of the ratio of unnegotiated or otherwise undocumented immigrants to all immigrants 
counted within the state’s territory. Figures used in the calculation of this measure are taken from 
UNHCR (2011) estimates during the year of the run-up to the first election cycle observed with 
this study. Where it is assumed based on the state’s figure on this measure that the median asylum 
claimant may be present within the state’s borders due to higher estimates of practical border 
openness, I hold that it is more likely that the state will be called on to pay out on the cost of any 
asylum processing procedure to be implemented.      
 Because only applicants who have entered a host state’s territory under the condition of 
escape from past, current, or anticipated future persecution may claim access to Convention 
protection, and because those to whom this condition applies will rarely possess legal travel 
documentation, potential asylum applicants are almost invariably classified as illegal immigrants. 
In Belgium, 51.36% of all immigrants lacked documentation, while in South Korea, 67.55% of all 
immigrants lacked documentation. Based on these measures, I hold that state borders are 
sufficiently open to permit the possibility that a potential asylum applicant is likely to be able 
access Belgian and South Korean territory for the purpose of initiating a claim. For this reason, 
both states continue to take decisions on questions at future nodes.     
 For the next stratifying decision, I report a measure for each state as a function of its 
observed propensity to approve first-instance affirmative asylum claims. Where the majority of 
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asylum claims are denied (a condition that is met within all but four Convention signatory states 
observed in this study), the state will interpret greater costs to be associated with their compliance 
instruments. This holds because denied claimants will continue to engender payout of costs to the 
state as they access the state’s asylum appeals process and state paid benefits during the period 
that the appeals process is pending.        
 Only 16.99% of all asylum claims were approved on first instance in Belgium, and only 
18.21% of claims were approved on first instance in South Korea during the period under 
observation. For this reason, the rule makers within both states may take decisions on further 
questions as if informed by a strong likelihood that the median applicant will continue to access 
state resources over a longer period of time. The expectation of greater payout on the part of the 
state will greatly reduce the likelihood that the state will perceive the practical ability to enact 
compliance instruments toward the aim of costless signaling. Elites will expect to pay the cost of 
any rules they may enact, and they will expect that these costs may be demanded on behalf of up 
to 83% of all asylum applicants in Belgium and on behalf of up to 81% of all asylum applicants in 
South Korea.            
 For the final stratifying decision, states consider the costs that they may expect to stem 
from hosting the denied applicant. To calculate this measure, I adapt the procedure used toward 
the calculation of a similar measure by UNHCR in its annual Statistical Yearbooks. Both Belgium 
and South Korea register relatively low totals measured against the Greek baseline of 2.00 pending 
claims per $US 1 GNP. The total number of individual claims pending decision is reported for 
Belgium at 0.52 per $US 1 GNP, and for South Korea at 0.15 per $US 1 GNP. These relatively 
low figures indicate that the domestic electorates within both states may be less likely to demand 
action on the part of the elite with reference to the presence of the asylum seeker within the host 
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state’s borders.          
 Despite the seemingly low values of Belgian and South Korean indicators on this measure, 
it is important to note that of the 44 states considered with this study, only Canada and Austria 
register higher summed totals of utilities along the “where should the institution matter” dimension 
of analysis than the total reported for Belgium, and only 12 states register sums exceeding that 
reported for South Korea. 
The Domestic Politics of Rule Construction: How Should the Institution Matter? 
 I use the following sections to explicate decisions taken by Belgium and South Korea along 
the vertical dimension of the Chapter 2 model. I demonstrate that the configuration of inputs on 
these decisions are useful toward an understanding of the condition that cost acceptance through 
institution building becomes a practical necessity. Under this condition, elites will perceive 
electoral benefit from opportunities to sell cost acceptant instruments through the instrumental use 
of calls to make gains on an issue of greater importance to popular view of elite legitimacy. As 
with the previous chapter, I begin with a section outlining the specific protections that Belgium 
and South Korea have agreed to uphold as Convention contracting states.     
 1. Belgium and South Korea at T1: What Protections Have They Agreed to Uphold? 
The temporal frame considered in this study begins with the run-up to the second pre-2010 
legislative election within each state observed. For Belgium, I begin with the process leading up 
to the 2003 general election; for South Korea, I begin with the process leading up to the 2004 
legislative election. At the relevant points in time, both Belgium and South Korea had signaled 
intent to comply with the terms of both the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol.    
 Belgium was among the 26 states to present delegates at the drafting of the Convention and 
was among its 18 original signatory states. South Korea acceded to the Convention in December 
1992. The instruments of the Convention were given force of law domestically in July 1953 in 
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Belgium and immediately upon accession in South Korea.34 At the time of domestic entry, both 
Belgium and South Korea communicated and registered reservations to specific items of text 
within the Convention.           
 The Belgian delegation registered a reservation in answer to Article 15, which mandates 
the right of refugees and asylees to form non-political and non-profit making associations and trade 
unions in a manner not to be differentiated from the most favorable relevant treatment granted to 
nationals of a foreign country living within the host state. The reservation notes that aliens are not 
granted striated levels of treatment under Belgian law, and that the association rights of refugees 
and asylees will be treated under the law as equal to all Belgian non-nationals. For this reason, 
Article 15 would not be understood to apply.        
 Belgium also registered a general reservation stipulating that the language “most favorable 
treatment,” as it is used throughout the Convention to apply to individual refugees would not be 
understood to extend to the country from which the applicant has fled. Belgium’s external relations 
with states from which refugees and asylees had fled would continue to be conducted in a manner 
completely independent of Belgium’s recognition or non-recognition of refugees and asylees from 
these states within its territory. Both this general reservation in answer to the use of the language 
on “most favorable treatment” and the reservation in answer to Article 15 concerning the right of 
assembly remain in effect throughout the period considered in this study.   
 The South Korean delegation registered a reservation in answer to the Article 7 language 
                                                          
34 In South Korea, all international agreements become effectively binding immediately upon accession, and no 
domestic ratification procedure is necessary to effect the binding nature of the agreement. For this reason, in South 
Korea, all international agreements fall under within a category commonly referred to in the international law literature 
as “self-implementing.” For the purpose of this work, I employ modified definitions of “self-implementation” and 
“non-self-implementation.” Here, I discuss “non-self-implementation” as the condition under which domestic 
legislation is necessary, not for the instruments of the treaty to assume force of law, but for the terms of the treaty to 
be carried out domestically. This is important to the current work because of the extensive scope of legislation 
demanded on the part of each signatory state to effect the condition of full compliance, as discussed in Chapter 1. 
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mandating refugee exemption from legislative reciprocity following a three-rear period of 
residence. “Exemption from legislative reciprocity,” as it is used in the Convention, is used to refer 
to a possible condition in which non-nationals within the host state must be granted favored 
reciprocal conditions within other states per the terms of any current or future bilateral agreement 
between the host state and another state. The South Korean reservation noted that Article 7 would 
not be understood as binding. In the event of any future agreement between the government of 
South Korea and that of a second state that would grant favorable treatment of Korean non-
nationals, to include rights to property, social security benefits, and copyright, while within the 
second state’s territory, no guarantee of this favorable treatment would be automatically extended 
to refugees following the three-year term of residence. Although this reservation remained in effect 
during the period of time that includes the legislative election cycle observed within this study, 
this reservation was officially withdrawn shortly after the 2008 legislative election, during the 
drafting of what would become South Korea’s 2010 Refugee Act.     
 2. Party Politics and the Ability to Shape Electorate Preferences 
With the decision on the second question, I consider direction of influence. Both Belgium 
and South Korea are observed not to meet the Chapter 2 criteria established to permit imputation 
of further utilities based solely on electoral data. Under this condition of bottom-up influence, 
elites within both states are presumed to assume and to advocate for policy positions in a manner 
that attends to preferences that are already held within the voting public. 
To follow, I outline the role of the public consciousness as it relates to future action on 
issues of asylum, insofar as this action had begun to take form at the point in time leading up to 
the 2003 Belgian general election and the 2004 South Korean legislative election. In Belgium, the 
long established far-right, nativist, anti-immigrant stances espoused by the Dutch speaking Vlaams 
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Blok (Flemish Block) and the French speaking Front National (National Front) had already 
resulted in an effective blockade against the possible entry of either party into any future governing 
coalition. Mainstream parties, as well as the Flemish and Walloon publics, recognized and largely 
dismissed nativist rhetoric as extremist and racist. At the same time, questions of asylum remained 
far outside the realm of legislative and popular consciousness, as the country’s provisions for 
access under the terms of the Convention had been infrequently accessed due to liberal immigration 
laws that made entrant protection under the terms of the Convention practically unnecessary. By 
2004, The South Korean government had begun to face calls by international human rights 
observers to assume a role of leadership among Asian states in forging and strengthening asylum 
protections. However, little political will to step into this role existed. As in Belgium, issues of 
asylum remained largely outside the scope of public debate. 
Belgium. No treatment of the workings of political parties in Belgium would be complete, 
if even possible, without at least a note addressing the bifurcated nature of the Belgian party 
system. No political parties compete for votes in the federal parliament at the state level. Instead, 
parties compete either in Dutch-speaking Flanders or in French-speaking Wallonia, and parties 
representing both the Flemish and Walloon communities compete in the officially bilingual capital 
region that encompasses Brussels. As a dual result of the linguistic orientation of all parties and 
the effects of electing MPs on the basis of party lists, there exists a large number of politically 
relevant parties at any point in time, and divisions in voter support across these parties ensure that 
no single party will receive a majority of parliamentary seats. During the run-up to the 2003 
legislative election, 11 parties held seats in the 150-member Chamber of Representatives, with no 
party claiming more than 25 Representatives. Therefore, all governments are coalition 
governments.            
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 Anti-immigrant, nativist parties represented both the Flemish and the Walloon regions. The 
Flemish Vlaams Blok was formed in 1972, having splintered from the dominant Flemish 
regionalist party Volksunie. Coffé, Heyndels, and Vermeir (2007) attribute this split to the 
perception that Volksunie had begun to make an unacceptable number of concessions to the 
Francophone population. Throughout the 1980s, party leaders noted and were eager to imitate the 
success of parties in mobilizing large segments of the populations of France and the Netherlands 
based on anti-immigrant sentiment. Vlaams Blok came to adopt fiercely nativist rhetoric as an 
aspect integral to the broadcast of its Flemish nationalist identity. The party became increasingly 
defined by this rhetoric, and in the 1991 federal election Vlaams Blok won 10.3% of all Flemish 
votes, and as a result, won 2 seats in the Chamber of Representatives. Into the early 2000s, the 
party received increasing levels of support, albeit primarily in Flemish regional elections. The 
Walloon Front National was formed in 1985, espousing an ideology of unitary Belgian ultra -
nationalism and strong anti-immigration sentiment. In the 1991 federal election, Front National 
also gained representation in parliament, with one Deputy assuming a seat in the lower chamber. 
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the party produced and 
distributed pamphlets that strongly implied that all Muslims were terrorists. Party leader Daniel 
Feret would later be convicted on the charge of inciting racism on the basis of this and other similar 
pamphlets. Due to the success of both extreme right parties, following the 1991 election, all 
remaining parties holding seats in the Chamber of Deputies entered into an agreement encoding 
their common commitment to exclude Vlaams Blok and Front National from any future 
government coalition. As a result, neither party has been represented in any subsequent governing 
coalition. Unlike in the case of the FPÖ - BZÖ in Austria, the party platforms themselves were 
effectively dismissed as racist, and mainstream parties did not come to adopt anti-immigrant 
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aspects of either far right party into their agendas during the period under observation. By contrast, 
immigration remained largely unaddressed as mainstream parties attempted to preempt possible 
influence of the far right parties on the electorate. For this reason, issues of asylum remained 
largely outside the public discourse.  
South Korea. No anti-immigrant or nativist party has emerged in the history of a democratic 
South Korea, although fact this cannot be attributed to a lack of anti-immigrant or nativist 
sentiment. The South Korean party configuration has been characterized by comparatively minor 
differences among parties aligned with two primary camps, the conservative and the progressive, 
and only since the early 2000s have members of the electorate begun to interpret programmatic 
differences between the two camps (Wang 2012). Party platforms were not produced and made 
available to the voting public until 1997, and until the early 2000s, indicators of voters’ places of 
birth remained the single most important factor in determining party support (Steinberg and Shin 
2006).             
 Issues of immigration had not figured into the platforms of any party leading up to the 2004 
general election, and dialogue on asylum did not appear in the legislative record until 2006. In its 
2004 Country Operations Plan for the Republic of Korea, UNHCR outlined several reforms needed 
to the country’s asylum system. Among these reforms were the improvement to asylum-seeker 
living conditions and claimant access to legal support. If the government were to achieve these 
reforms, South Korea would serve as a regional example in humanitarian protection toward asylum 
claimants (UNHCR 2004).         
 Prior to the 2004 election, in 2003, South Korea received its highest number of asylum 
claims since the government had begun processing claims only 9 years earlier. Still, despite the 
call by UNHCR to take action, the 139 claims processed was sufficiently small to suggest that no 
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popular mandate or political will existed to address political escape to South Korea within the 
legislature.          
 Because issues relating to immigration and asylum are noted to matter more strongly to 
elites and supporters of right parties (Weiner 1996), for the purpose of this study, where no anti-
immigrant or nativist party is observed to exist, I observe parties of the political right. Specific to 
the case of South Korea, this criterion permits the tracking of the work of Hwang Woo-yea, former 
chair of the center-right Grand National Party (known since 2012 as the New Frontier Party), who 
was the first and most consistently vocal advocate in the National Assembly for the expansion of 
humanitarian protection to asylum claimants.       
 As I establish in Chapter 3, under the condition that ineffective asylum processing 
conditions are not present within a state, in order to avoid cost through the effective lengthening 
of time to the median applicant’s final status determination, government policy must encourage 
action toward this goal. At the point of time that begins this study, both the Belgian and South 
Korean systems for processing asylum claimants remained largely untested. Furthermore, the lack 
of political will to implement action toward the avoidance of cost is demonstrated through the 
mainstream Belgian party efforts to effectively remove asylum dialogue from the public discourse 
as part of the effort to silence the Vlaams Blok and the Front National and through the absence of 
Grand National Party response to UNHCR calls to action based on the virtual unawareness of 
related issues among the South Korean electorate. These two conditions – the untested nature of 
the asylum processing system and the lack of will to take instrumental action on issues of asylum 
– establish a first step toward an understanding of the prediction that Belgium and South Korea 
will interpret a practical inability to avoid the full potential cost of Convention compliance.  
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3. Election Results          
 The Belgian federal election was held on May 18, 2003. Vlaams Blok increased its vote 
share, winning 11.59% of the popular vote. This resulted in an increase of three seats in the 150-
member Chamber of Deputies, for a total of 18. Front National also increased its vote share, 
winning 1.98% of the popular vote. Because this total amounted to more than 5% of the Walloon 
vote, Front National was able to retain its one seat in the lower chamber. The grand coalition, 
incorporating parties represented within the liberal, socialist, and green blocs, remained largely 
unchanged in terms of party composition, although the left parties significantly increased their 
vote share. After a brief negotiation period, new grand coalition government took office in July 
2003. As a result of the cordon sanitaire, both far right parties remained excluded from the 
government coalition.          
 The April 15, 2004 legislative election in South Korea marked the first point since South 
Korea’s return to functional democracy that a center-left party had won a majority in the country’s 
299-member National Assembly. The Uri party won 152 seats, increasing the vote share won in 
the 2000 legislative election by its predecessor party, the Millennium Democratic Party, by 102. 
The conservative Grand National Party lost 16 seats, to retain 121 in the National Assembly. 
 Whereas decisions taken by Belgium and South Korea at the previous node speak to the 
lack of perception of political will to take action on questions of asylum, decisions taken at the 
current node suggest a lack of perception to take action that is unfriendly to the asylum seeker. 
Again following Weiner (1996), I propose that the overall left gains in both states serve as a second 
indicator that the government will not seek to take moves toward the avoidance of cost toward the 
normative standard. 
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 4. Following Through with Policy       
 The measure at the fourth node considers the question of whether the state will interpret 
the practical ability to take action toward the expansion of its bureaucratic mechanisms in order to 
avoid cost of compliance by effectively increasing the median applicant’s wait time to final status 
determination. Through treatment of previous decisions taken along the “how should the institution 
matter” dimension of analysis, I have demonstrated the lack of political will in both Belgium and 
South Korea to take the necessary action toward this goal. To follow, I demonstrate that such action 
was not only unnecessary to elite political survival, but that it would also be read as pragmatically 
untenable.            
 The question at hand serves to gauge the perceived ability on the part of the government to 
practically lose the potential asylum applicant within ever-increasing webs of bureaucratic 
processing mechanisms. As I have shown in Chapter 3, this condition was met within both Austria  
and Greece. Here, I address how and why Belgium and South Korea are shown to have acted as if 
under the contrary expectation.        
 Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell (2010) collect data on bureaucratic functioning within 
58 countries in order to measure public administrations according to their degree of Weberianism. 
Weber (1915, translated in Parsons 1947) notes six defining principles of the ideal typical 
bureaucracy: job specialization, formal hierarchical structure, management according formal rules, 
impersonality, and career orientation. Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell propose that a 
comparative view of bureaucratic structures leads to the unavoidable conclusion that public 
administrations cannot be viewed as simply “more” or “less” Weberian because public sector 
employment within many countries adheres strongly to some criteria, but not to others. These 
criteria may be understood to coalesce along two separate dimensions of the idealized Weberian 
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bureaucracy: the “open vs. closed” dimension, and the “professional vs. politicized” dimension.  
 As important to the measure at this node of analysis, of the 58 countries included in the 
Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell study, only four register totals higher than those observed for 
South Korea on the measure of “closedness,” and only these four, plus South Korea, measure totals 
higher than Belgium. Measures of the closed nature of bureaucracy are based on expert surveys of 
policy and public administration specialists, and include indicators of hiring and advance as based 
most strictly on meritocratic principles and guarantees of life tenure for bureaucrats. Under these 
conditions, it will become far less likely that that the state will perceive the practical ability to use 
public sector employment to foster job growth for two reasons: it will be more difficult for 
members of the public to meet the standards for bureaucratic employment, and fewer bureaucrats 
will be expected to abandon their positions.35 
 Moves taken by Belgium and South Korea on the first three stratifying decisions indicate, 
respectively, the states’ lack of political will to take any action on issues of asylum, the lack of 
popular mandate to implement procedures that may be judged as inhospitable to asylum seekers, 
and the presence of impediments sufficient to preclude the practical ability to take action to slow 
asylum processing. As for all states for which this third condition applies, I terminate the decision 
sequence for Belgium and South Korea. 
After the Election: The Opportunity to Instrumentalize Calls to Cost Acceptance 
With the previous sections, I have elucidated through the conditions under which 
Compliance institutions may be most strongly predictive of length of time to final status 
                                                          
35 It is important to note at this point that Greece also registers a high score on the measure of bureaucratic closedness. 
However, the effect of this score is mediated by the fact that Greece also registers a score near the bottom of the 
bureaucratic professionalism scale, indicative of the fact that bureaucratic hiring and promotion decisions are often 
observed to be made toward political ends. Belgium and South Korea, by contrast, both register totals within the upper 
third of all states observed, indicative of the fact that hiring and promotion decisions within these states are made 
professionally, not politically. 
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determination, yet political will and practical inability to forge the types of mechanisms necessary 
to encourage longer asylum processing procedures are absent. To follow, I demonstrate how elites 
taking action as if under these two conditions may identify and respond to future stimuli in such a 
manner as to sell the necessary acceptance of cost as a beneficial assumption of cost, as such 
framing may be judged useful toward the ultimate aim of electoral survival. Within both focus 
countries, elites were able to identify calls to expand humanitarian protections. These calls to 
action were then instrumentalized in manners that permitted broad, cross-the-board support for the 
greater expenditure on asylum processing toward the goal of signaling greater legitimacy on the 
part of the elected rule makers. This legitimacy would be earned on two fronts. First, because 
actions taken to expand humanitarian protections incurred support across ideological lines, elites 
would perceive the ability to broadcast records of cross-party and cross-coalitional cooperation. 
Second, actions to accept and to exceed the full potential cost of compliance would be advocated 
on grounds that were more important to the country’s reputation in the eyes of the international 
community (in Belgium) or to elite reputation in the eyes of the domestic electorate (in South 
Korea) than the issue of avoiding costs on asylum processing. Elites would then be able to cash in 
on this increased perception of legitimacy toward the ultimate goal of continued policy influence 
and electoral victory. 
Belgium. On January 21, 2011, the European Court of Human Rights issued a ruling on 
Case no. 30696/09, MSS v. Belgium and Greece (ECHR 2011). This case had been lodged on 
behalf of an Afghan national (referred to in the decision under the name “Mr. M.S.S.,” or simply 
“MSS”) who had sought asylum protection within Belgium, but had been deported by Belgian 
authorities to Greece.            
 MSS had fled Kabul in early 2008. He had traveled through Iran and Turkey, entering the 
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European Union through Turkey’s sea border with Greece. Eurodac authorities collected 
fingerprints and other information identifying MSS on his arrival on the Greek island on December 
7, 2008. He was detained in Greece for one week, and upon his release, he was issued an order to 
leave the country. He did not apply for asylum in Greece.      
 MSS arrived in Belgium on February 10, 2009. Here, he presented himself to the Belgian 
Aliens Office and attempted to initiate the process necessary to claim asylum protection. On his 
presentation to Belgian authorities, his fingerprints were again taken; an immediate match was 
identified, revealing that MSS had originally entered EU territory through Greece. On March 10, 
2009, the Aliens Office submitted a request that the Greek government take charge for the 
applicant’s asylum request. Greek authorities failed to respond within the two-month period 
provided for within the text of the Dublin Accord, and pursuant to paragraph 7 of the Accord, the 
Aliens Office interpreted this lack of response as a tacit agreement on the part of the Greek 
government to assume responsibility for the asylum case. During the two-month wait, MSS had 
been interviewed by Belgian authorities. He indicated that he suffered from hepatitis B, and had 
been under medical treatment for the condition for eight months.     
 On April 2, UNHCR intervened on behalf of the applicant. The office sent a letter to 
Belgium’s Minister for Migration and Asylum Policy outlining various deficiencies regarding 
asylum processing and reception conditions in Greece and recommending that Belgium suspend 
all applicant deportations to Greece. A copy of this communication was sent to the Aliens Office. 
Acting against this recommendation, on May 19, the Aliens Office ordered MSS into police 
custody pending transfer to Greek territory. This order was accompanied by a guarantee by the 
Belgian Aliens Office that Greek authorities would permit MSS to initiate the asylum application 
procedure. On May 27, his deportation was scheduled. On the date of the scheduled deportation, 
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an appeal was filed against the decision to transfer the applicant on the basis of the conditions that 
had been communicated to the Aliens Office by UNHCR the previous month. The applicant’s 
attorney did not appear at the appeals hearing, and the appeal was denied on the basis that MSS 
did not have legal representation and was unable to represent himself. The deportation was 
rescheduled for May 29, but MSS refused to board the aircraft, and was taken back into police 
custody. A third deportation date was scheduled and appealed, and on this second appeal, MSS 
was issued a final order to leave Belgian territory. No third appeal was filed with the Belgian 
authorities. On June 11, MSS’s attorney filed a petition to have the applicant’s case considered by 
the European Court of Human Rights.        
 On June 15, MSS was transferred to Greece. He identified himself to asylum authorities at 
the Athens airport. He was immediately placed in a detention facility on the airport grounds. Here, 
he was locked in a small room with 20 other detainees. He was released three days later and 
presented with an order to appear at the Attica police headquarters for an initial hearing to gauge 
his standing to lodge an asylum claim. MSS did not appear as ordered, and he took up residence 
in an Athens park where other Afghan escapees had assembled. On August 1, he was arrested at 
the Athens airport attempting to flee Greece using a forged Bulgarian passport. On his arrest, MSS 
noted that he had been beaten by guards during his original detention in Greece, and that he was 
attempting to escape the country for out of fear of future similar mistreatment at the hands of  
Greek police. On August 3, he was issued a suspended sentence of to two months’ imprisonment 
for attempting to flee Greece with using forged documents. MSS continued to reside in Greece as 
an asylum applicant pending final status decision through September 1, 2010, when he again 
attempted to leave the country. He was transferred to a location near the Turkish land border for 
subsequent expulsion to Turkey; however, Greek authorities abandoned MSS at this location, and 
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he did not cross the border to be received by Turkish authorities.      
 Unknown to MSS, also on September 1, 2010, ECHR first deliberated on the case that had 
been filed in June of the previous year. By December 15 2010, ECHR had received updated 
information, including information on issues relevant to the applicant’s current situation, and 
jurists entered a second round of deliberations. The Court issued its ruling on January 21, 2011.  
 Specifically with regard to MSS’s action against Belgium, the court held that Belgium had 
violated several articles of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (Council of Europe 1953). Belgium’s deportation orders against MSS 
were ruled in violation of the imperative not to transfer potential deportees where such transfer 
would result in the subject’s treatment under substandard living conditions.  The Belgian 
government was ordered to suspend all future transfers to Greek territory. In concurring opinions, 
three of the 16 judges note Belgium’s overall complicity in the ultimate conditions that MSS faced 
within Greece.            
 Almost immediately, the governments of Austria, Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, France, 
Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom announced that they would also 
suspend Dublin Accord transfers to Greece. And, as if reacting as a result of the injury to its 
reputation, the Belgian parliament began immediately on the Law of 19 January 2012 Modifying 
Asylum Seeker Reception (Belgian Parliament 2012). The Law was enacted on February 17, 2012 
with the support of the majority of deputees within every party represented in parliament. 
 The Law delineated and provided funding for several new protections. Most clearly 
stemming from the MSS decision were provisions introducing and funding the “return path.” Under 
the new “return path” provisions, applicants against whom deportation orders had been issued are 
provided state-paid housing for an initial period of 15 days, assuming that proper procedural steps 
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have been taken. During this initial 15-day period, return counseling is provided. Each potential 
deportee is given the opportunity to make arrangements for return to his or her place of origin (or 
other Dublin community state, in the case of Dublin transfers), and continues to receive all state-
paid benefits afforded during the period under which the case was under review. Financial 
assistance is also available for the travel process itself. This 15-day period may be extended for up 
to 20 additional days, during which all benefits and counseling services remain available.  
Additional time extensions are provided for, to include those permitting family members to retain 
full benefits while minor children are in school (up to the end of the school year), for the four -
month period surrounding the birth of a child, for the duration of needed medical care, or 
“whenever human dignity demands it.” No action may be taken on a deportation order during the 
period of time that protections are applied. After the period of protection has ended, if the deportee 
has failed to repatriate, he or she may still remain in a group detention facility with limited benefits 
for up to two additional months. Under only two conditions may a deportation order be executed 
by the state: that the deportee has failed to participate in the “return path” program, or that this 
two-month period of voluntary detention has expired.      
 But more important to the purpose of this work are actions taken toward the funding of 
reception conditions. It is through the Law’s funding procedure that the state was able to use calls 
to advance humanitarian protections for asylum claimants toward the goal of creating the type of 
pressure on the asylum system that would actively and greatly reduce applicant wait time to final 
status determination. Funding for similar provisions had been long provided only within Norway 
and Sweden; with the exception of South Korea only months earlier (to be discussed in the 
following section), Belgium was the first country to adopt these guarantees outside of Scandinavia. 
 Upon application, the potential asylee must report a place of residence. If the applicant has 
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no physical address, the applicant is offered the opportunity to live in an open reception center. In 
each open reception center, fully furnished individual and family units are provided, both at no 
charge. Clothing allowances and cash for daily living are provided, and for those living in the 
reception centers, at least one restaurant is available, and residents are entitled to receive meals at 
a discount that reflects highly subsidized costs. During the period of residence within a reception 
center, the applicant is free to take leave without notice to any location within Belgian territory; 
the only prohibition on movement involves leaving Belgium. During the period of time under 
which the asylum case is under review, the applicant has the right to work legally within the 
country. Additionally, legal and psychological counseling services are provided without charge to 
the applicant throughout the period leading up to final status determination.    
 These guarantees have pressured the state to expedite asylum processing. Between January 
1, 2013 and December 31, 2015, 1/3 of all asylum claims were decided within three months, and 
an additional 1/3 of claims were decided within nine months.  
South Korea. Since South Korea granted its first asylum claim in 1994, civil rights groups, 
human rights advocates, and medical experts working on behalf of refugees had been monitoring 
the country’s progress on the humanitarian treatment of claimants. By 2006, refugee advocates 
were well aware of the deficiencies in the still largely untested procedures for reception and 
processing, and a group of these advocates approached the Seoul Bar Association for assistance in 
recruiting members of the National Assembly to take up the cause of the asylum seeker. However, 
due to the lack of political will to implement strategies that would necessarily effect an increase in 
cost to the state in processing claims, it was difficult to find an advocate in the legislature. Finally 
in 2009, the Bar Association was able to recruit Hwang Woo-yea to draft and present a version of 
what would become the Law on the Status and Treatment of Refugees (hereafter, Refugee Law). 
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The Refugee Law was debated several times, and provisions were added and lifted through the 
course of several debate sessions, yet it did not come to a vote for nearly two years (Lee 2012, 
Kim and Kim 2012).           
 During the two-year period that the Refugee Law was being sporadically debated and 
repeatedly tabled, increasing numbers of undocumented Chinese immigrants began to appear 
across South Korea. The longstanding view within the country had held “Korean” to be an 
unadulterated racial category, and the presence of the perceived “other” within had resulted in the 
wide broadcast of xenophobic sentiments and pervasiveness of racist dialogues particularly 
targeting people of Japanese, Chinese, and African descent. In 2007, the United Nations 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination had issued a statement  indicating its 
concern over “the emphasis placed in ethnic homogeneity of Korea” in that it “might represent an 
obstacle to the promotion of understanding, tolerance, and friendship among the different ethnic 
groups living on its territory” (UNCERD 2007). Despite government efforts to respond through 
policy (National Action Plan for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 2006, Act on the 
Treatment of Foreigners in Korea 2007), nativist sentiment, and more particularly, anti-
immigration sentiment continued to pervade over the next several years.    
 One effect of debate leading up to passage of the Act on the Treatment of Foreigners was 
the broadcast of the idea that verbal persecution of foreigners on the basis of ethnicity was 
ultimately immoral, even though it was not legally prohibited. By 2010, the public consciousness 
began to shift its focus from one on the “other” to one on “the illegal” (Kim and Kim 2012).  The 
public had largely retained its long-established view of the “native” vs. the “other,” but had begun 
to refer to these groups using new names – the “legal,” and the “illegal.”    
 It was against this backdrop that the first 2011 debates on the Refugee Law had begun to 
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unfold. At a time when the population was becoming progressively vocal concerning the presence 
of the “illegal” among them, Assemblyman Hwang perceived the opportunity to resell the Refugee 
Law. If incentivizing the asylum claims process would cause more undocumented immigrants to 
attempt to claim asylum protection, thereby providing documentation of their presence within 
South Korea, Hwang could expect a greater level of support for the new legislation. The obstacle 
he faced to the achievement of this goal was the need to create a bill that was sufficiently generous 
that it could be sold on the basis that large numbers of undocumented immigrants would attempt 
to access the benefits it would provide.        
 The bill as it was ultimately passed in December 2011 was extremely generous in terms of 
provisions of reception to the asylum claimant. The encoded provisions were largely parallel in 
scope, if not in detail, to those to be passed months later in Belgium. These included guarantees of 
housing, legal assistance, education benefits, basic livelihood provisions, language training, and 
the right to reunify families even prior to a decision on the applicant’s asylum claim. Toward the 
twin goals of expediting applicant processing time to status determination and being seen to take 
action to keep the labor market open primarily to the native population, the Refugee Law included 
the promise of the opening of the labor market to the applicant in the event that time to final status 
determination exceeded one year. With these new provisions, the Refugee Law passed with wide 
support from members of parties within the National Assembly holding 250 of 299 total legislative 
seats. 
Conclusion: Polar Ideal Types and the Domestic Politics of Cost Acceptance 
Through the cases of Belgium and South Korea, I have demonstrated two separate 
motivations underlying action taken toward the reframing of the pragmatic need to accept, and 
even to exceed, the full potential cost of Convention compliance instrumentally. In both cases, one 
149 
 
 
 
result of this action was the passage of provisions that were extremely generous, if only to the 
asylum applicant, by worldwide standards. A second result was the diminishment of applicant wait 
time to final status determination. Still a third result, and the result most beneficial to the 
institutions’ drafters, was the ability to broadcast legitimacy to intended audiences as this 
legitimacy would prove useful toward the ultimate elite aims of electoral survival.   
 In both states, elites are demonstrated to have acted as if under the assumption that the 
institution to be forged would display measurable effects on median applicant wait time to final 
status determination. Also in both states, the ability to accept cost through the effective 
diminishment of wait time to final status determination would prove unnecessary, impractical, and 
impossible until something else happened. The primary distinction I draw through the explication 
of the Belgian and South Korean cases in this chapter is the nature of this something else.  
 In Belgium, the government acted as if to restore its reputation following the ECHR ruling 
on MSS v. Belgium and Greece. As home to a large number of human rights organizations, and as 
home to the de facto capital of Europe, the injury to its reputation within Europe was widely 
broadcast within the international media, and action with the aim to preempt similar scrutiny by 
the international community was taken through action to halt Dublin Accord transfers to Greece 
by many Accord signatory states. In South Korea, the government at large acted as if to convince 
its domestic public that it was taking moves to identify and ultimately manage the presence of the 
illegal immigrant within its territory.         
 Through an understanding of these two poles of cost-acceptant behavior, I suggest that 
future research will be better able to conceptualize the instrumentalization of action toward the 
achievement of larger gains to be assumed through comparatively smaller losses taken on issues 
of Convention compliance. Among states seeking means to benefit from the necessary evil of 
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increasing costs to the state, under which call to cost-acceptant behavior will the state interpret the 
greater potential benefit to act? Will elites be able to benefit more greatly from the use of calls to 
increase view of the state’s legitimacy on the international stage, or will elites be able to benefit 
more greatly from the use if calls to speak to an issue of greater importance than Convention 
compliance to its domestic electorate?  
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CHAPTER 5 – INSTITUTIONS AS CHEAP TALK: PROMISES OF EXPEDIENT GAINS 
VS. PROMISES OF INCREMENTAL GAINS 
 
With the previous two chapters, I have focused on the how question – by what mechanisms 
do institutions matter? This is the question more pertinent to the majority of state signatories to the 
Refugee Convention and its Protocol. For these states, the model I develop in Chapter 2 suggests 
that domestic implementing procedures should be of use to understand asylum outcomes as they 
relate to length of time to final determination of asylum claims. For those states registering the 
highest summed scores on the “where does the institution matter” dimension of the model 
developed in Chapter 2, elites within most will perceive the winning strategy to the rule-
construction game to entail the creation and / or maintenance of institutions that effectively prolong 
wait times to final status determination insofar as they are able to implement them. Under this 
condition, asylum rules will be built with the understanding that they will carry real results, and 
these results will permit the state avoid payout on the full potential cost of issues on asylum. I 
show how this scenario plays out with reference to two opposed poles of state behavior as 
demonstrated through the cases of Austria and Greece in Chapter 3. Within a smaller subset of 
states where the institution is predicted to display measurable effects on outcomes, elites will 
perceive a diminished ability to evade the full potential cost of compliance, and under this 
condition, ideational markers may lead to the calculation that the lower overall electoral cost to 
elites will entail the creation and maintenance of institutions that effectively shorten wait times to 
final status determination. Here, institutions are also built to matter, but the state perceives and 
acts according to both positive and negative incentives to pay greater costs toward achievement of 
the normative standard. The resulting higher payout is taken as a loss necessary to overall elite 
winning strategies. I show how this scenario plays out with reference two opposed poles of state 
behavior as demonstrated through the cases of Belgium and South Korea in Chapter 4.   
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 With this chapter, I address the question of where institutions matter. Under the condition 
that elites may perceive that outcomes will result primarily from state-specific markers of 
structural hierarchies that had been in existence prior to debates inherent to the rule-building 
process, the institutions to be forged may assume the role of mere superstructure and prove 
ultimately epiphenomenal to compliance outcomes. If it is perceived that the rules will not greatly 
influence outcomes, what latitude will this expectation permit to elected rule makers in the 
broadcast of promises as they strive to achieve or maintain electoral power and influence? Through 
an examination of these markers of structure in Chile and the United Kingdom, I demonstrate that 
where the institution is predicted to be of little effective consequence, elites can be observed to 
have taken action in a manner that is fundamentally different than the prediction on the “how 
should the institution matter” scale developed in Chapter 2 would indicate if considered in 
isolation. Here, where elites are able to forge rules under the prediction that they not going to 
display measurable effects, the encoded outcome of the rule-building process may be, and will 
likely be, instituted as mere cheap talk. Under this condition, with which body – the international 
community, or the domestic electorate – will the elite perceive the greatest opportunity to score 
short-term gains toward their long-term goal of continued legislative influence and electoral 
survival? Then, what does the answer to this question tell us about the types of rules we should 
expect to find in place, and why?         
 The existing literature fails to address the theoretic possibility that on any given question, 
within any universe of possible observations, institutional output may be highly useful to an 
understanding or prediction of outcomes observed within some cases, yet ultimately of little use 
toward the understanding or prediction of outcomes within other cases. The framework I develop 
in Chapter 2 with reference to the rationality assumption is, in small part, an attempt to correct for 
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this weakness. By placing markers of competing forms of explicating causation within a mutually 
exclusive framework, I am able to initiate a dialogue among schools of argument within the 
comparative politics literature toward an answer to what is framed with this work as the initial 
question – where do institutions matter? In the following section, I demonstrate the state of the 
debate as it exists today. The question as it is has been long discussed is not one of “under what 
conditions do institutions matter”; instead, it is a question that permits much less latitude for 
nuance in the understanding and prediction of observed rules and their applicability to observed 
outcomes – “do institutions matter?” 
Do Institutions Matter? Institutional Endogeneity vs. Institutional Exogeneity 
 The literature examining the relevance of an understanding of institutions to the 
understanding of outcomes has long and nearly exclusively focused on the question of whether 
institutions matter. The question is almost invariably framed as one of institutional endogeneity 
vs. institutional exogeneity. In other words, is the rule written and enforced by the same body that 
will benefit from its outcomes? If it is, can the rule itself ever be of use to understand outcomes, 
given that the outcomes themselves had been selected for in the construction of the rule? Under 
this condition, the institutions are said to be endogenous; the rule makers have chosen their desired 
outcome, and this outcome must be understood to have served as a logical prior to the construction 
of the institution. Therefore, as understood within the context of the framework I develop in 
Chapter 2 with reference to the rationality assumption, endogenous institutions cannot be of use to 
understand outcomes precisely because any outcomes to be observed will already have been 
chosen as a result of the institution builder’s preliminary endowments.   
 In what can be seen as an early contribution to the endogeneity vs. exogeneity debate 
(although the language of endogeneity vs. exogeneity is not used), in “The Tragedy of the 
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Commons,” Hardin (1968) demonstrates that rational actors will invariably exploit common-pool 
resources. In an environment in which others may also exploit the resource, it is only in taking 
moves to secure more than one’s own fair share that an actor can guarantee to be left any share. 
The alternative is one in which the actor’s fair play results in the exploitation of the resource by 
others to the extent that the actor can expect to be left with nothing. Each actor holding a claim to 
the common resource will proceed under the same assumption. As a cumulative result of all actors’ 
similar calculations, the common-pool resource will become depleted and ultimately unusable by 
any actor. Because interested-actor moves taken according to the common calculus are instituted 
toward the protection of each actor’s own share, no rule endogenously conceived or enforced can 
solve this problem. All common pool resources will face depletion and degradation unless the rule 
governing the commons is instituted, enforced, and adjudicated by an actor holding no stake in the 
allocation of the resources. For a rule to demonstrate any effect on allocation outcomes, it must be 
drafted and administered by a disinterested party; it must be exogenous.     
 The above argument suggests that where the rule itself originates is of the utmost 
importance – only regulation from the outside can impose meaningful effects toward expected and 
desired outcomes. In this framework, outcomes must be defined with reference to a common 
interest, and no actor who holds a stake in the outcome can be held capable to construct or enforce 
a rule that will delineate action toward any effect other than the interested decision maker’s own 
previously established aims. Coase (1960) introduces a second dimension to this debate – the 
content of the exogenous rule. In Coase’s formulation, those benefitting from actions that result in 
adverse effects to others may produce the same output without regard to the question of whether 
the rules governing their actions are of endogenous or exogenous construction. This is because in 
the absence of transaction costs, market competition will lead to perfect efficiency in output. Here, 
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the outside mandate of the imposition of fines on the producer of negative externalities is 
understood as the exogenous construction and enforcement of the institution, and the result of 
market forces is understood as the endogenous enforcement of the institution. This stage of the 
author’s overall argument is commonly known as the Coase Theorem. However, in a 
comparatively overlooked aspect of the overall argument, Coase permits that transaction costs 
invariably exist, as does the ability to impose different types of rules exogenously. Because of this, 
the goal of an institution’s framers should be the construction of specific instruments toward the 
management of these transaction costs. It is not the “who pays” rule that matters; it is the “how do 
we deal with transaction costs” question that matters, and this question must be solved through 
exogenous institutions. Here also, for a rule to matter toward the desired outcome, it must be 
imposed from the outside. The distinction lies in the paradox – some rules imposed from the 
outside will produce the same outcomes as rules imposed from the inside, which will be 
indistinguishable from outcomes generated in the absence of a rule.    
 By contrast, in Governing the Commons, Ostrom (1990) outlines conditions under which 
endogenously instituted rules have been shown to result in equitable distributions of common 
resources in many areas. Those holding claim to a stake in the common resource can expect to 
maintain their stake in the absence of exogenous rule creation and enforcement under the following 
conditions. Where these conditions are met, Ostrom shows that institutions of endogenous creation 
and enforcement may be sufficient to effect the outcomes desired.
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 Boundaries are defined and agreed 
upon. 
 Rules governing the use of the 
commons are tied to local needs and 
conditions. 
 Those affected by the rules are able to 
participate in modifying the rules as 
necessary. 
 Violators of the rules expect graduated 
sanctions. 
 The rights of those in the rule-making 
community to govern the allocation of 
goods are respected by outside 
authorities. 
 The community monitors the use of 
the commons according to its own, 
pre-established rules. 
 Dispute resolution mechanisms are in 
place, accessible, and of low cost to 
potential participants. 
 Where the commons are sufficiently 
large, responsibility for governance is 
built in nested tiers. 
 
 Przeworski (2004) notes a near consensus in the comparative politics literature, whereby it 
is very much en vogue to take the prospect that institutions do matter as a given. For Przeworski, 
this now-popular view is short sighted in light of the endogeneity vs. exogeneity debate. In order 
to arrive at this conclusion, Przeworski takes a further step in logic – for an institution to be 
understood as endogenous, it must also be understood as epiphenomenal. The rule itself must be 
held, not only as uninstructive toward the determination of causation, but also as ultimately  
inconsequential to causation if its outcome results from preferences that informed its creation. If 
variations among institutions are to be held to matter toward an understanding of variations in 
observed outcomes, and if these institutions themselves are going to be held as necessary for the 
outcome to be achieved, they can only be seen as exogenous; the endogenous institution is 
irrelevant. Because of this, Przeworski holds that the “intrusion of the institutionalist paradigm” 
into broad topic areas within comparative politics today is nothing more than “an infectious 
pathology” that is currently being passed among researchers within the discipline.  
 Perhaps as a means to lend clarity to this debate, Elgie (2012), undertakes the goal to 
determine the extent to which exogeneity is present within the drafting of the foundational 
documents of former French colonial states in Africa. Elgie conducts a content analysis of each 
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state’s constitution and develops a 9-point scale of “Frenchness” in order to serve as a measure of 
the extent to which each document relies on text within the French Constitution. Higher measures 
on this scale suggest greater levels of exogeneity. This understanding, however, requires a 
redefinition of the term exogeneity to include cases in which a common outside influence may be 
recognizable. The terms of this outside influence are not conceptually defined except for the 
purpose of the limited study. This proves ultimately uninstructive to the debate itself for two 
reasons. First, although the intent is clearly to advance the debate, this aim is only accomplished 
through a redefinition of its most fundamental terms. Second, Elgie fails to define the context 
under which common outside influence can be understood as exogenous influence.   
 This premise is of consequence to studies such as Mearsheimer (1994) for which even the 
imposition of outside influence (here, in the case of international treaty-making and oversight 
bodies) is insufficient to suggest exogeneity. Mearsheimer concludes that if actors who are both 
involved in the rule making process and bound by the rules generated by the process, and are 
therefore, able to decide what the rule making bodies do, the outside body cannot be understood 
to exert a true exogenous influence.           
Chile and the United Kingdom – A Different Question     
 With this chapter, I move beyond the institutional endogeneity vs. institutional exogeneity 
debate in order to steer the dialogue in a different, and potentially, a more useful direction. The 
terms of this move entail the satisfaction of two conditions. First, I presuppose a common guiding 
framework to which all states have explicitly conceded authority – here, by virtue of signatory 
status to the 1951 Refugee Convention and / or its 1967 Protocol. The presence of a binding, 
externally enforced agreement to uphold the terms of a common framework strengthens Elgie’s 
exogeneity proof. Whereas the former French colonial states share many historical and socio-
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economic factors in common, there is no externally enforced agreement in place among these states 
to adopt elements of the former mother country’s foundational documents into their own. More 
important to the step I take for the purpose of this chapter is the second condition – that the question 
of the institution’s importance is treated completely independently of the question of institutional 
endogeneity vs. institutional exogeneity. Despite the common framework defined within the 
Convention, it is understood for the purpose of this work that all relevant domestic institutions are 
of endogenous construction, yet subject to exogenous enforcement mechanisms. In establishing 
and satisfying this condition, I hold the endogeneity of institutions constructed under the common 
framework as a conceptual constant in a manner that no other study on the question on the 
relevance of institutions does. This permits a shift in focus from one of institution as endogenous 
vs. institution as exogenous to the question of one on externalities, here captured through markers 
of structural hierarchies inherent to membership within the community of democratic state 
signatories. Cases in which these externalities are demonstrated as sufficient to create conditions 
under which the institution should be of use to understand observed outcomes are discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 4. This chapter considers the alternate scenario – where markers of the same 
structural hierarchies permit the prediction that markers of ideation will be insufficient to an 
understanding or prediction of the institution that will be in place. To accomplish this, I examine 
the endogenous institutional output of two states, Chile and the United Kingdom.    
 The framework I develop in Chapter 2 for the identification of cases in which the institution 
is likely to matter relies on structural hierarchies among members of the closed community of 
states sharing a similar motivation – the impetus to achieve or maintain elected power and 
influence within a successfully consolidated democracy. Where markers of these structural input 
factors are shown to display the greatest limitation on the ultimate expectation that domestic 
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compliance rules will matter, the rules themselves are predicted to exert the lowest level of effect 
on observed asylum rules, specifically as these rules influence the length of time to the median 
asylum applicant’s final status determination.      
 In isolation, a look at questions of how the institution should matter would suggest the 
prediction that Chile would encode cost-evasive strategies toward full compliance with the 
normative goal, while the United Kingdom would encode cost-acceptant strategies toward the 
normative goal. This is shown in Chapter 2, Figure 4. However, because the institution is predicted 
to be uninstructive toward an understanding of compliance outcomes, I am able to demonstrate 
how and why the opposite result was reached with these two countries. Here, structural and 
ideational conditions are shown to converge in a manner demonstrative of an outcome that would 
not be possible if the institution were to be employed toward any aim other than cheap talk – 
comparatively benign procedures have been instituted within these two countries, yet they were 
sold to the electorates within the respective countries as cost acceptant in Chile and as cost evasive 
in the United Kingdom.         
 Because the goal of this chapter is fundamentally different than the goal of the previous 
two chapters, I present the argument in a different manner. In Chapters 3 and 4, I have followed 
sections outlining brief histories of forced migration within two focus countries with empirical 
sections outlining how the Chapter 2 model works within the focus countries. First, following the 
horizontal dimension of the Chapter 2 model, I have examined input factors indicative of the fact 
that institution in place should permit an understanding of asylum outcomes. Then in subsequent 
sections, following the vertical dimension of the Chapter 2 model, I have examined questions of 
how the politics of electoral survival suggest the ultimate forms that the relevant institutions will 
take. With this chapter, the sections to follow deal with these where and how questions in mirrored 
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reverse. I first lead the reader through a much abbreviated treatment of state-specific input factors 
following the vertical dimension of the model. This permits an understanding of the types of 
institution that would be in place under the condition that the institution itself were predicted to 
matter to outcomes. I then lead the reader through the horizontal dimension of the model in order 
to demonstrate that the configuration of structural hierarchies permits the prediction that the 
institution itself should not be important to an understanding of asylum outcomes. Finally, I lead 
the reader back through a second, more comprehensive treatment of the vertical dimension of the 
Chapter 2 model in order to demonstrate how the state-specific practice of cheap talk through 
institution building has led to the implementation of rules that have assumed forms that contradict 
the predictions of the horizontal dimension of analysis if taken in isolation.  
 To follow, I present a brief history as it is useful to understand the background against 
which relevant debates have taken form. Why should we expect for elites within Chile to have 
gained from selling a narrative of cost acceptance, and why should we expect for elites within the 
UK to have gained from selling a narrative of cost avoidance, even if these narratives would 
ultimately be employed toward the creation of signals without real cost? 
A Short History of Forced Migration in Chile*      
 The Pacific to its west, the Andes to its east, the Atacama Desert plateau to its north, and 
the Antarctic to its south, Chile’s entire history has been characterized by social and cultural 
insolation imposed by its geographic isolation. This geographic isolation permitted its European 
colonizers to assume the role of arbiters of those who would be allowed to settle in Chile, and the 
colonizers’ aims to encourage population growth through the import of white, European men were 
                                                          
* All data within this section are taken from Doña and Levinson’s 2004 report for the Migration Policy Institute, titled 
“Chile: Moving Towards a Migration Policy.”  Much of the narrative structure follows that of applicable sections of 
the report as well. 
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realized through policy that remained in effect into the 20 th century. Overall numbers of migrants 
to Chile remained small relative to the numbers migrating to other, larger South American 
countries, yet the presence of the high proportion of European immigrants to non-European 
immigrants defined the country’s makeup from its inception in terms of law, culture, and religion.
 Selective admissions procedures date back to 1824. At this time, Chile’s first immigration 
act entailed measures to encourage English, German, and Swiss men to establish factories in the 
country’s urban centers and to populate its sparsely inhabited south. Chile’s 1854 census data 
reveal that 30 years after the act, approximately 20,000 people of foreign birth were present in the 
country, and that the majority of these were German colonists. The Chilean General Immigration 
Agency in Europe was established in 1882 to provide Chilean land to European settler families. 
By 1895, an additional 31,000 Europeans had taken advantage of Agency provisions and had 
settled and populated the southern colonies of Llanquihue and Valdivia; by 1900; Europeans had 
begun to settle and populate Antafogasta and Magallanes as well. Between 1865 and 1920, over 
half of all Chile’s foreign born were Europeans.      
 Procedures favoring European immigration ceased during WWI. Lawmakers sought first 
in 1918 to restrict all immigration, due to fears of a possible influx of refugee flows. With the onset 
of WWII, Chile took even more extreme measures. No foreigners would be permitted entry to the 
country without proof of funds sufficient to provide for their sustenance for a period of six months, 
and only immediate relatives of those who held two years of continued residence in Chile would 
be permitted to immigrate. At the same time, non-European immigration began to rise. By 1930, 
migrants (who were mostly undocumented) from Syria, Palestine, and Lebanon accounted for 15% 
of the foreign born population, and by 1952, this total had risen to over 20%. Despite these 
increases in non-European migration, over the next few decades, overall immigration to Chile fell 
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sharply. In early 1972, Chile acceded to the Refugee Convention and its Protocol, yet no 
parliamentary action was taken to incorporate the provisions of these documents into domestic 
law.            
 Following the 1973 coup that installed Pinochet’s military regime, Chile became, for the 
first time, a country of net emigration. Between 1973 and 1990, more than 500,000 Chileans fled 
the country, with more than 50% settling in Argentina, Australia, Canada, Venezuela, or Sweden. 
The net effect of mass emigration was somewhat mediated by the fact that, at during the same 
period, Pinochet’s government actively promoted open-market policies that stimulated foreign 
investment in Chile. Foreign currencies and technologies were privileged, and this encouraged 
some (albeit at a comparatively much smaller level of) non-European immigration, notably by 
those with high levels of education and income from other South American countries as well as 
from East Asia.           
 In 1975, Pinochet’s government instituted the first provision for entry to Chile as an asylum 
seeker. The broader aim of the 1975 Immigration Act was to limit migration flows to Chile to those 
potential entrants who would be judged to provide economic benefit to the country; the provision 
for entry as an asylum seeker was ill defined and practically unusable. Under the Act, a petitioner 
could only be granted asylum-seeker status by way of a visa to be issued prior to the petitioner’s 
entry into the country. Due both to the unworkability of the asylum procedure and to the repressive, 
brutal nature of the military regime that remained in place until 1990, few took advantage of the 
relevant provisions of the 1975 Act.         
 This law remained in force and unaltered for many years following the ouster of Pinochet’s 
government and Chile’s return to democratic rule. In fact, it was not until 2008, under the center-
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left Concertación alliance government and under President Bachelet, herself a former asylee, that 
the 1975 act was revisited and substantially altered. 
A Short History of Forced Migration in the United Kingdom    
 The United Kingdom has a long history of action relating to forced migration, dating back 
as far as the British state’s highly restrictive 1793 Aliens Bill, which sought to limit flight to 
England by those seeking immunity from persecution following the French Revolution. This act 
was overturned in 1826, largely in response to a shift in public opinion that had begun to equate 
asylum to the obligations inherent to protecting individual rights and free trade (Schuster 2003). 
In 1848, Lord Palmerston spoke of the need to grant guarantees against refoulement after a 
petitioner had reached British territory, as refoulement would necessarily effect persecution at the 
hands of the asylum seeker’s host state.   
"The laws of hospitality, the dictates of humanity, the general feelings of mankind, forbid 
 such surrenders; and any independent government, which of its own free will were to make 
 such a surrender, would be universally and deservedly stigmatised as degraded and 
 dishonoured." (Lord Palmerston 1848, quoted in Open Democracy 2008).   
 Until the end of the 19th century, entry to Britain was largely unrestricted by the state; by 
the early 20th century, laws concerning entry had become much more prohibitive. In the late 1800s, 
many had left the mother country to seek fortune in the colonies or in the United States. With the 
demand for laborers that resulted from the industrial revolution, easy entry was judged as the best 
means to replenish the work force. By the early 1900s, however, the British economy had begun 
to experience a period of high unemployment and overall decline, and popular intolerance toward 
the presence of immigrants had begun to take shape.      
 This resulted in the passage of the 1905 Aliens Act. Russian and Polish Jews fleeing 
persecution in Russia had come to settle in Britain in large numbers. The Act established criteria 
against which a potential migrant could be judged as undesirable, and if one of these criteria were 
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met, even at a later point in time, the potential migrant could assume that entry would not be 
permitted or tolerated, and that any protection previously extended may be rescinded or 
retroactively invalidated. Four criteria were introduced: a lack of means for the migrant to support 
himself and his family, mental instability or physical illness that may progress to necessitate the 
immigrant’s incarceration or hospitalization, the immigrant’s previous record of having been 
found guilty of a non-political crime, and the existence of a previous deportation order against the 
immigrant.           
 The intent of Aliens Act was to exclude poor, sick, or criminal migrants; however, the Act 
explicitly permitted entry for the purpose of accessing asylum protection. 
“But in the case of an immigrant who proves that he is seeking admission to this country 
 solely to avoid persecution or punishment on religious or political grounds ... leave to land 
 shall not be refused on the ground merely of want of means or the probability of his 
 becoming a charge on the rates” (British Parliament 1905). 
The opportunity to access asylum protection was to remain available and protected, 
although the right would become restricted by law in the context of WWI in 1914 to exclude 
Germans and (later) Austrians from those to whom protection may be extended, and following the 
war in 1919 to expand future wartime emergency powers to restrict claimant entry. Additionally, 
the 1919 act further restricted rights of those asylees who were already in Britain, to include 
prohibitions against jury service and employment in the civil service.    
 Despite these wartime and post-wartime provisions, the UK remained protective of its 
long-earned status as a country of potential asylum. During WWII, over 20,000 European Jews 
were granted asylum protection; following Hungary’s 1956 Revolution, over 21,000 Hungarians 
were granted asylum protection, and following their 1972 expulsion from the country by Amin, 
over 27,000 Asian Ugandans were granted protection (Wilson 2014). From the early 1980s until 
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the point in time that begins this study, several parliamentary acts redefined processes inherent to 
the asylum adjudication system. These will be discussed as relevant in subsequent sections.  
Chile and the United Kingdom – What Types of Institution Would We See If the Institution 
Were Built to Matter? 
With this section, I lead the reader through a treatment of input factors that lead to the 
prediction that if the institution in place were to matter strongly to asylum outcomes, these 
institutions would be observed as cost evasive in Chile and as cost acceptant in the United 
Kingdom. I accomplish this through a brief examination of utilities calculated toward answers to 
questions along the vertical dimension of the Chapter 2 model. Then, following an analysis of the 
horizontal dimension of analysis toward questions of why the institution should not be predicted 
to matter to outcomes in the next section, I return to a the “how should the institution matter” 
decision sequence in order to effect an examination of the political processes that have resulted in 
the institutions that are in place within Chile and the United Kingdom.    
 I use the first decision of the “how should the institution matter” sequence to create a binary 
necessary to separate states to have adopted the Convention and its Protocol (or to have assumed 
the responsibilities of the Convention by virtue of having adopted of the Protocol) from those 
states not to have adopted the Convention into law domestically. On this binary measure, both 
Chile and the United Kingdom receive the score indicative of the fact the two states have assumed 
the duties inherent to signatory status, and both states continue to take decisions into subsequent 
nodes.36           
 At the second node, I examine the question of direction of influence. Both Chile and the 
                                                          
36 In Chapters 3 and 4, I have used treatment of this first question to enumerate the specific protections that focus 
countries have agreed to uphold by virtue of the state’s record of registered and withdrawn reservations to the 
Convention. For the purpose of this chapter, I reserve parallel treatment of the domestic government / UN negotiation 
process for the second, more detailed treatment of questions along the “how should the institution matter” dimension. 
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United Kingdom receive a score indicative of the fact that top-down influence should not be 
assumed. Therefore, utilities to be calculated in answer to subsequent questions must account for 
preferences revealed as functions of input factors other than merely the election and reelection or 
ouster of parties to have advocated for restrictive policies toward the outsider within their borders.
 At the third node, for each state not having met the criteria for top-down influence, I report 
a measure calculated as the percentage of the vote share earned by conservative or otherwise 
nativist parties in the second pre-2010 election, compounded with the percentage of respondents 
to have identified immigrants and foreign workers among those whom they would not wish to have 
as neighbors in the Wave 4 of the World Values Survey as a percentage of Romania’s 21.8% 
measure where available, logged. Data are calculated using measures of vote share earned by 
Independent Democrat Union and National Renewal in Chile’s 2005 legislative election and the 
Conservative Party in Britain’s 2001 general election. The parties observed received less than 39% 
of the vote share in Chile and less than 31% of the vote share in the United Kingdom, and scores 
on the marker of xenophobia do not exceed 2/3 of the baseline total in either country.37   
 For the decision on the fourth question, I report data indicative of the likelihood that the 
state will be practically capable to limit the number of year-over-year asylum claims decided 
through the expansion of its bureaucracy. I report for Chile a score that exceeds that earned by 
Greece on the same measure. This indicates that if elites within Chile had perceived the mandate 
to limit the number of decided claims, the state would have read an ability greater than even that 
observed within the Chapter 3 focus state acting under the condition of bottom-up influence to 
                                                          
37 For Chile, which did participate in the Wave 4 survey, 10.8% or respondents identified immigrants and foreign 
workers among those whom they would not wish to have as neighbors. For the UK, which did not participate in the 
Wave 4 survey, the total reported is the mean value of 13.8%. This is likely an accurate, if slightly conservative 
estimate. The UK did participate in the Wave 5 and Wave 6 surveys and registered totals of 14.2% on this measure in 
both years. 
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implement cost evasive strategies. As discussed with reference to Greece in Chapter 3, the ability 
to create or encourage the expansion of bureaucratic procedures toward the more intuitive aim of 
cost avoidance on issues of Convention compliance creates a condition in which the state is likely 
to pursue this aim in the building of its institutional framework. For this reason, utilities continue 
to be calculated at subsequent nodes for Chile. I report for the United Kingdom a score equal to 
that observed for South Korea on the same measure. This indicates that even under the condition 
that elites within the United Kingdom had perceived a mandate to limit the number of decided 
claims, the state would have read the practical opportunity to implement cost evasive strategies 
only at the level reported for South Korea. As discussed in detail with reference to Belgium and 
South Korea in the previous chapter, because of the perception of a practical inability to implement 
cost evasive strategies, even under the condition that the popular mandate to do so may exist, the 
state will act as if under a perception of the impracticality of cost avoidant strategies. Because 
perception of the practical ability to avoid costs does not exist, the state will be expected to interpret 
the need to accept the full potential cost of Convention compliance. As with Belgium and South 
Korea, no utilities are calculated for the UK on further questions.      
 At the fifth node, Chile is one of the 20 states remaining to collect utilities under the 
condition of bottom-up influence. All 20 of these states fall within either Q1 or Q2 on Figure 5 in 
Chapter 2, indicative of the fact that if the institution were to matter to compliance outcomes, cost 
evasive strategies would be instituted within the relevant implementing legislation. Whereas the 
decision at the previous node served as a proxy measure of the state’s practical ability to avoid 
cost through its implementing procedures, the decision at the current node serves a proxy for the 
saleability to the electorate to implement these procedures, as measured through its ability to foster 
job growth. On this measure, I report a function of each state’s observed unemployment level. For 
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Chile, I report a score near the median, with eight states (Australia, Brazil, France, Ireland, Israel, 
Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United States) holding lower unemployment figures, 
and the remaining 11 states (Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Greece, Mexico, Peru, South Africa, Spain, and Uruguay) holding higher unemployment levels. 
The implication is that elites within Chile will perceive a moderate level of saleability to efforts to 
expand its bureaucracy toward the aim of avoiding the full potential cost of Convention 
compliance.            
 For the decision at the final node, I report a utility calculated as a function of the positive 
or negative gains made by the parties observed in the first election cycle, for the second election 
cycle. In the 2009 election, little had changed in terms of parliamentary representation; in Chile’s 
120-member legislative body, Democratic Union picked up four seats, and National Renewal lost 
one seat.           
 As I note in Chapter 2 and discuss in detail with reference to Belgium and South Korea in 
Chapter 4, the primary difference observed among states to encode cost evasive instruments into 
the domestic implementing procedures entails the elite perception of the state’s practical ability to 
avoid cost through the ability to expand the state’s bureaucracy. Perception of this ability is not 
proposed as a sufficient condition, but merely as a necessary condition. Where this condition is 
met, the institution of further domestic instruments toward the goal of cost avoidance is possible. 
Achievement of this condition is demonstrated in Chapter 3 through the cases of Greece and 
Austria, and is demonstrated in the current chapter in the case of Chile. Where this condition is not 
met, domestic action that will effect the payout of greater costs toward the normative standard may 
prove uncontroversial and may incur broad, cross-the-board support within the state’s rule making 
body. This is observed in Chapter 4 through the cases of Belgium and South Korea, and its 
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possibility is suggested here in the case of the United Kingdom.      
 However, as I outline in Chapter 4, a second condition is also necessary to the prediction 
of a state’s cost acceptant strategy – the institution itself must be predicted display meaningful 
effects on the median applicant’s wait time to final status determination. To follow, I lead the 
reader through a treatment of the sequence mapped along the horizontal dimension of the Chapter 
2 model in order to demonstrate that this second condition is not met in either Chile or the United 
Kingdom.                                      
Chile and the United Kingdom – Why Shouldn’t the Institution Matter?  
 The first question considers the hierarchy inherent to the division of wealth among the 
community of 44 states observed. On this measure, I calculate a score as a function of per capita 
GNP as reported by World Bank (2011) for Chile at $US 11,925, and for the United Kingdom at 
$US 38,790. This measure suggests a hierarchical ordering useful toward the determination of the 
extent to which elites within each state may gauge that the institution to be built will impose real 
costs to the state. Richer states may act as if informed by two postulates informed by their measure 
of wealth: it will create conditions under which they will be more likely to face calls to pay out on 
the full cost of any legislative and procedural rules to be implemented, and that these rules will be 
extended to greater numbers of asylum applicants. Although this measure is useful toward an 
understanding of state decisions to be taken at future nodes for all states, the outcome of the 
decision does not create a functional binary that differentiates states registering totals at the lower 
end (as Chile) from states registering totals at the upper end (as the United Kingdom). Therefore, 
the sequence continues for all states, including Chile and the United Kingdom.   
 At the second node, I address the hierarchy inherent to relative levels of access to country 
territory among states observed. The median applicant is more likely to perceive the opportunity 
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to cross the border into a state for the purpose of initiating an asylum claim where the border itself 
is either more porous or easily traversed. Unlike the decision at the previous node, the decision 
based on a state’s perception that the median applicant will be able to cross the border is used to 
create a binary that divides those states with more permissive access to entry from states with more 
greatly restrictive access to entry. Where elites within the state are able to take action as if under 
the perception that the median claimant will be unable to access asylum protection, utilities 
calculated toward decisions at further stratifying nodes will prove irrelevant to outcomes. This 
holds because a state’s prior history of propensity to approve the median claim and the cost to the 
state in hosting the median claimant will be incalculable under the condition that the median 
claimant is unable to cross the state’s border for the purpose of seeking asylum protection. Because 
of this, within all states for which the institution is predicted to permit prediction of the length of 
time to final status determination, the Chapter 2 model stipulates that elites will only be able to 
take further action informed as if by the perception that the median claimant will be able to access 
asylum protection.           
 In order to claim standing necessary to access protection under the instruments of the 
Convention, the applicant must cross the potential host state border under the condition of having 
fled the country against which he or she is claiming asylum protection, and this flight must be 
based on the applicant’s prior persecution or “well-founded fear” of persecution. Stated differently, 
a potential applicant may only initiate an asylum claim having entered the potential host country 
as a means of escape. The text of the Convention explicitly notes that under this condition, legal 
travel documentation will, in most cases, be unobtainable. It is for this reason that, per Article 31, 
all state signatories are barred from taking legal action against a claimant who has entered the state 
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without proper documentation.38          
 In Chapter 3, I examine the cases of Greece and Austria, where during the year of the run-
up to first observed election cycle, respectively, 98.99% and 38.16% of all entrants lacked legal 
documentation; in Chapter 4, I examine the cases of Belgium and South Korea, where during the 
year of the run-up to the first observed election cycle, respectively, 51.36% and 67.55% of all 
entrants lacked legal documentation. These figures indicate easier relative practical access for the 
potential claimant to asylum procedures due to the fact that the illegal, undocumented, or 
unnegotiated entrant has been relatively more able to access receiving state territory. In Chile, 
however, only 14.68% of entrants lacked legal documentation; in the United Kingdom, only 5.98% 
of entrants lacked legal documentation. I treat these relatively low numbers as indicative of the 
fact that elites may perceive the opportunity to engage in the rule building process as if under the 
assumption that the median claimant will be practically incapable of accessing the country’s 
asylum protection processes due to the inability to cross the host state’s borders under the condition 
of illegal, undocumented, or unnegotiated entry. This lack of practical access may be attributable 
to the difficulty faced by the potential applicant in accessing the state’s territory due either to 
geographic isolation relative to net-sending states, as in Chile, or to relatively stricter border 
controls, in the United Kingdom.         
 Where it may be interpreted that the median claimant will not be able to access the asylum 
claims process, elites face the perception that they may construct Convention compliance 
institutions as mere cheap talk. Hathaway (2002, 2007) and Powell and Staton (2009) find that 
                                                          
38 As noted in Chapter 3, the Greek delegation had registered a reservation in answer to the Article 31 prohibition 
against initiating legal action against a claimant who had crossed the border without proper documentation; this 
reservation was officially withdrawn in 1978. Apart from Greece, only Moldova (upon its 2002 accession to the 
Convention) had registered a reservation in answer to the Article 31 prohibition. Moldova’s reservation explicitly 
notes its temporary nature pending the rewriting of relevant provisions of its domestic laws. No reservation stipulating 
that a state may derogate from protections enumerated in Article 31 remains in effect.  
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states will seize the opportunity to ratify or accede to international human rights treaties as means 
of costless signaling where conditions may permit the expectation that states may be incapable of 
enforcing or unlikely to face calls to enforce the terms of the treaty. One goal of the current work 
is to expand this line of reasoning within the scholarship beyond its application to the ratification 
or accession procedures to include discussion of the possibility that a country’s own domestic rules 
in implementation of an international treaty may be used toward the same goal.    
 In the previous section, I have enumerated the conditions that have led to the prediction 
that if the domestic procedures within Chile and the United Kingdom were to matter to outcomes, 
these procedures would facilitate a longer wait time to median applicant final status determination 
in Chile, and a shorter wait time to median applicant final status determination in the United 
Kingdom. This is attributable primarily to the perception in Chile that elites may assume the 
opportunity to avoid cost the full potential cost of full compliance through the expansion of its 
bureaucracy, and the lack of this perception in the United Kingdom, which may force the state to 
accept the full potential cost of compliance. In this section, I have established that the median 
claimant is likely not present within Chile or the United Kingdom due to conditions revealed 
through each state’s relatively restricted border access. Because of the greatly diminished 
possibility that the median claimant may found within either of these two states, I hold that one of 
the two Powell and Staton (2009) conditions sufficient for the use of institution as cheap talk – 
that the state will not face calls to pay out on the cost of an international treaty – has been met.  
 Because nothing inherent to the logic of these studies suggests that such cheap talk may be 
conceptually limited to questions of ratification or accession, I proceed under the assumption that 
domestic enforcement mechanisms may be used as instruments toward the same aims. In the 
following section, I lead the reader through a second, more detailed treatment of the decision 
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sequence mapped along the vertical dimension of the Chapter 2 model in order to explicate 
precisely how this institution-as-cheap-talk process can be shown to have worked within Chile and 
the United Kingdom. Where the institution itself may be judged as ultimately unimportant to 
outcomes, it may be employed toward the conveyance of costless signals. Where this condition is 
met, how do elites sell procedures to their electorates toward the long-term gain of political 
influence and survival?                                         
Institutions as Cheap Talk – What Institutions Are in Place?    
 Within both Chile and the United Kingdom, the possibility exists that elites may use the 
rule construction process toward the aim of costless signaling. With reference to the ability to use 
signatory status to an international human rights convention, Powell and Staton (2009) 
demonstrate that this possibility captures a condition sufficient to ensure that a state will pursue 
this course of action. For the purpose of this chapter, I propose that the ability to use the content 
of domestic mechanisms instituted toward treaty compliance toward the same goal will result in 
the fulfillment of a condition that is similarly sufficient. With reference to the Refugee Convention 
and its Protocol, in order to demonstrate that state-specific ideational conditions should permit no 
prediction of the implementing legislation in place, I lead the reader through the domestic political 
environment within Chile and the United Kingdom as it is useful to an understanding of the forms 
that costless signaling may take. Where cost evasive strategies would be predicted based on a 
reading of the “how should the institution matter” sequence in isolation in Chile, under the 
condition of institution as cheap talk, measures were introduced, debated, and sold to the voting 
public and the international community as cost acceptant strategies. Where cost acceptant 
strategies would be predicted based on the same measures, under the same condition of institution 
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as cheap talk, measures that share marked similarities were introduced, debated, and sold to the 
voting public as cost evasive strategies.          
 1. Chile and the United Kingdom at T1: What Protections Have They Agreed to 
 Uphold?   
The period of time considered with this study begins with the run-up to the second pre-
2010 legislative election within each state observed. For Chile, I begin with the process leading up 
to the 2005 legislative election; for the United Kingdom, I begin with the process leading up to the 
2001 general election. At this point in time, both Chile and the United Kingdom had signaled intent 
to comply with the terms of both the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol.   
 The United Kingdom was among the 26 countries to present delegates at the drafting of 
the Convention at Geneva in 1951 and was among its 18 original signatory states. Chile acceded 
to the convention in January 1972. The Convention was given force of law domestically 
immediately upon accession in Chile, and in March 1954 in the United Kingdom. At the time of 
domestic ratification, both Chile and the United Kingdom communicated and registered 
reservations to specific items of text within the Convention. All reservations39 remain in effect at 
the point of time that concludes this study.         
 The Chilean delegation registered two reservations relating to Article 17, Paragraph 2, 
which outlines conditions to be attached to the possible revocation of the right of those who have 
been granted asylum to engage in wage-earning employment. With regard to the language 
indicating that the right to earn a wage cannot be revoked under the condition that the asylee has 
                                                          
39 The United Kingdom registered several reservations with particular reference to the applicability of its signatory 
status to its colonies, protectorates, and overseas territories. Those relating to colonies, protectorates, and territories 
remain in effect insofar as these the geographic areas named remain part of the United Kingdom. In the cases of 
territories that have become independent states, most (e.g., Belize [British Honduras], Cyprus, Jamaica) have acceded 
to the Convention separately. Mauritius and Tanzania (which includes the former British protectorate Zanzibar) have 
not acceded to the Convention, and are counted among non-signatory states. Only reservations relating to the mother 
state are enumerated here. 
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resided within the country’s territory for three consecutive years, the Chilean delegation stipulated 
that for the purpose of its domestic legislation, this period of time required for continued residence 
may be extended to ten years. Regarding the language in the same paragraph that deals with 
abandonment by a spouse that holds host state nationality, due to the then-current Chilean 
prohibition against divorce, the Chilean delegation stipulated that the prohibition would be 
understood to apply only in the case of the death of a spouse who held Chilean nationality.  
 Chile also registered a reservation in answer to Article 34, which assigns to signatory states 
the duty to facilitate the naturalization of recognized refugees. This reservation stipulates that the 
Chilean government will not be able to grant refugees “facilities that are greater than those granted 
to aliens in general, in view of the liberal nature of Chilean naturalization laws.”    
 The Chilean delegation also registered a general reservation, noting that with regard any 
potential deportation orders to be issued, the state would not be able to grant a longer period for 
denied asylum claimants to comply than would be granted under any other condition under which 
an expulsion order had been issued.         
 The British delegation registered a reservation in dual answer to Articles 8 and 9. Article 
8 stipulates that the state may not take action against the person, property, or interests of asylees 
who remain nationals of a foreign state based solely on the asylee’s nationality. Article 9 stipulates 
that no item within the text of the Convention is intended to prevent a state from the application of 
exceptional measures in “times of war or other grave circumstances” against a refugee if such 
measures are deemed necessary by the signatory state to its national security. This reservation 
stipulates that the Article 8 language “action against property” will not prohibit the state from 
exercising claim to any property acquired under a treaty of peace completed at the conclusion of 
WWII, and the language “action against property … or interests” would not prohibit the state from 
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exercising claim to property or interests that may come under the control of the state in the course 
of future war.            
 The British delegation also registered a reservation in answer to Article 17, which 
enumerates conditions under which the right to earn a wage may be revoked. This reservation 
stipulates that the period of time of continued residence for the enumerated protections to be 
considered binding will be increased from three to four years, and that the prohibition against 
termination of an asylee’s right to earn a wage under the condition that the asylee has one or more 
children possessing host-state nationality will not be understood as binding in British domestic 
legislation.            
 The British reservation to Article 24, section 1, subsection b, which mandates that 
provision of state welfare benefits must be accorded to asylees on the same basis as these benefits 
are accorded to nationals of the host state, notes that the then current British law would supersede 
the text of the subsection. The terms of the relevant British law are not noted in the reservation.  
 The British delegation also registered a reservation in answer to Article 25, which 
delineates several responsibilities on the part of the host state in the provision of administrative 
assistance in the procurement and delivery of documentation necessary for a refugee to exercise 
rights that would otherwise require the assistance of authorities of a foreign country. This 
reservation stipulates that the British government will not be bound to assist in the procurement or 
delivery of this documentation, and that any documents or certifications provided directly to the 
refugee by a foreign government will be given credence by the British state only insofar as British 
law permits. A note of commentary following this reservation stipulates that no arrangements of 
the type suggested in Article 25 have been found necessary to secure the rights of refugees in the 
UK, and that any possible future need for such arrangements “would be met by affidavits.”  
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 Aside from these reservations, Chile and the United Kingdom have agreed to be bound to 
uphold all protections defined within the Convention and its Protocol. For the purpose of the 
purpose of the previous two chapters, I have used treatment of this measure toward the explication 
of the calculation of utilities earned along the “how does the institution matter” dimension of 
analysis. For the purpose of the current chapter, state decisions based on the calculation of these 
utilities have been discussed in an earlier section. Instead, the aim of this subsection and the 
following subsections is to lead the reader through an understanding of the types of rules that have 
come to be enforced given the understanding that the institution itself will be of little effective 
consequence to length of time to final status determination. Proceeding from this premise, 
following subsections will not explicate the calculation of utilities. Instead, the subsections to 
follow are used to expound the domestic political environments within Chile and the United 
Kingdom in order to facilitate an understanding of the specific form that institution-as-cheap-talk 
has taken under the condition that the institution itself can be held to have been constructed as if 
under the assumption that its instruments could not be employed toward either the evasion or the 
acceptance of cost related to Convention compliance. 
 2. Party Politics and the Ability to Shape Electorate Preferences 
For the second decision, states weigh elite propensity to take action that may or may not 
reflect the wishes of the electorate. Both Chile and the United Kingdom report scores indicative of 
the fact that the Chapter 2 conditions outlined for top-down direction of influence have not been 
met.            
 To follow, I outline the role of public debates on issues of asylum at the point in time 
leading up to the 2005 Chilean legislative election and the 2001 British general election. In the 
case of Chile, issues of forced migration were neither highly polarizing nor highly salient, and 
these issues did not play any significant role in election processes or results during the entire period 
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of time observed with this study. In the case of the United Kingdom, issues of forced migration 
did prove progressively more polarizing among elite actors, but in contrast to the Ivarsflaten 
prediction, the masses reacted more strongly to cues presented on both legal migration and 
economic migration, and this reaction has only in 2016 reached a peak comparable to that observed 
in the course of 2006-2007 in Austria.  
Chile. Since Chile’s return to democracy, no far right party has garnered popular support. 
The parties I observe with this study include the center right Independent Democratic Union (UDI) 
and National Renewal (RN). Both parties had existed during Chile’s 16.5-year military 
dictatorship. In the 1988 plebiscite that resulted in Pinochet’s ouster and the country’s return to 
democratic rule, UDI initially supported Pinochet’s spot on the ballot, while RN initially called for 
an alternate candidate to appear on the ballot. However, after Pinochet had secured the spot as the 
“proposed candidate,” RN supported his candidacy.40        
 The 1980 Chilean Constitution remains in place in a highly amended form. As important 
to this work, during the entire period of time observed, the binomial representation system 
remained in effect. One result of this system was the disproportionately large representation in 
parliament of candidates aligned with the coalition winning the second largest vote share.41 In 
practice, this resulted in nearly equal shares of center-left and center-right alliance members in the 
elected legislature during the entire period under observation. Also remaining in effect throughout 
                                                          
40 The plebiscite had been called for under Pinochet and mandated in the 1980 Constitution. The two choices presented 
to the voters were “yes” and “no.” A “yes” vote indicated that the “proposed candidate is approved.” The Junta would 
remain in power until the newly elected parliament assumes office in March 1990; A “no” vote indicated that “the 
proposed candidate is rejected.” The junta would remain in power for one year following the vote, and presidential 
and parliamentary elections would be held three months prior to the junta’s departure from power. The “no” vote won 
with nearly 56% of the popular vote, and presidential and parliamentary elections were held in December 1989. The 
newly elected government took office in March 1990. 
41 In order for members running within a single coalition to assume both seats within a legislative district, its candidate 
list was required to receive 2/3 of the vote share; where this 2/3 threshold was not met, one member from each list 
would represent the district in parliament.  
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the entire temporal space observed in this study was Chile’s 1975 Immigration Act, under which 
an asylum claim could only be initiated under the condition that the asylum seeker had entered 
Chile on an asylum seeker visa. Due in part to Chile’s geographic isolation relative to net asylum 
sending states and the resulting lack of popular awareness of the provisions in place, and in part to 
the near equal representation of the right and left in government, there was no political will to 
change this provision of the Immigration Act.        
 An absence of political debate among the Chilean population has marked its history since 
the country’s return to democracy. The Pinochet regime had actively sought to depoliticize the 
population in effort to maintain its hold on power, while also promoting a neoliberal economic 
agenda. Because right coalitions have held nearly 50% of parliamentary seats during the entire 
period observed, and because parties within these coalitions have continued to emphasize free 
market economic policies as self-correcting mechanisms toward aims important to the life of the 
average Chilean, the free market of ideas has been slow to assert hold, and political debate has 
largely been restricted to the political class (Silva 2004).         
 In this environment, the center-left Concertación alliance government under Ricardo Lagos 
(2002-2006) focused its attention on easing restrictions on immigration overall, while 
simultaneously improving border security (Doña-Reveco and Levinson 2012). During this period, 
asylees were permitted unrestricted access to the labor market pending a medical checkup and the 
issuance of a national identity card and access to the citizenship application process following a 
period of 5 years of continued residence.         
 United Kingdom. As in Chile, during the time period under observation, no far right or 
blatantly anti-immigration party has received widespread support or representation in the British 
Parliament. In the landslide 1997 general election, the Conservative Party saw a loss of 178 seats, 
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while the Labour Party saw an increase of 145 seats. In this environment, Tony Blair’s newly 
elected Labour government moved markedly to the center of the political space, deemphasizing 
the party’s long held pro-labor orientation toward the promotion of strongly pro-market policy. 
Policies included within the New Labour platform entailed the move of health, education, and 
public services to the private sector. At the same time, factions within the newly diminished, newly 
fragmented Conservative Party moved farther to the right. The fragmentation of the Conservatives 
was most readily observed with the break of nearly 200 candidates seeking election in the 2001 
contest to oppose Britain’s entry to the Eurozone.        
 Gabrielatos and Baker (2008) note that during Labour’s first term in office, press coverage 
on issues of asylum saw a spike between March and May 1999, coinciding with both the war in 
Kosovo and the separatist movement in East Timor. This spike came at the beginning of a three-
year trend, in which the number of asylum applications rose from the 1998 level of less than 
60,000, to between 90,000 and 100,000 in 1999, 2000, and 2001. The media dialogue mirrored the 
political dialogue espoused by the Labour Party, which came to emphasize the idea that the right 
of an asylum seeker to access the labor market during the period of time that the seeker’s claim 
was pending decision served as a pull factor in attracting illegitimate asylum claims (Robinson 
and Sergott 2002). Labour’s answer to the perceived problem was to advance two aims: to prevent 
asylum seeker arrival to British territory (Mulvey 2010), and to remove the claimant’s right to 
work. This second goal was written into British law in 2001.      
 However, the narrative underlying these changes was problematic for two reasons. First, it 
did not reflect reality. UK Home Office (2001) notes that the majority of asylum seekers had been 
employed in fields where demand for labor was high, and that comparatively few sought public 
welfare assistance; Burnett and Peel (2001) note that the median asylum applicant within the 
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United Kingdom held a higher level of education than the median applicant within any other 
European country. Second, the asylum dialogue was difficult for the British electorate to process, 
at a time when they were receiving simultaneous cues regarding both migration from other EU 
member states and the necessity to adopt a new British national identity in addition to long held 
separate English, Northern Irish, Scots, and Welsh national identities (Kriesi et al. 2006).  
 The political environment leading up to the 2005 Chilean legislative election and the 2001 
British general election provides a context necessary to understand the condition of bottom-up 
direction of influence within both states. In a highly depoliticized and largely disaffected Chilean 
electorate, the center-left Lagos government perceived no popular call to address issues of asylum. 
Borders were securitized, and more generous provisions for immigration in general were instituted, 
yet the 1975 Pinochet era provisions for accessing asylum protection remained in place. Here, 
where the elite interpreted no popular mandate to address asylum issues, no governmental action 
was taken addressing asylum as a discrete issue. In the United Kingdom, by contrast, the center -
left, yet increasingly centrist Labour government did attempt to provide a narrative somewhat 
hostile to the asylum seeker, but the cues were popularly confounded in the mind of the voting 
public with competing cues on intra-European immigration to the UK and the creation of a British 
national identity. In this environment, border security and measures limiting the right of the asylum 
seeker to earn a living became the only practically saleable actions, and as in Chile, the asylum 
process itself remained largely unaddressed. 
 3. Election Results 
The Chilean legislative election was held on December 11, 2005. The center-left 
Concertación coalition remained in government, having received 51.75% of the popular vote and 
having increased its majority representative share by three, winning 65 seats in the 120-member 
Chamber of Deputies. The center-right Alianza coalition remained in opposition, having received 
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38.72% of the vote and having increased its representative share by one in the lower chamber, 
winning 58 seats. The Chilean presidential election was held on the same day. None of the four 
candidates presented claimed a majority of the popular vote, and this outcome resulted in a runoff 
contest between the two highest vote earners. In the runoff election on January 15, 2006, Michelle 
Bachelet of the PS (Socialist Party, member of the Concertación coalition) defeated Sebastián 
Piñera of RN, (National Renewal, member of the Alianza coalition) with 53.49% of the vote. 
 The British general election was held on June 7, 2001. Labour remained in government, 
having received 40.7% of the vote. Labour lost five seats in the House of Commons, reducing its 
number of MPs from 418 to 413. The Conservatives remained the second party with 31.7% of the 
vote, and picking up one parliamentary seat over its number following the 1997 election, for a total 
of 165. Blair assumed a second term as prime minister.     
 As a result of the elections, the center left governments – both of which having perceived 
no popular mandate to undertake adjustments to the processing of asylum claims – remained in 
office in Chile and the United Kingdom.  
 4. Policy as Costless Signaling 
In Chile, Bachelet assumed the presidency on March 11, 2006. During the first two years 
of the Bachelet presidency, parliament again took little action to address political escape and 
subsequent refuge within Chile as a discrete issue. Instead, the act defining Concertación’s 
progress on issues of immigration during the first half of Bachelet’s presidency was the 2007 
Amnesty Act, which normalized the status of 50,705 undocumented immigrants between October 
2007 and February 2008 (Doña-Reveco and Levinson 2012). Under the program created by the 
Act, immigrants were granted temporary residence visas for a one-year period, and they were 
permitted to extend their period of residence by an additional year under the condition that they 
had been able to find work.          
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 In October-November 2008, Amnesty International’s Secretary General Irene Khan visited 
Chile to conduct an assessment of the country’s commitment to the advancement of human rights. 
The visit concluded with a meeting between Khan and Bachelet, in which a memorandum 
enumerating several recommendations for the improvement of human rights was presented. This 
memorandum noted that “[in] a country that has witnessed first hand [sic] the tragic consequences 
of human rights violations, all political leaders and sectors of society share a joint responsibility 
for upholding human rights,” and that “major cultural and institutional changes are urgently needed 
if Chile is to make a clean break from its past” (Khan Memorandum, quoted in Amnesty 
International 2008).           
 In part in answer to the call to address observed human rights abuses through institutional 
changes, the Bachelet government began to develop policy aimed at the improvement of Chile’s 
asylum process in 2008. Interpreting the state’s responsibility to repay its debt to the rest of the 
world for having received 500,000 exiles (a number that included Bachelet and her mother, 
following her father’s political imprisonment and subsequent prison death) during the period of 
Pinochet’s military dictatorship, the Concertación government began to draft South America’s first 
comprehensive framework for asylum-seeker receiving, processing, adjudication, resettlement, 
and integration. This act took final form as the 2010 Law of the Refugee.     
 In the United Kingdom, by contrast, Blair’s Labour government undertook several attempts 
to signal the toughening of restrictions on asylum entry. In April 2003, the 2002 Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act (NIA Act) came into force. Restrictive measures included the 
following. Section 55 stipulated the requirement that if potential asylees did not initiate the claims 
process as soon as practically reasonable following their entry to the UK, they would not be able 
to access support under relevant provisions of the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act. These 
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support provisions included access to state-subsidized housing (Article 4), public welfare 
assistance in the case that the applicant is judged “sufficiently destitute” to manage the cost of 
daily living (Article 95), and any short-term support as defined under Articles 4 or 95 in the case 
that claimant need for this support is judged to be temporary. Section 94 stipulated that negative 
decisions on asylum claims would not carry automatic suspensive effect and provided a list of safe 
countries. Claims initiated on the part of any applicant seeking protection from these countries 
would be certified as “clearly unfounded” pending review by the Secretary of State office. 
 In 2003, the United Kingdom acceded to the Dublin Accord.42 This is important because 
the United Kingdom had until this point opted out of European agreements regarding border 
security, and had therefore assumed control over its external border to an extent that no other EU 
member state had. No asylum claim would be heard unless the potential claimant had entered the 
community of fellow signatory states through Britain’s own border, and due to efforts of and 
effective allocation of resources to the UK Border Agency, this border was most difficult to cross 
within Europe.          
 In 2004, the Asylum and Immigration – Treatment of Claimants etc. Act instituted a 
provision that undermined the spirit, if not the letter of Article 31 of the Refugee Convention, which 
explicitly prohibits any signatory state action against claimants who lack proper travel 
documentation upon entry to receiving state territory. This provision stipulated that under the 
condition that an asylum claimant lacked such documentation, the potential asylee would face the 
burden of providing a “reasonable explanation” for the absence of documentation.   
 In spite of the prediction that Chile and the United Kingdom would interpret a relative 
inability to construct meaningful institutions toward the management of cost on issues of 
                                                          
42 The Dublin Accord is discussed in detail with reference to fellow signatory states Greece (in Chapter 3) and Belgium 
(in Chapter 4). 
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Convention compliance due to the strength of markers of structure relating to the perception that 
the median claimant would not be able to access the country’s territory at this node in the decision 
sequence, elites within both states did undertake efforts to implement policy changes. These policy 
changes, however would serve primarily as devices to signal intent without the expectation that 
the full potential cost of this intent would be paid.        
 The resulting cheap talk was implemented to signal willingness to expedite gains toward 
achievement of the normative standard in Chile and to incrementalize gains toward the 
achievement of the normative standard in the United Kingdom. In Chile, the intent to expedite 
progress was signaled to the international community, making use of the moral argument that the 
country owed a debt to the rest of the world. However altruistically intentioned, these institutional 
reforms would be perceived to cost the state very little. During the four years of the Bachelet 
presidency, UNHCR (2011c) reports numbers of people accessing asylum protection within Chile 
at only 338 in 2006, 518 in 2007, 890 in 2008, and 498 in 2009. In the United Kingdom, the intent 
to incrementalize progress toward the normative standard was signaled to members of the domestic 
electorate who had begun to grow more aware of the presence of the outsider within the country’s 
territory. Despite the strength of these signals, the measures implemented would display little 
effect on the actual processing of asylum claims. Because of this, measures implemented would 
also result in little effective cost to the state, as none displayed an effective change to length of 
time to final status determination. Year-over-year asylum claims processing wait times remained 
largely static at a period of around 12 months, although the number of claimants attempting to 
access asylum protection did decrease steadily during the 2001-2004 period. UNHCR (various 
years) reports these figures for 2001 at 147,425; for 2002 at 138,905; for 2003 at 108,347; and for 
2004 at 77,103.          
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5. Selling the Procedures 
During the run-up to the 2009 elections, The Concertación alliance faced trouble on two 
fronts. PS President Bachelet held wide popularity, but was barred for holding consecutive terms 
in office. Concertación endorsed PDC (Christian Democrat) former President Eduardo Frei, whose 
campaign rhetoric focused not on Frei’s former record, but on promises to continue Bachelet’s 
legacy on election. RN candidate Sebastián Piñera had emerged as Frei’s likely contender in the 
event of a runoff election, with the support of Alianza’s successor coalition, the center-right 
Coalition for Change parties, including the RN and IDU. However, due to Bachelet’s continued 
popularity, Piñera’s candidacy focused largely on maintaining much of the then-current 
government policies. While Frei was burdened by a previous and comparatively (to Bachelet’s) 
unpopular 1994-2000 presidency, Piñera faced no similar burden. Piñera spoke out in opposition 
to elements of a conservative UDI platform by advocating for social stances that were perceived 
as highly liberal. These stances included measures to ensure availability of the morning-after 
contraceptive pill and to create inheritance rights for unmarried couples, including same sex 
couples. Piñera also promised to retain many of the Concertación government’s economic policies; 
the greatest divergence between the anticipated candidate and Bachelet on economic issues was 
the increased emphasis on law enforcement and crime prevention (Economist 2009). With regard 
to the parliamentary election, the popular view was that Concertación alliance parties would lose 
several seats. Ultimately, within Chile’s highly depoliticized and disaffected electorate, little 
difference was noted between the two candidates. As this was the case, both anticipated candidates 
for a presidency that held wide powers in terms of setting the legislative agenda were in the process 
of campaigning on the basis of maintaining the most popular elements of the current agenda. 
  With regard to issues of asylum, the advances made by the Bachelet government were not 
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politically salient to the masses as discrete issues; instead, they were popularly seen to form only 
a small part of a highly popular agenda. Because of the perceived irrelevance of political flight and 
asylum in Chile to voters, the audience to whom the advances were framed consisted of observers 
within the international human rights regime and the international press. These advances would be 
largely maintained and strengthened following the 2005 election, to be discussed in a subsequent 
section.             
 In the United Kingdom, issues of asylum remained similarly unimportant to the electorate, 
albeit for different reasons. It was widely perceived that Blair’s Labour government would 
maintain a large portion of its majority in parliament and that Blair would retain the position of 
prime minister. The dialogue concerning issues of asylum had focused almost exclusively on 
securitization and the removal of perceived pull factors, and this dialogue was communicated, by 
contrast, to the domestic electorate. Concrete actions on increased border security and pull-factor 
removal, although aimed specifically at the asylum seeker, were not popularly understood to apply 
strictly to the asylum seeker, as these issues were conceptually applicable to all immigrants. For 
this reason, anti-asylum rhetoric was popularly conflated with competing rhetorics addressing 
British national identity and intra-European immigration. This resulted in an effective lack of need 
to continue selling the asylum dialogue. This lack of need to sell is evidenced by the fact that the 
only legislative action on issues on asylum during the five years to follow was limited to one 2006 
bilateral agreement with Switzerland to repatriate potential asylum seekers to Swiss territory 
(UK/Swiss Bilateral Readmissions Agreement 2006) and the 2007 Border Act, which stipulated 
the ability for denied asylum seekers to continue accessing state-paid welfare provisions. 
 6. Keep the Rule Maker in Office? 
Questions of keeping the rule makers in office become largely irrelevant under the 
condition that the rules themselves have been instituted toward the aim of costless signaling. In 
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Chile, where the audience for this cheap talk was not the domestic audience responsible for electing 
the rule makers, but instead, the international community, issues of asylum became consumed 
under a larger agenda, which both run-off candidates had promised to support following their 
election. In the United Kingdom, where the audience for this cheap talk was the domestic 
electorate, issues of asylum became conflated with issues pertaining to issues of nationality and 
migration in general. This cheap talk itself became increasingly less advantageous to and therefore, 
less used by elites vying to retain popular support. As if following from the prediction that the 
median asylum seeker would not be able to find his way across the UK border, no effort was made 
toward the effective increase or decrease in length of time to final status determination, and as 
expected following from the predictions of Chapter 1 relating to the operationalization of 
compliance, no change in period over which the median claim remained pending can be observed 
following any legislative action on securitization and removal of perceived pull factors.   
 The Chilean legislative and presidential elections were held on December 13, 2009. Due 
to the fact that parliamentary seats are awarded by district, Chile’s Concertación alliance 
government, despite having received a plurality 44.35% share of the overall vote, won a slim 
minority in terms of MPs. Concertación parties suffered a loss of eight seats in the Chamber of 
Deputies, resulting in a total share of 57 in the lower house. Parties aligned with the Alianza 
successor Coalition for Change alliance picked up one seat, resulting in a total share of 58 in the 
lower house. Piñera and Frei emerged as the two highest vote takers in the presidential election 
and faced a run-off election on January 17, 2010. Sebastián Piñera emerged victorious in the run-
off contest, receiving 51.61% of the popular vote. As a result of both elections, Little mandate for 
overall change was observed, and mandate for either the maintenance of or change on issues of 
asylum remained completely outside the public dialogue.      
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 The British general election was held on May 5, 2005. Also due to the effects of district 
voting, despite Labour’s share of only 35.20% of the popular vote compared to Conservative’s 
32.4%, Labour retained a large majority of parliamentary seats. 356 seats were awarded to Labour 
candidates, while only 166 seats were awarded to Conservative candidates. As party leader, Blair 
assumed a second term as Prime Minister. The election resulted in Labour’s loss of 46 
parliamentary seats and Conservative’s gain of 33 seats over the parties’ respective 2001-2005 
shares. Although a mandate for a right shift in government may be observed from this result, 
because of the irrelevance of issues unique to political flight and asylum to the calculation of policy 
preferences within the British electorate, no mandate for change to policies that had focused on 
border security and the removal of pull factors can be interpreted. Furthermore, because these 
specific policies are noted to stem from issues perceived in the literature as important to electorates 
favoring right governments (Weiner 1996), even in the event that issues of asylum had proven 
highly salient, no mandate for change to the 2001-2005 Labour policy would be expected 
following a right shift in government.        
 In the preceding sections, I have led the reader through a second treatment of the Chapter 
2 model with reference to two countries for which the configuration of compliance institutions is 
predicted not to permit an understanding of asylum outcomes as these outcomes relate to length of 
time to the median asylum applicant’s final status determination. In both Chile and the United 
Kingdom, these institutions have been constructed as if following from the understanding that the 
state would not face calls to pay out on the cost of any institution to be constructed. Chile has used 
this opportunity to broadcast costless signals to members of the international community, as issues 
of forced migration were unimportant to a domestic electorate within a country that has not 
received more than 1000 asylum application in any year observed over the course of this study. 
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The United Kingdom has used this opportunity to broadcast costless signals to members of its own 
domestic electorate. These signals, however, proved ultimately unimportant due to the facts that 
the cues on issues of asylum focused on issues that could be applied conceptually to all immigrants, 
and that issues relating to voluntary immigrants were much more salient in the eyes of the British 
public.            
 Through each point in the decision sequence, I have shown how the phenomenon of 
institution as cheap talk was encouraged and the forms that this cheap talk has taken, resulting in 
the costless broadcast of two discrete intentions: to expedite progress toward the normative goal 
in Chile, and to incrementalize progress toward the normative goal in the United Kingdom. These 
goals diverge from the predictions summarized in Chapter 2, Table 4, and this divergence may 
only be understood under the condition that the institutional output itself meets the criteria for use 
of institution as cheap talk. To follow, I discuss developments as they have occurred in both focus 
countries following the second observed election cycle. 
After the Elections: Further Developments in Chile and the United Kingdom  
 Chile. Following the 2009 election, the Coalition for Change government continued the 
reforms initially undertaken at Bachelet’s initiative under the Concertación government. Under 
Piñera, the 1975 Pinochet-era Immigration Act, having been substantially amended during the 
Bachelet presidency, was finally supplanted. The subsection permitting entry to Chilean territory 
as an asylum seeker was replaced and greatly expanded with the 2010 Law for the Protection of 
Refugees. The Law consolidated and formally implemented all relevant refugee and asylum 
international agreements to which Chile was a party, and it also included provisions defining 
protections for victims of gender-based violence and for unaccompanied minors. The Law 
mandated the creation of a five-member administrative committee responsible for oversight of all 
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bureaucratic and judicial procedures resulting from asylum claims and included, and as the first 
instance of any such legislation in South America, a refugee bill of rights. Practically, however, 
Chile continues not to face calls to pay out on full potential cost of the obligations the state has 
assumed. Despite the vast increase in numbers of asylum seekers worldwide and the advances 
made under Piñera and the 2010-2014 Coalition for Change government, Chile has observed a 
sharp decrease in the number of asylum claims initiated. UNHCR (2016) reports these numbers 
for 2011 at 305, for 2012 at 168, and for both 2013 and 2014 (the last year for which data are 
available) at 249. New Majority, the successor coalition to Concertación, regained a parliamentary 
majority and its government assumed office in January 2014; Bachelet was reelected to the 
presidency and assumed office in March 2014. Any possible changes resulting from the return of 
the center-left remain to be measured.       
 United Kingdom. Following the 2005 general election, the Labour government took little 
action on issues relating to asylum. As discussed in the previous section, only two laws were 
enacted, and neither addressed the procedure of an already well-functioning system for processing 
asylum claims. The Labour government was replaced in the 2010 general election by a 
Conservative government, headed by David Cameron. The Guardian (2015) notes that Cameron’s 
Conservative government has resumed the practice of conflating issues of political flight with other 
issues migration and national identity, yet the system for processing claims has remained effective 
and unchanged.            
 Under the Conservative government, however, this rhetoric has become more widely 
accepted in the popular dialogue. In 2015, the UK Refugee Council enumerated and responded to 
counter several myths that had become popularly accepted among British voters with reference to 
the asylum seeker in the United Kingdom. First among these myths was that asylum seekers make 
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up a large proportion of new immigrant arrivals in the UK. In response, the Refugee Council noted 
that between June 2014 and June 15, of the 636,000 people to have arrived in Britain, only 5% had 
attempted to claim standing necessary to access asylum protection. Second among these myths 
was that Britain is Europe’s top recipient of asylum applications. The Refugee Council document 
noted that between January and September 2015, the UK had received only around 3% of all 
asylum applications lodged within EU member states, and that within a single weekend in October 
2015, more asylum seekers had reached Greece than had reached the UK between the beginning 
of January and the end of October 2015 (UK Refugee Council 2015).     
 In part as a result of the pervasive nature and wide acceptance of these myths as true, 
popular demand for the UK to reassert control over its external border rose. This rise culminated 
in the 2016 United Kingdom European Union Membership referendum on June 23, 2016. The 
outcome of the referendum was the non-binding mandate for Britain to exit the EU.  
Conclusion: Polar Ideal Types and the Domestic Politics of Institution as Cheap Talk 
 Powell and Staton (2009) finds that states will perceive that where they will not face calls 
to pay out on the full cost of international treaty compliance, they will ratify or accede to treaties 
for the purpose of costless signaling. Because nothing inherent to the logic of the Powell and Staton 
argument suggests that this condition sufficient to trigger the use of signatory status as cheap talk 
may be conceptually limited to the ratification or accession process, I apply this same logic to the 
passage of state-specific legislative, bureaucratic, and judicial procedures enacted toward the 
domestic implementation of the international treaty. With regard to the Refugee Convention and 
its Protocol, this study holds that under the condition that the median asylum seeker is unlikely to 
be counted among a receiving state’s total of asylum seekers due either to strict measures of border 
control or to geographic isolation relative to net refugee-sending countries, the receiving state will 
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be freed to draft legislation toward the aim of signaling whatever intent will prove popular with 
the audience to which the state intends to broadcast its signal. Under the condition of institution as 
cheap talk, the type of institution in place will be unpredictable on the basis of utilities earned 
toward decisions taken on the “what type of institution should we expect?” dimension of analysis 
presented in Chapter 2.          
 Through the cases of Chile and the United Kingdom, I have demonstrated that the 
institution in place may directly contradict the predictions of the vertical dimension of the Chapter 
2 model, if taken in isolation. Here, the issue of importance is not the elite-domestic interplay 
surrounding the construction of the institution, but the specific state of elite-domestic interplay that 
suggests the type of audience to which the elite focus their costless signaling. In Chile, the audience 
was one of international human rights and media observers. In a domestic environment in which 
the voting public paid little attention to asylum as a discrete issue, the Bachelet and Piñera 
governments were able to trumpet Chile’s status on the international stage as a country highly 
committed to the normative standard set forth within the Refugee Convention, and the governments 
were able to do this without fear of domestic electorate repercussion. In the United Kingdom, the 
audience to whom these signals were broadcast was the domestic electorate. Measures were 
implemented and dialogues were advanced with the aim of making Britain appear to voters as 
more secure and less attractive to the immigrant, yet none of these measures had the effect of 
changing the bureaucratic or procedural processes necessary to claim asylum. In effect, the already 
restrictive level of border security created a condition under which politically important promises 
could be made to the voting public without fear of reprisal from the international community.  
 Through an understanding of these two poles of costless signaling behavior, I suggest that 
further research will be better able to measure and predict state action taken under the condition 
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that the institution itself can be predicted not to matter to Convention compliance outcomes. 
Among states where institution-as-cheap-talk may be implemented, to which audience will the 
state choose to broadcast its signals? Will the greater output of a state’s signaling devices be geared 
toward the broadcast of intent to expedite gains toward the normative standard to the international 
community of human rights observers, or will the greater output of a state’s signaling devices be 
geared toward the broadcast of intent to incrementalize gains toward the normative standard to the 
domestic electorate? 
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CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH                                                                                                                             
  With this work, I have proposed a framework potentially useful to an answer to the question 
– where and how do institutions matter? Taking advantage of the quasi-experimental framework 
that results as democratic states construct varying forms of domestic legislation in implementation 
of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, I have attempted 
to delineate the conditions under which the rules enacted at the domestic level toward full 
compliance should prove predictive of compliance outcomes. Where should the rules in place lend 
insight into the outcomes observed, and where do the rules constitute mere superstructure, having 
been built primarily toward the goal of costless signaling? Then, where these rules should lend 
insight into the state’s compliance outcomes, how do these rules – presented as products of the 
elite quest for electoral survival within individual states – allow us to determine the political 
motivations underlying the construction of these rules, and what do these motivations tell us about 
the types of domestic compliance rules should we expect to observe? 
The Theoretic Model         
 The framework I have presented in Chapter 2 is based on Parsons (2008). I recast each of 
the four methods proposed to expound causation narratives – the psychological, the structural, the 
institutional, and the ideational – within a clear, mutually exclusive context with reference to the 
three elements of the rationality assumption. Building from the Bueno de Mesquita et al  (2003) 
framework that presents regime type as indicative of elements of the psychological as they are 
understood in this work, I hold constant elements of psychology by controlling for regime type. 
This permits a framework in which all decision makers can be observed to choose actions based 
primarily on the motivation to achieve or maintain elected office and policy influence within 
successfully consolidated democracies.        
 I employ factors indicative of hierarchical orderings within the community of states taking 
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decisions as markers of structure. I use these structural markers to calculate estimates of elite 
motivations within the rule-building game – where should elites be expected to forge institutions 
that will display measurable effects on outcomes, and where should elites perceive the opportunity 
to use institutions merely as signaling devices, without expectation that these signals will carry 
real costs to the state? Where costless signaling can occur, the rules drafted should prove 
uninstructive toward an understanding of observed outcomes. Alternatively, where the institution 
should be of use to understand compliance outcomes, two possibilities exist: that the rules will be 
drafted toward the aim of cost acceptance, and the rules should be drafted toward the aim of cost 
evasion.            
 Then, I address two separate goals using markers of ideation. Where the strength of 
structural hierarchies is sufficient to allow the prediction that the rules in place should not be 
important to outcomes, these markers of ideation will serve demonstrate the wide variation in 
outcomes among states to have forge institutions that are quite similar. I demonstrate this outcome 
in Chapter 5 through the cases of Chile and the United Kingdom. Where the strength of these 
hierarchies is insufficient to suggest that the rules will prove epiphenomenal to outcomes, the 
institutions should matter, and these markers of ideation will permit the prediction of the electoral 
motivations to have informed those elites involved in the rule construction game. The motivation 
to accept the full cost of normative compliance is discussed in Chapter 4 through the cases of 
Belgium and South Korea, and the motivation to avoid the full cost of normative compliance is 
discussed in Chapter 3 through the cases of Austria and Greece.   
 Through the application of this model to questions stemming from matters of full 
compliance with the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, I am able to achieve a 
second, equally important goal. Since the mid-1980s, authors have tried to answer questions of 
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asylum outcomes. These questions have been framed, almost exclusively, as questions of why the 
current distribution of asylum seekers is observed in its present configuration. Authors have 
attributed these configurations to matters of push-pull factors, of receiving state wealth, of 
geographic contiguity and distance, and of prior state histories of positive decisions on asylum 
claims. Each of these attributions is centered on a causation narrative that proves highly lacking in 
its predictive capability due to the presence of large numbers of outlier cases that cannot be 
reconciled to the proposed narrative.        
 By placing questions of Refugee Convention compliance within this model, I disaggregate 
the overall question into two separate questions: where should a state’s compliance instruments 
lend insight into the observed configuration of asylum seekers among democratic receiving states, 
and how should a state’s compliance instruments serve the same goal? I have advanced the case 
that the factors that have proven statistically significant toward answers to the current distribution 
of asylum claims have proven so primarily as they have provided answers only to the where 
question – not the how question. I have placed these proposed explanations in a new light by 
casting each answer as a marker of structural hierarchy. Instead of treating each as a discrete 
variable and a potential key to an answer to the overall question, I employ each proposed 
explanation toward the calculation of the state decision maker’s space within the hierarchy of all 
state decision makers. Through this process, I am able to answer the question – where does 
structure play a sufficiently strong role to suggest that any compliance institution to be built will 
assume the role of mere superstructure, and where will the compliance institution itself provide 
the key to answers that have long eluded authors? I then address questions of the degree popular 
nativist sentiment, direction of elite-mass influence, and electoral propaganda and results to 
determine how the compliance institution drawn and maintained within each of the 44 receiving 
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states should lend insight into each state’s observed configuration of compliance instruments, and 
how these instruments themselves should lend insight into the distribution of asylum seekers 
worldwide.  
The Cases: Cost Evasion in Austria and Greece     
 Through examination of Austria and Greece, I lead the reader through the most intuitive of 
possible scenarios – that the rules will be built to matter, and that these rules will carry the effect 
of the avoidance of the full potential cost of Convention compliance to the state. Methods 
employed toward the evasion of the full potential cost of compliance are observed through two 
discrete paths: instrumental action in Austria and instrumental inaction in Greece.   
 In Austria, the procedure for being granted asylum has become increasingly complex, and 
the judicial bar for proving a claim to asylum protection has been raised to a practically 
insurmountable level. At the same time, a procedure to allow for the deportation the denied 
applicant has been encoded, the application of suspensive effect to be applied to negative decisions 
has been relegated to an extra-judicial procedure, and bodies charged with performing 
investigations on asylum claims have become increasingly and frustratingly fractured. These 
developments have unfolded against a backdrop of increasing broadcast of nativist sentiment in 
political advertisement and progressively right moves in mainstream party platforms on issues of 
asylum due to the salience of anti-asylum seeker narratives in the public consciousness. Where the 
issues were important first to the fringe elite, the masses responded; after the masses had become 
invested, the mainline elite took action. The effect was the avoidance of the full potential cost of 
Convention compliance through the incrementalization of progress toward the normative standard.
 In Greece, by contrast, no reframing of the archaic, net-emigration era procedures was 
enacted. The two mainline parties moderated their rhetoric to exclude discussion of any issue that 
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may have been seen as controversial or polarizing, including discussion of any potential solution 
to Greece’s unparalleled problems with undocumented entry to its territory. Leaders within each 
party took no action. Instead, in the race-to-the-center political environment that encompassed the 
entire temporal space under observation, elite rhetoric on the relevant issues took two forms: hold 
the EU responsible for the problems of high levels of undocumented entry, and blame actors within 
the other party for allowing the EU to impose its will on Greece. In this environment, inaction was 
the means that resulted in the incrementalization of progress toward the normative goal, also 
achieving the evasion of the full potential cost of Convention compliance. 
The Cases: Cost Acceptance in Belgium and South Korea   
 Through examination of Belgium and South Korea, I lead the reader through a process that 
results in an outcome that is far less intuitive and also less frequently observed. Here, the rules will 
be built with the understanding that they display measurable effects on outcomes, but instead of 
being built toward the goal of avoiding the full potential cost of Convention compliance, the rules 
are built toward the evasion of overall electoral costs. The minimum cost of Convention 
compliance is greatly exceeded because elected rule makers have been observed to take action as 
if having judged payment of these increased costs as losses necessary to their overall winning 
strategies. This scenario is observed under the condition that the drafters of the relevant institution 
can be shown to have perceived the opportunity to use losses in the rule building game to achieve 
greater gains on issues that are ultimately unrelated to Convention compliance.   
 Means of surpassing the effective cost of full compliance are understood through two 
discrete motivations: to score greater legitimacy abroad as in Belgium, and to score greater support 
at home in South Korea. Following the ECHR ruling on MSS v. Belgium and Greece, leaders 
within Belgium perceived that the harsh tone taken against the state had been noted and met with 
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immediate policy action throughout Western Europe. States actively worked to avoid the fate that 
Belgium had suffered merely as a result of its literal interpretation of the role it was to assume 
under the terms of the Dublin Accord. As the country was seat of the European Union and home 
to a large share of nongovernmental human rights organizations, elites within Belgium are 
observed to have taken action as if having reacting to this injury to its reputation. Almost 
immediately, elements of the Swedish legislation (which had been long viewed as the exemplar of 
generosity in asylum provision) pertaining to the reception and processing of asylum seekers were 
encoded into its domestic law by the elected rule makers, with little debate or vocal opposition.  
 In South Korea, growing concerns over the control of its borders and the presence and 
participation of large numbers of undocumented immigrants led to a novel solution. By increasing 
the incentives to apply for asylum, and by granting levels of benefits unparalleled within Asia (and 
indeed, within most of the world outside of the Nordic countries and Belgium) elected rule makers 
were able to trumpet their prediction of an end to mass concerns over the presence of the unknown 
immigrant among them. By incentivizing the asylum application process, fewer undocumented 
immigrants would be counted among the country’s population precisely because a high number of 
these immigrants would be expected to take advantage of the opportunity to normalize their status 
in South Korea by initiating individual asylum claims. This reform was also uncontroversial, with 
wide support from members of parties holding more than 250 of parliament’s 299 seats.  
The Cases: Signals Without Cost in Chile and The United Kingdom  
 Through the cases of Chile and the United Kingdom, I examine the condition under which 
the rules themselves should not matter greatly to compliance outcomes. Discussion of the domestic 
politics of electoral survival is implemented here, not toward the determination of the type of rule 
that we should expect to find in place, but toward an understanding of the fact that under the 
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condition of institution-as-cheap-talk, highly divergent outcomes may result from institutional 
rules that share marked similarities.        
 Due to its near geographic isolation relative to potential refugee sending states, Chile is 
observed to have taken calculations as if under the assumption that the state would never face calls 
to pay out on any generosity in provisions that may result from its rule-building process. Its 
provisions, including the first initiative taken by a South American state to resettle refugees and 
the continent’s first comprehensive framework for defining asylum seeker reception, processing, 
and adjudication, have set the South American standard for action on forced migration. This 
standard was only later to be matched with similar actions by Brazil and Uruguay. At the same 
time, it must be recognized that the number of people to whom these provisions may be extended 
is greatly moderated by the fact that urban centers in Chile are difficult to reach except by air travel 
or by travel of great distance through Peru. This is important because although Peru does not 
guarantee nearly as many protections to potential or approved claimants, the state does offer one 
benefit that remains unmatched in South America – the highest number of positive decisions on 
affirmative asylum claims. By December 2009, Chile’s backlog of pending asylum claims had 
dropped by over 49% from its January total, leaving fewer than 1/3 of the claims initiated in late-
2008 and all of 2009 undecided at the beginning of 2010, and resulting in a median-applicant wait 
time to final status determination of less than one year.       
 Over the same period of time in the United Kingdom, the backlog was also reduced as a 
percentage of overall claimants awaiting final status determination, albeit by less than 9%. This 
also resulted in a median-applicant wait time to final status determination of less than one year. 
However, while this figure accounts for cases involving fewer than 500 claimants in Chile, the UK 
figure accounts for cases involving 12,400 claimants. Here, instead of acting under the impetus to 
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liberalize asylum laws as a form of costless signaling to outside observers, the UK acted under the 
impetus to tighten and restrict asylum access as a form of costless signaling to a domestic electorate 
that was growing weary of the ever-expanding presence of the outsider within its borders. These 
acts were largely limited to mere rhetoric at the expense of concrete policy, as during the period 
of time that the rules governing asylum were being legislated, the majority of the British electorate 
was far more concerned with questions of European migration than questions of non-European 
migration. A greater score was to be made by conflating varied issues of immigration into a single 
series of talking points, as opposed to the construction of rules that would address the presence of 
the asylum seeker. 
Purgatory, Protest, or Paralysis:                                 
Legacies of Contestation, Path Dependent Institutions, and the Current Refugee Crisis 
 
Institutional setups are products of time. The analysis I have conducted considers 
compliance institutions with reference to the specific debates that were important to elite electoral 
survival during the time the rules were being debated, encoded, enforced, and maintained. Future 
work will examine the question of path dependencies as they relate to these compliance 
institutions. How will these rules – the legacies of time-specific debates – continue to influence 
compliance outcomes after the domestic debates have changed with the further passage of time? I 
suggest that the three paths outlined in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 – cost evasion, cost acceptance, and 
institution-as-cheap-talk – will lend themselves to three discrete types of outcomes going forward. 
 For countries that have engaged in instrumental cost evasion, the institutions constructed, 
maintained, and enforced have led to outcomes in which the median applicant awaiting final status 
determination has become trapped within legal and bureaucratic mechanisms that can’t be easily 
remedied due both to their complexity and to the number of people whose source of income 
depends on their continued roles within these mechanisms. For applicants having run to escape 
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life-threatening conditions, this presents one type of tragedy – a state of purgatory. In this 
purgatory, the potential asylee is temporarily safe from persecution at the hands of the sending 
state, and has no real option other than to hope that this refuge will continue indefinitely. But any 
guarantee of this refuge is long awaited, and the idea that the claimant will never receive permanent 
recognition is always within the realm of possibility.      
 For countries that have engaged in instrumental cost acceptance, the potential tragedy is of 
a different type. Here, where the state has enacted policies that have greatly exceeded the minimum 
cost of compliance, there exists the strongest potential for protest by the non-refugee population, 
who may question why state resources are being extended to the outsider living within the 
country’s territory, to the possible exclusion of resources to be extended to the native born 
population? This outcome has been observed with the rise of nativist parties in the three European 
countries (Belgium, Norway, and Sweden) to have fallen most strongly under this prediction, and 
anti-immigrant sentiment can only be expected to rise as a result of the current refugee crisis in 
Europe and the continued provision of benefits that exceed the minimum required for full 
compliance.            
 For countries that have engaged in rule construction as cheap talk, the tragedy is of a third 
type. Here, the domestic institutions are poorly suited to deal with increases in the population of 
potential claimants precisely because they were constructed under the assumption that the states 
would never be forced to pay out on their promises. This presents a sort of paralysis for the state 
as forced migration numbers increase. Under the condition that the state finally becomes forced to 
pay out, its own institutions are ill-equipped to manage a situation that was far from the minds of 
those who had been charged with writing the rules of the game. Especially within Europe, the state 
cannot move slowly because asylum applicants are entering the country’s territory in large, 
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unprecedented numbers. At the same time, the state cannot move quickly, as human rights 
observers across the world are acutely aware and understandably cautious following the many 
deaths suffered by Latin American deportees that resulted from the Obama administration’s rush 
to ameliorate the judicial processes surrounding asylum in the US without having taken the 
necessary steps to speed the concomitant bureaucratic processes. State policy response will 
become effectively stalled due to the conflict between the pressure from electorates to take extreme 
measures to correct shortfalls and pressure from the international community to exercise only 
cautious movement toward the normative goal. I suggest that this situation will present the greatest 
problem in the UK. Following the vote to leave the European Union due largely to electorate 
perception that the state should assert control over its own borders, the UK will be left to address 
the shortfalls that have resulted from the construction of its own compliance instruments as mere 
cheap talk at the same time that it must further consolidate its own external border. 
 Future work will address these legacies and their outcomes – both as they affect domestic 
legal, judicial, and bureaucratic processes, and as they affect the lives of those who have been 
forced to flee and have found themselves as unwitting heirs to these legacies of time-specific 
political debates.   
Further Research Directions                                                                   
Polar Ideal Types: Filling In the Blanks  
With each of the case study chapters, I have identified two ideal-typical poles of state 
behavior toward the construction and maintenance of compliance instruments. Further work will 
benefit from the ability to analyze receiving state-specific behavior as it conforms more or less 
strongly to one of these two poles of action.        
 Cost avoidance is understood through the instrumental incrementalization of progress 
toward the normative standard. If a state behaves in such a manner as to permit the prediction of 
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cost avoidance, how will the state incrementalize its progress? The processes of instrumental 
action and instrumental inaction, typified by Austria and Greece, respectively, are potentially 
useful to an answer to this question. Cost acceptance is understood through the instrumental 
expediting of progress toward the normative standard. If a state behaves so as to permit the 
prediction of cost acceptance, what motivation informs the expedition of its progress? Completely 
unaddressed with this work is the question of the manner in which the state-level motivation – 
either as a response to pressure from outside observers as in Belgium or as a response to pressure 
from domestic electorates as in South Korea – will be useful to an understanding of the ideal typical 
form that its cost-acceptant action will take? Further work will benefit from the opportunity to 
examine this question in much greater detail. Finally, a state may use the rule-building game to 
signal its responsiveness toward calls either to incrementalize progress as in the UK or to expedite 
progress as in Chile under the calculation that the actual institutional output will display no 
measurable effects on compliance outcomes. If the institution is not going to matter, how does the 
freedom to make sweeping promises with regard to the institution interact with a country’s own 
domestic political environment to permit prediction of the type of institution and/or outcome we 
should expect to observe?  
Further Research Directions                                                                   
Expanding the Temporal and Spatial Frames: New Data, New Predictions  
 
The model I develop in Chapter 2 and explicate further with reference to six focus countries 
considers only the two most recent pre-2010 election cycles within each of the 44 countries I 
observe. However, nothing inherent to the logic of this model suggests that the scope of its 
predictive capability is limited to two election cycles or only to the 44 states observed. I suggest 
that future work will be able to apply this model more broadly, to incorporate examination of the 
interplay between structural hierarchies as they change over time and a temporal space that 
206 
 
 
 
incorporates both previous and subsequent election cycles within all states. This will permit 
analysis of the movement of states from their fixed positions as conditions change over time, 
allowing for further predictions to be made with regard to the domestic institution – where and 
how did it matter 20 years ago, and where and how will it matter in 20 years from now. Questions 
of this type will become increasingly important in light of the post-Arab Spring developments with 
regard to the movement of unprecedented numbers of people taking political flight, with particular 
reference to those seeking humanitarian protection within Europe.     
 Additionally, nothing inherent to the logic of the model suggests that it cannot be applied 
to smaller states (e.g., Malta), to states where the adjudication process was not accessible from 
within the country’s borders (e.g., Germany), or to states that are observed to be democratic, but 
had not experienced recent party turnover preceding the short temporal frame observed (e.g., 
Japan). These additional controls for elements of psychology were introduced to the current study 
merely to suggest a minimum standard of similarity among country cases observed and to limit 
the selection of cases to a more manageable number. However, with the construction of a broader 
dataset to include estimates of revealed preference utilities on all measures, the inclusion of these 
and many other states can only broaden the scope and strengthen the predictive capability of the 
model.    
Further Research Directions                                    
Where and How Do the Rules Matter? Possible Applications to Other Questions 
On more of a meta-theoretic level, I propose that the framework I develop with reference 
to the elements of the rationality assumption and the resulting model I test with reference to 
compliance with the Refugee Convention and its Protocol are both potentially useful toward 
answers to other, completely unrelated questions of comparative politics. First, by reconfiguring 
the Parsons framework to place each mode of explaining observed relationships between 
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independent and dependent variables within a clear, mutually exclusive context, I have 
demonstrated that elements of psychology, structure, institution, and ideation may be placed in 
dialogue with each other and ultimately tested against each other toward answers to questions of 
where and how institutions influence outcomes. Second, with the model I develop, I have 
demonstrated that performing this type of test can lend new insight into debates, the ultimate 
answers to which possibly having long eluded researchers. In the attempt to identify a single input 
variable as the key to understanding causation, many authors have been left with results that have 
served as the basis for the backformation of causal arguments that ultimately lack explanatory 
power due to the number of outlier cases that the author’s causation narrative is unable to explain. 
 Further work will benefit from the opportunity to apply this framework to test elements of 
the structural against elements of the institutional, and to construct tests not only on questions of 
normative compliance following various UN mandates, but on a broad array of questions for which 
competing forms of causal explanations exist. Are structural narratives or institutional narratives 
more accurately predictive of such factors as regime type, level of economic development, 
likelihood of democratic consolidation, party formation and success, policy outcomes, etc., or does 
the possibility exist that we may identify specific conditions under which markers of structure may 
be more accurately predictive of outcomes within certain observed cases, while markers of 
institution may be more accurately predictive of outcomes within others? 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Elections and Parties Observed   
 
Australia  
Election Years: 2004, 2007  
Parties: Liberal Party of Australia, National Party of Australia, Country Liberal Party,  
One Nation Party   
Austria  
  Election Years: 2006, 2008  
  Parties: Freedom Party of Austria, Alliance for the Future of Austria  
Belgium  
  Election Years: 2003, 2007  
Parties: Vlaams Blok (Flemish), National Front (Walloon)   
Brazil  
 Election Years: 2002, 2006  
Parties: Liberal Front Party, Progressive Party, Party of the Reconstruction of the  
National Order, Republic Party    
Bulgaria  
  Election Years: 2005, 2009   
Parties: Bulgarian National Patriotic Party, Citizens for European Development of  
Bulgaria, Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria, National Movement for the Salvation of the  
Fatherland, National Union Attack, Union of the Patriotic Forces and Militaries of the  
Reserve Defense     
Canada  
  Election Years: 2006, 2008  
  Parties: Conservative   
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Chile  
Election Years: 2005, 2009  
  Parties: Independent Democrat Union, National Renewal   
Costa Rica  
  Election Years: 2002, 2006  
  Parties: Homeland First, Libertarian Movement Party, National Rescue Party   
Czech Republic:  
  Election Years: 2002, 2006  
  Parties: Civic Democrats, Social Democrats    
Denmark  
  Election Years: 2005, 2007  
  Parties: Venstre, Danish People’s Party, Conservative People’s Party   
Dominican Republic  
  Election Years: 2002, 2006  
Parties: Dominican Revolutionary Party, National Unity Party, Social Christian  
Reformist Party   
El Salvador  
  Election Years: 2003, 2009  
  Parties: Nationalist Republican Alliance   
Estonia:  
  Election Years: 2003, 2007  
Parties:  Estonian Independence, Estonian Reform Party, Party of the Fatherland Union,  
Union for the Republic, Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica   
Finland  
Election Years: 2003, 2007  
  Parties: National Coalition Party, True Finns      
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France  
  Election Years: 2002, 2007  
Parties: Movement for France, Liberal Democracy, National Front, Rally for France,  
Union for a Popular Movement, Union for French Democracy   
Greece  
  Election Years: 2007, 2009  
  Parties: New Democracy   
Ireland  
  Election Years: 2002, 2007  
Parties: Fianna Fail, Progressive Democrats   
Israel  
  Election Years: 2006, 2009  
  Parties: Likud     
Italy  
  Election Years: 2006, 2008  
  Parties: National Alliance, Social Alternative, Fiamma Tricolore   
Jamaica  
  Election Years: 2002, 2007  
  Parties: Jamaica Labour Party   
Latvia  
  Election Years: 2006, 2010  
  Parties: Civic Union, New Era, Party for Fatherland and Freedom, People’s Party,  
Society for Other Politics    
Lithuania  
  Election Years: 2004, 2008  
  Parties: Homeland Union, National Resurrection, Order and Justice   
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Mexico  
  Election Years: 2006, 2009  
  Parties: National Action Party     
Netherlands  
  Election Years: 2003, 2006  
Parties: People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, Party for Freedom, Proud of the  
Netherlands   
New Zealand  
  Election Years: 2005, 2008  
  Parties: New Zealand Frist, New Zealand National Party   
Norway  
  Election Years: 2005, 2009  
  Parties: Progress Party, Conservative Party   
Peru  
  Election Years: 2001, 2006  
Parties: Alliance for the Future, Let’s Go Neighbor, Peru 2000, Peru Possible, National  
Unity   
Poland  
  Election Years: 2005, 2007  
  Parties: Civic Platform, Law and Justice    
Portugal  
  Election Years: 2005, 2009  
  Parties: New Democracy, Social Democratic   
Romania  
  Election Years: 2004, 2008  
  Parties: Democratic Liberal Party, Greater Romania, National Liberals   
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Slovakia  
  Election Years: 2002, 2009  
Parties: Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, Slovak Democratic and Christian Union,  
Slovak National Party   
Slovenia  
  Election Years: 2004, 2008  
  Parties: Slovenian Democrats, Slovenian National Party, Slovenian People’s Party   
South Africa  
  Election Years: 2004, 2009  
  Parties: Congress of the People, Inkatha Freedom, Freedom Front Plus     
South Korea  
Election Years: 2004, 2008  
Parties: Future Hope Alliance, Grand National Party, Liberty Forward, Pro-Park  
Coalition   
Spain  
  Election Years: 2004, 2008  
  Parties: Convergence and Union, People’s Party,   
Sweden  
  Election Years: 2003, 2007  
  Parties: Christian Democrats, Liberal People’s Party, Moderate Party, Sweden Democrats   
Switzerland  
  Election Years: 2002, 2006  
Parties: Christian Social Party, Federal Democratic Union, Swiss People’s Party, Swiss  
Democrats   
Trinidad and Tobago  
  Election Years: 2002, 2005  
Coalition: People’s Partnership – Left coalition containing the major nativist party,  
National Joint Action   
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United Kingdom  
  Election Years: 2001, 2005  
  Parties: Conservatives   
United States  
  Election Years: 2006, 2008  
  Parties: Republican   
Uruguay  
  Election Years: 2004, 2009  
  Parties: Civic Union, National Party 
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APPENDIX B 
Calculation and Use of Bureaucracy Measure 
The figure in Table 11 figure is a compound measure calculated in the following manner. 
Log (percentage of highest total figure observed as the product of three input factors below): 
1. percentage of vote share earned by parties observed in Appendix A 
2. percentage of public working in government 
3. dichotomous measure indicating either successfully consolidated bureaucracy (per 
International Labour Organization [2010]) or shared land border with a country 
hosting a successfully consolidated bureaucracy (per Gunther, Puhle, and Nikiforos 
[1995]). 
For the following states (all of which taking action under the condition of bottom-up direction of 
influence), this third input factor takes a score of 1.0: 
Australia 
Belgium 
Brazil 
Canada 
Costa Rica 
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Ireland 
 
Israel 
Jamaica 
Lithuania 
Mexico 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
South Korea 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
 
 
For the remaining states taking action under the condition of bottom-up influence, this third input 
factor takes a score of 0.5: 
Bulgaria 
Chile 
Dominican Republic 
El Salvador 
Greece 
Peru 
 
South Africa 
Trinidad and Tobago 
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Where the product of the second and third input factors falls below the mean value for all states, I 
terminate the decision sequence, and no utility estimates are reported on further questions. This 
results in the termination of the sequence in some state instances for which the report of overall 
measures exceeds the mean total figure, and the continuation of the sequence in some state 
instances for which the report of overall measures fall below the mean total figure. 
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I create a revealed preference decision model using markers of structural and ideational 
input factors informing the writing, passage, funding, and enforcement of domestic legislation in 
implementation of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol within 44 democratic states. Where are domestic rules responsible for observed displays 
of compliance, and where are outcomes attributable to structural factors that render the domestic 
rule-making process effectively irrelevant? Where the outcome of the rule-making process is 
predicted to matter, elites may use the content of these rules toward the goal of continued policy 
influence and electoral survival. Under this condition, I identify two discrete motivations as 
observable from state action: to avoid the full potential cost of Convention compliance, and to 
accept or exceed its full potential cost. Toward each of these aims, I identify two ideal-typical 
modes of elite response. Toward the goal of cost avoidance, elite behavior takes form along the 
polar continuum between instrumental action and instrumental inaction; toward the goal of cost 
acceptance, elite behavior takes form along the polar continuum between the instrumental uses of 
calls to increase cost originating from the international community and from the domestic 
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electorate. By contrast, where the outcome of the rule-making process is predicted not to matter 
strongly to outcomes, elites will perceive the freedom to construct rules under the expectation that 
the states they represent will not be forced to pay out on the cost of any promises to be read from 
the domestic legislation. Resulting rules may then assume the function of costless signaling 
devices. I identify two ideal typical modes of elite behavior toward the use of institution as cheap 
talk: the broadcast of promises to commit greater levels of resources toward Convention 
compliance, and the broadcast of promises to curtail costs to be assumed toward Convention 
compliance. I develop exemplary-case country narratives explicating state action toward each of 
the six ideal typical compliance and implementation patterns observed within democratic 
destination states worldwide. I apply these answers to one of the primary questions of comparative 
politics – where and how do institutions matter? 
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